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I reckon I got to light out for the Territory ahead of the rest, be-
cause Aunt Sally she's going to adopt me and sivilize me and I can't
stand it. I been there before.'
'Way back in 1980, three presidents and three grandchildren ago,
I was invited-along with many others concerned with contract law-
to contribute a short piece to the Columbia Law Review's symposium
on the then-recently-promulgated Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts.' Choosing as my topic the general area of promissory estoppel,
I attempted to identify and describe the various ways in which the
new Restatement went beyond that doctrine's original formulation to
elaborate on and widen the role which reliance-protection could per-
form in the general area of promissory obligation.3 While I dutifully
tried to point out as many shortcomings in the enterprise as I could
find, in order to renew my scholar's license for the new decade, the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law; Max E. Greenberg
Professor Emeritus of Contract Law, New York University School of Law. This article
grew out of a presentation made while I was a Visiting Professor at Hastings in the fall of
1996, and was completed during my final year at N.Y.U. I am grateful to my Contracts
colleagues at those schools and to my casebook co-authors Nathan Crystal and H.G.
Prince for their encouragement and advice. I also owe a debt of gratitude for financial
support received from the Filomen D'Agostino Greenberg and Max E. Greenberg Re-
search Fund of New York University School of Law. And finally, I owe an unrepayable
debt to Daniel Laguardia, N.Y.U. J.D. Class of 1998, without whose unrelenting assistance
this article would have been probably shorter, but surely poorer. Errors remaining can be
blamed on nobody else but me.
1. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 366 (Oxford ed. 1996).
2. The full symposium can be found at Symposium on the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1981).
3. See Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1981) [hereinafter Proliferation].
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overall thrust of that piece was clearly that Promissory Estoppel, like
Love, is Here to Stay and a Good Thing, Too. Indeed, perhaps swept
away with my own enthusiasm, I proposed at one point that promis-
sory estoppel had become "perhaps the most radical and expansive
development of this century in the law of promissory liability., 4 At
the time, this hyperbolic endorsement seemed perhaps appropriate
but certainly unnecessary; with or without my help, promissory es-
toppel was doing just fine, thank you, and showed every indication of
continuing to do so.
As the last sands of this century slip ever more rapidly through
the glass, a reassessment appears to be in order. With hindsight, 1980
may have been the high-water mark for promissory estoppel, at least
in the eyes of many commentators. Since that time, a succession of
articles has called into question virtually every aspect of that doctrine:
its essential nature, its utility, even its viability as a part of the living
law of contract. This article is my attempt to survey some of the his-
tory of promissory estoppel, old and new, and to offer some thoughts
of my own on whether and why it should remain on the sled as we
mush toward the millennium.
In the discussion below I will first offer my own version of the
obligatory thumbnail sketch of the development of promissory estop-
pel over the last century. (Most of this is familiar stuff to contracts
teachers and students, but a brief refresher may not hurt.) I will then
describe and respond to some of the commentary that has appeared
since 1980, commentary which variously discusses, deconstructs, and,
in some cases, denigrates and dispatches promissory estoppel as pre-
viously understood. I will then offer some thoughts of my own about
the importance-both practical and symbolic-of promissory estop-
pel as a part of our vision of contract law.
IL Historical Development
It has become commonplace to speak of American contract law
as having a "classical" period and a "modern" one-the sort of over-
simplification that blurs a lot of detail, but can nevertheless be helpful
in contrasting what seem to be the most salient characteristics of dif-
ferent times. Given the way the world has turned since the Restate-
ment (Second) was adopted, we appear to have passed beyond what
4. Id. at 53. This language has been frequently quoted, probably because of its
"sound-bite" size and flavor. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis
of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
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was then the "modern" era, on to something else. The essential na-
ture of that something else is, as yet, still unclear. For the purpose of
this discussion, I will therefore divide the recent history of contract
law into three parts: the classical period (roughly 1880-1930); the
modem period (1930-1980); and-for want of a more descriptive la-
bel-the postmodern6 period (1980 to the present).
A. The Classical Period
In his widely-noted discourse on The Death of Contract,7 Grant
Gilmore attributed the essential shape of classical contract law to
three Harvard law professors: Langdell, Holmes and Williston. By
1880, the first two members of Gilmore's triumvirate of classical ar-
chitects were already busily sketching the outlines of what would be-
come the generally accepted structure of American contract law.
Christopher Columbus Langdell had for ten years been Dean of the
Harvard Law School and had already published his casebook on Con-
tracts! By 1880 he had produced the casebook's second edition, with
an appended summary of the law of contracts, 9 thereby solidifying his
claim to be seen as the father of both systematized contract law and
the case-method of law study." At the same time, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Boston Brahmin, Civil War veteran and Olympian-to-be,1'
was preparing to deliver his 1881 lectures on the Common Law.
These lectures-whatever their historical foundations, or lack
thereof-would reshape our law of both tort and contract.12 By 1930,
half a century later, Gilmore's third musketeer, Samuel Williston, had
6. Postmodernism, defined as "'a movement or style ... characterized by a depar-
ture from or rejection of 20th century modernism (including modem or abstract art, avant-
garde writing, functional architecture, etc.) and represented typically by works incorpo-
rating a variety of classical or historical styles and techniques,'" William Safire, Post-
Modernism Out, Neopuritanism In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1989, § 6, at 10, (quoting
CLARANCE L. BARNHART ET AL., THE SECOND BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEW
ENGLISH (1980)), has been taken by the public "to mean 'the latest thing, more modem
than modem."' Id Both definitions could be employed in this case.
7. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
8. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS: WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (1871).
9. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879).
10. And earning the gratitude of generations of law students yet unborn.
11. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944). For slightly less adulatory biography see, LIVA
BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL (1991), or SHELDON M. NOVICK,
HONORABLE JUSTICE (1989).
12. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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produced his encyclopedic treatise on the common law of contract'
and was shepherding into existence the Restatement of Contracts," a
work which would mark both the dawn of the age of Restatements
and the apogee of the classical contract rule-system.
(1) Consideration-The Ascendance of Bargain Theory
One of the principal tenets of this new systematized contract
structure was its reconsideration of consideration itself, the gate-
keeper of contractual liability. 5 By the late nineteenth century, it had
become conventional in English and American law to refer to "con-
sideration" as the factor necessary to make a promise enforceable.
As the test for that requirement, one would look for either a "bene-
fit" or a "detriment"-a benefit received by the promisor, or some
loss or injury suffered by the promisee in connection with the prom-
ise.16 In Holmes's view, however, the requirement of consideration
could be better understood when seen as one element of an exchange
transaction. The promise was supported by consideration, and was
qualified for enforcement, when the promisor had received something
in exchange for her promise, or the promisee had given something for
it. That something might have been an actual performance, or merely
the promise of one, but in either case it had to be regarded by the par-
ties as the exchange which induced the making of the promise, both
ostensibly and (at least in part) actually.17
Deceptively similar to the doctrine it replaced-so similar, in
fact, that even modern courts are apt to invoke both formulations
when a consideration issue arises (and probably with similar re-
sults)'-the bargain theory was in several respects more notable for
what it excluded than for what it included. By insisting that the "det-
riment" suffered by the promisee be given in exchange for the prom-
ise, the new dispensation effectively ignored the possibility of the
promisee's substantial change of position in reliance on the promise,
not bargained for as the price of the promise, but substantial and det-
rimental nevertheless. And by concentrating on the exchange trans-
13. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(FIRST)].
15. See generally Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire The GateKeeper? An Examina-
tion of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1993) (discussing
the decline of the theory that consideration is necessary to enforcement).
16. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.6 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS].
17. See GILMORE, supra note 7, at 19-21 (discussing and quoting OLIVER HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 227-30 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1963) (1881)).
18. See, e.g., Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., 561 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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action as the raison d'etre of contract, the bargain theory marginalized
many significant promissory transactions in other areas, such as intra-
family promises or promises made to charitable institutions. Such
promises could probably be more accurately characterized as "gifts"
than as "bargains," even though they were likely in many cases to
have been made out a complex of motives including more than pure
altruism.9 On the other hand, by stressing the law's willingness to en-
force bargains per se, whatever their terms, Holmesian contract doc-
trine moved away from earlier equitable notions of "just price" or
"unconscionability" toward the proposition that virtually any ex-
change-based bargain, no matter how lop-sided, could and probably
would be upheld as consideration-supported. The result was a doc-
trine of consideration well adapted to free-market transactions among
well-counseled bargainers, and not much else.
Once elaborated, this new view of consideration proved re-
markably prolific. Its offspring included an insistence on the free
revocability of offers (regardless of the offeror's assurances to the
contrary, unless consideration had been given for the formation of an
option contract),2' the "pre-existing duty rule" (potentially invalidat-
ing many settlement agreements), and its corollary, the "one-sided
modification" rule (requiring fresh consideration on both sides for
any change in the obligations imposed by an already-existing con-
tract).' Despite the logical strength of the case for these various
propositions as deductions from the basic consideration principle,
collectively they added up to a rather substantial constraint on the
freedom of bargainers to make or remake their agreements. By the
time the Restatement (First) adopted Holmes's bargain theory across
the board (in the form of section 75, plus related sections), there had
been numerous calls from commentators for amelioration of at least
some of consideration's ramifications, if not for wholesale abrogation
of the doctrine itself.4 But Williston remained steadfast, and at the
19. By the same token, the ostensibly bargained-for promise might be made, at least
in part, for motives other than a desire to receive the promised exchange, as Oliver
Holmes himself recognized by stressing the "conventional" nature of the reciprocal in-
ducement involved. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263,275 (1996).
20. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1869 (1977). For a criticism of Horwitz's analysis, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz The-
sis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 533 (1979).
21. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 47.
22- RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 76(a) ("An act or forbearance required by a legal duty
is not consideration.").
23. See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
24. See, e.g. Corbin's critique of consideration as related by GILMORE, supra note 7,
at 63; 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471 (1926); Ernest G.
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apogee of the classical era, bargained-for exchange held the high
ground of contract law.
(2) The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel
During much of this period, even as the doctrinal stones were
being laid for the ramparts of contract's new citadel, the winds of
change were blowing outside. Doctrinal refinements notwithstand-
ing, cases continued to appear in which seriously made promises had
engendered unbargained for, but substantially detrimental, changes
of position on the part of trusting promisees. Some of these cases in-
volved intra-family promises, such as promises to make a marriage
settlement, to convey land or pay money; some were charitable sub-
scriptions, later revoked by the promisor or her survivors; some were
made in a business context, but not explicitly in exchange for any
"price," performed or promised.5 Faced with transactions that failed
to conform to the new "bargain" paradigm, some courts, with evident
effort, forced these cases into the bargain mold;"' others simply gave
up, and fell in line with the new orthodoxy.' A substantial number,
however, found ways to justify the enforcement of promises in such
circumstances. Some courts explained their decisions in terms of "es-
toppel": "estoppel in pais," "equitable estoppel," or just plain "es-
toppel"-and, eventually, "promissory estoppel," to distinguish these
broken-promise cases from others involving reliance on statements of
fact.' By thus building on existing terminology, these courts were
able to persuade themselves, perhaps, that they were merely doing
what courts had always done. (And indeed that may have been the
case, if the bargain theory of consideration with its disregard of reli-
ance was truly a latter-day invention of Holmes and his cohorts, as
Gilmore's story runs.29)
By the time the first Restatement of Contracts was being drafted,
it was possible to stitch those various scraps of case law into a patch-
Lorensen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919). See
also K.N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 777 (1941) ("What is known or believed about consideration... I take to be in the
realm of what we call today philosophy, as distinct from science."); Lord Wright, Ought
the Doctrine of Consideration be Abolished from the Common Law?, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1225 (1936).
25. For a discussion of these cases, see Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Re-
quirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950).
26. See, e.g., Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
27. See Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W. 2d 661 (Minn. 1960).
28. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
29. See GILMORE, supra note 7, at 20-21; see also Holmes, supra note 19, at 271-76.
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work quilt, and to see in that quilt a recurring pattern of enforcement
based on discernible injury to the promisee, resulting from actions
taken on the strength of a reasonable expectation of performance by
the promisor. Whether Gilmore's dramatic account of the role
played by Arthur Corbin in promissory estoppel's genesis is literally
true or not,3° we can see in Restatement (First) section 90 an attempt
to draw from the case law a principle that could be stated abstractly
(and illustrated abstractly, in the Restatement's conventional "A
promises B" fashion) as a separate basis for promise enforcement,
distinct from the bargain theory of consideration stated in section 75.
Section 90 of the Restatement (First) was captioned "Promise
Reasonably Inducing Definite and Substantial Action.",3' That title
not only accurately labeled the rule that followed, it virtually stated it
in full. Besides repeating the caption's ingredients of "a promise"
which does in fact "induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character" which the promisor should "reasonably ex-
pect," the text of the section itself added only one more element: it
must appear that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise."'3
So stated--or "restated"-the new principle of "promissory es-
toppel" was available to any court disposed to utilize it. If Corbin was
right about its case-law foundations, the new rule should have found
wide employment in the courts, and with time it did.33 But Grant
Gilmore, looking back across nearly half a century, viewed the Re-
statement (First's) adoption of the reliance principle as more than just
another addition to the judicial tool kit, a more efficient device for
doing what the courts were generally getting done anyway. In the
"schizophrenia" of sections 75 and 90 Gilmore saw a fundamental
contradiction that would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the
classical system. "We have become accustomed to the idea," he as-
serted,
without in the least understanding it [a characteristic Gilmorean
aside], that the universe includes both matter and anti-matter. Per-
30. See GILMORE, supra note 7, at 62-65. Despite the appeal of this story, commenta-
tors have cast doubt on its authenticity. See, e.g., Sidney W. DeLong, The New Require-
ment of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppek Section 90 as Catch-
22,1997 Wis. L. REv. 943, 962 n.55.
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 90.
32. Id.
33. See Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doc-
trine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 352 n.37 (1969) (claiming that in 100 decisions in the preceding 10
years, promissory estoppel had replaced applicable bargain exchange theories). For an in
depth analysis of the gradual adoption of promissory estoppel by the fifty states, see
Holmes, supra note 19.
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haps what we have here is Restatement and anti-Restatement or
Contract and anti-Contract.... The one thing that is clear is that
these two contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably to-
gether: in the end one must swallow the other up.34
B. The Modern Period
The world in 1930 stood poised on the brink of immense change.
The Twenties had roared through, leaving a post-Prohibition hango-
ver in their wake; the 1929 market collapse had presaged the Great
Depression of the Thirties, which in turn would inspire the New Deal;
the seedlings of World War II were germinating in the soil of Ver-
sailles. Not surprisingly, change was stirring in the academic/legal
community as well. Even as the courts were poised to embrace the
new wave of Restatements, Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn and other
Legal Realists were arguing persuasively that law was to be found not
in rule books or syllogisms but in the hearts and minds of legisla-
tor/judges, conscious of their institutional responsibility to shape law
as an instrument of social welfare.35 Llewellyn's vision was eventually
to bring forth Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
U.C.C.], whose spirit had, by 1980, infused the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, the embodiment of "modern" contract law.
During this period, the star of promissory estoppel continued to
ascend. Originally seen as particularly suited for use in non-
commercial settings, such as situations involving intra-family promises
and charitable subscriptions, its application was eventually ex-
tended-over some strong objections3 -into commercial settings as
well. There, it was employed to compensate those who reasonably
relied on business promises freely given but never performed. Gra-
tuitous "firm" offers, voluntary waivers, one-sided modifications, all
sorts of assurances freely made and reasonably relied on-such ex-
pressions of commitment, which under the bargain theory could usu-
ally be freely repudiated for lack of consideration, became binding
obligations with the doctrinal Krazy Glue of promissory estoppel
7
At the same time as reliance was finding increased employment
as a basis for the imposition of promissory obligation, the notion of
reliance as a basis for remedial compensation was attracting increas-
ing attention. In a path-breaking 1936 article, The Reliance Interest in
34. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 61.
35. For background on the Legal Realists, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1985); N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND
KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
36. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
37. See Henderson, supra note 33, at 353-55 & nn.50 & 52 (citing cases).
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Contract Damages, Professor Lon Fuller and his student/associate
William Perdue identified three "remedial interests"-expectation,
restitution and reliance-and the greatest of those, they intimated,
was reliance. Where reliance as the basis for promissory estoppel ap-
peared to serve principally as a basis for the imposition of obligation
in the absence of conventional consideration, Fuller and Perdue sug-
gested that the facilitation and protection of reliance could be seen as
an underlying goal of all of contract law, including even the enforce-
ment of purely executory agreements and the award of "expectation
damages" for contract breach.
Judges and commentators alike found merit in the Fuller/Perdue
analysis, and took to using their set of remedial interests as a concep-
tual framework for the law of damages in contract cases.39 A bit fuzz-
fly, the Restatement (Second) followed suit.40 This new emphasis on
the importance of reliance, although not addressed specifically to the
notion of promissory estoppel as expressed in section 90, had its effect
in that area nevertheless. On the one hand, The Reliance Interest
seemed to validate Corbin's insight that reliance protection was a ba-
sic and legitimate goal of contract law. On the other hand, emphasis
on reliance protection as a remedial goal strengthened the hand of
those who argued that the remedy in promissory estoppel cases
should ordinarily be limited to compensation for injury to the prom-
isee's reliance interest, and should not extend to the lost expectation
(the ordinary measure in conventional breach of contract cases).41
This debate led to some changes in the Restatement (Second)
version of section 90, in order to accommodate the notion that reli-
ance damages either should, or at least could, be a sufficient remedy
in promissory estoppel cases.42 Commentators have since differed
over both the wisdom and the effect of this tinkering,43 but overall the
38. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages: 1, 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936); see also L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
39. See e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1417, 1425
(9th Cir. 1986); Robert E. Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REv.
704, 705-6 & n.3 (1982) (noting that the cases citing the article enjoy a "leading case"
prominence, and listing cases); Todd D. Rakoff, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest
as a Work of Legal Scholarship, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 203; Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited
Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE LJ. 1449, 1462 (1991) (listing this article as
the ninth most cited).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 344. For a general discussion of affected sec-
tions, see Hudec, supra note 39, at 706.
41. See, e.g., Warren L. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L.
REV. 908,941-45 (1937).
42. See Proliferation, supra note 3, at 55-58.
43. Compare Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 112 (arguing that reliance is not, and
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revised section 90 seemed designed generally to continue the work
begun by its predecessor. And just as consideration had done in the
classical era, promissory estoppel generated doctrinal spin-offs of its
own." Building on existing case law, other sections of the new Re-
statement extended the reliance-protection principle to firm offers,45
waivers and modifications,46 promises lacking in definiteness, 47 and
even oral agreements failing to satisfy the statute of frauds.4
As the Eighties began, courts and commentators alike were be-
ginning to see promissory estoppel as not merely a stepchild of con-
tract law, but perhaps a new and distinct cause of action in its own
right. '9 Even Karl Llewellyn's "modern" version of the statute of
frauds (in U.C.C. section 2-201) frequently bowed to its power. Par-
tisans of promissory estoppel confidently predicted that victory over
the parol evidence rule was only a matter of time.5 1  And reliance-
protection appeared to some to be on the brink of displacing compen-
sation for lost expectation as the central organizing principle of con-
need not, be the limit of damages resulting from promissory estoppel cases) with Boyer,
supra note 25, at 494-98 (arguing that there is no need to give damages beyond the reli-
ance interest) and Holmes, supra note 19, at 289-90 (citing 20 jurisdictions that award reli-
ance damages in promissory estoppel cases). In a recent study, Professor Robert Hillman
concluded that the courts in promissory estoppel cases award damages flexibly, rather
than routinely awarding expectation damages, as other commentators have asserted.
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Em-
pirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 615-18 (1998).
44. See generally Proliferation, supra note 3 (elaborating on the expanded use of
promissory estoppel in Restatement (Second)).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 87.
46. See id. at §§ 84, 89.
47. See id. at § 90. Promises so indefinite as to lack any sort of commitment would
presumably fail to satisfy even section 90, but courts, in applying that section, have fre-
quently been willing to tolerate a degree of indefiniteness that might have been fatal were
the existence of an "offer" at issue. See, e.g., Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel. Inc.,
704 A.2d 1321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.
1965); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 139; see also McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177
(Haw. 1970) (in which the court enforced the validity of a one-year oral employment con-
tract on the basis of which the plaintiff had relocated to Hawaii); Hoffius v. Maestri, 786
S.W.2d 846 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (a memorandum insufficient to satisfy statute of frauds
requirements could still defeat a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of promis-
sory estoppel); Everett v. Brown, 321 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1984) (oral promise enforceable
under promissory estoppel despite statute requiring a writing for commission agreements).
49. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Es-
toppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472 (1983).
50. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-
201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 63, 93 & nn.195-98 (1980-81) (cit-
ing cases in which promissory estoppel was applied in conjunction with 2-201).
51. See Proliferation, supra note 3, at 78; Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence
Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1983).
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tract law.' Riding the wave of fairness, justice and "commercial rea-
sonableness" rolling from the Code and the Restatement (Second),
promissory estoppel seemed destined to sail on to ever greater tri-
umphs in the remaining decades of the twentieth century. Trumpet-
ing the fulfillment of his own rhetorical prophecy made a few pages
earlier, Gilmore in The Death of Contract analyzed and compared the
Restatement (Second's) new versions of sections 75 [now 71] and 90
(including supporting commentary and illustrations), and declared a
winner: "Clearly enough the unresolved ambiguity in the relationship
between § 75 and § 90 in the Restatement (First) has now been re-
solved in favor of the promissory estoppel principle of § 90 which has,
in effect, swallowed up the bargain principle of § 75. " 3
Maybe promissory estoppel was indeed "the most radical and
expansive development of this century in the law of promissory li-
ability.) 54
And maybe not.
C. The Postmodern Period
As the onset of the Reagan era brought "morning in America," a
lot of clocks were being reset-or, at least, a lot of pendulums began
to swing back. The momentum of "modem" contract law visibly
slowed, as accepted notions of "modem" contract jurisprudence were
beset from left and right by new schools of theory, from Critical Legal
Studies' to Law and Economics,5 6 with Relational Contract some-
where in between.' The fruitful dialogue between bench, bar and
52 See Patrick S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q.
REV. 193, 211-12 (1978); Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future and Vice Versa:
Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 932-938
(1984).
53. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 72.
54. See Proliferation, supra note 3, at 53.
55. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on
Contract Law and Practice, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 223; Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983); Critical Legal Studies
Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
56. See, e.g., CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1984); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCrION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2d ed.
1981); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Effi-
ciency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
57. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1982); Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 461.
July/August 1998]
classroom that had infused the Restatements and the U.C.C. with a
variety of insights seemed during this period to have been replaced by
a plethora of talk and a paucity of communication. And Reagan-era
judges-often politically conservative, sometimes devotees of Chi-
cago-School Economic Analysis-began to nudge contract back to-
ward a kind of formalism that had seemed obsolescent only a decade
or so ago."
As one of the star players on the modern contract law roster,
promissory estoppel seemed to be in a batting slump of its own.
Writing in 1990, Professor E. Allan Farnsworth observed that the
failure of promissory estoppel to make headway in further overcom-
ing the formal barriers to contract enforcement was "a surprise"-
such a surprise, indeed, that it ranked for him among the "top 10 con-
tract law developments of the 80s." 9 Some recent articles have re-
ported that promissory estoppel in the courtroom is indeed in a pe-
riod of decline, sometimes discussed but seldom relied on as an actual
basis for decision by American judges.'
Another group of recent articles is generally unanimous on a re-
lated proposition: Despite the arguments of some academics and the
holdings of a few courts, the Restatement (Second) suggestion that
courts might limit promissory estoppel plaintiffs to reliance damages
has been largely ignored. Expectation damages, these writers report,
have been and remain the norm, not only for contract cases in gen-
eral, but for promissory estoppel cases in particular.61 When plaintiffs
in section 90 cases are limited to reliance damages, we are told, it is
not because of doctrinal objections, but because some other limitation
on damages applies, such as uncertainty, failure to mitigate, unfore-
seeability of consequential damages, etc.-all of which are limitations
that would apply even if promissory estoppel were not the basis for
relief.62
58. See Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131 (1995).
59. E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top
Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203,219-20 (1990).
60. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, supra note 43 (reporting that in the period under
study (mid-1994 to mid-1996) promissory estoppel was seldom successful as a basis for re-
covery, and that appellate courts appear much more likely to reverse applications of
promissory estoppel than refusals to apply it); Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of
Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263 (1994).
61. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Con-
tract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 909 (1985); Michael B.
Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755; W.
David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 202
(1990); Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 130 & n.120; but see Hillman, supra note 43.
62. See Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131.
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That resolution of the reliance damages issue would not neces-
sarily diminish the power of promissory estoppel. Indeed, it could be
seen as strengthening that doctrine, supporting as it does the view
that promissory estoppel is just as strong a basis for obligation as the
conventional breach of contract claim. Perhaps more important for
the future of section 90 is the series of articles that have appeared
since 1985 in which not just the damage issue but the whole concept
of promissory estoppel has been reexamined. The next section of this
article will examine .this recent phenomenon, in an effort to compare
and evaluate what these writers have to tell us about the place of
promissory estoppel and reliance protection in American contract
law.
II. Reliance in the Reviews
The wave of postmodern commentary on promissory estoppel-
if not exactly a flood, at least a bubbling spring-is serious, scholarly,
and complex. Any attempt to reduce it to a series of thumbnail
sketches is surely incomplete, probably inaccurate and possibly un-
fair. These authors can speak for themselves, and indeed have done
so. Nevertheless, for me to offer my own response to their work, I
must necessarily attempt to describe and paraphrase it, so that you
the reader may get a sense not necessarily of what they have in fact
said, but of what I have heard.
From the title of this article, it might be assumed that the tone of
recent commentary has been plainly hostile to promissory estoppel,
or at least unfriendly. Generally, however, that is not the case; in-
deed, only one of the writers whose work I will discuss below, Mi-
chael Gibson, seems frankly unhappy with the sorts of results that
courts are apt to reach with the aid of that doctrine. The two com-
plementary pieces by Eric Mills Holmes are clearly as favorable to
reliance protection as any partisan of promissory estoppel could wish,
and most of the others could be regarded in some sense as friendly to
promissory estoppel. As we shall see, however, the overall thrust of
the recent criticism has been to reduce the role that reliance protec-
tion can or at least should play in contract law, by minimizing its im-
portance as compared to other means of reaching (or rationalizing)
decisions.
151-52 (1987).
63. See text at notes 158-62 infra.
July/August 1998] PROMSSORY ESTOPPEL
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
A. Come Back, Shane: Reliance Retired
Appearing in 1985, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the "Invisible Handshake," by Professors Daniel A. Farber and
John H. Matheson,' has good claim to be regarded as the genesis of
the revisionist approach to promissory estoppel, and is probably still
the most influential of this genre. Borrowing their catchy label from
economist Arthur Okun,65 Farber and Matheson advance the thesis
that the role of reliance in promissory estoppel cases, whatever it may
once have been, is now essentially ceremonial: a rhetorical third base
that the court touches to legitimize a result that is in fact independent
of-more specifically, oblivious to the absence of-the factor of reli-
ance. In short, they assert, reliance-based recovery is no longer reli-
ance-based.
Resting their conclusions on a ten-year survey of promissory es-
toppel cases, Farber and Matheson (to whom I will refer henceforth,
with what I hope is pardonable informality, as F & M) assert that the
results of the decided cases are simply not congruent with the reliance
factor. Recovery, they report, is often denied even though reliance is
present; more important to their thesis, it is often granted in the name
of promissory estoppel even when reliance is absent. 6 This in turn
suggests to F & M a fundamental reexamination of what this sort of
recovery is really about, and they provide one, complete with a sug-
gested Restatement (Third) provision to define it.67
Addressed apparently to the period from 1975-85, the F & M
survey of cases appears not to have turned up a noteworthy decline in
the employment of promissory estoppel. Indeed, they report among
their findings that the doctrine is regularly applied in a wide variety of
commercial contexts.6' Nor, they continue, is promissory estoppel
necessarily remitted to the status of a "fall-back" theory of recovery,
not to be even considered unless conventional contract analysis fails
the plaintiff; rather, as of 1985 at least, courts "are now comfortable
enough with the doctrine to use it as a primary basis for enforce-
ment. 69 Their survey also supported the conclusion-independently
reached by other investigators-that reliance plaintiffs are usually not
limited to reliance damages. Despite theoretical arguments to the
contrary and a gentle nudge from the Restatement (Second), courts
64. Farber & Matheson, supra note 61.
65. See id at 903.
66. In Part III of this article we will further address these two propositions.
67. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 930.
68. See id. at 907.
69. Id. at 908.
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in promissory estoppel cases routinely award full expectation dam-
ages (including in some cases substantial lost profits), as well as spe-
cific relief when appropriate.'
The most important (and, they suggest, the most surprising)
finding reported by F & M is the extent to which recovery overtly
based on "promissory estoppel" is granted in cases where there ap-
pears to have been in fact little, if anything, that one could call "sub-
stantial reliance."7' Frequently, they assert, courts "strain" to find
something they can call reliance, in order to justify recovery appar-
ently actuated by something else. Sometimes there has been a change
of position by the plaintiff, but not one that appears particularly det-
rimental; sometimes the parties appear to have actually had an
agreement that could have passed the bargained-for-exchange test,
but the court applies Restatement (Second) section 90 instead.
Attempting to explain this phenomenon, F & M suggest three
factors that appear common to these cases of dubious reliance: (1)
The defendant did indeed make a "credible promise" (i.e. a "binding
commitment" as opposed to "opinions, predictions or negotiations");
(2) the promising party did have authority to make that promise;
(3) because the promise was made in the furtherance of some eco-
nomic activity of the defendant, there was in the circumstances of the
case some prospective benefit to the promisor. '
Drawing these conclusions together, F & M proceed to suggest a
unifying principle suitable for inclusion in a sometime Restatement
(Third) of Contracts:
§ 71. Enforceability of Promises
A promise is enforceable when made in furtherance of an economic
activity.75
In time-honored restatement fashion, this proposed rule is ac-
companied by elaborating commentary and several illustrations.' As
thus explained, the rule would apparently cover most if not all prom-
ises made by a corporation or other business enterprise, such as a
partnership, limited partnership, joint venture,-etc. Since all business
organizations have as their ultimate end the making of a profit, it
might well be argued that such entities never make any commitment
70. See id- at 909-10.
71. Id at 910.
72. See id. at 910-14.
73. This of course is an "agency" question, not a "contracts" one, but in the commer-
cial realm most actors are corporations or at least multi-person organizations, so issues of
agency and authority are often raised.
74. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, 914-24.
75. Id. at 930.
76. See id- at 930-34.
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which is not "in furtherance of" economic activity.77 (Whether or not
a profit is actually earned should not be the issue; we assume that
every action is at least directed-even if misguidedly so-toward a
profit-making end.) If the promisor is a business organization, then,
the harder questions will be whether a sufficient commitment was ac-
tually expressed, 8 by a person who had sufficient authority to bind
the organization 9 by her words or actions.'
F & M clearly intend that a promise by an individual will fall
within this rule as well, if made in furtherance of that individual's
economic activity.8' Thus, promises made by individual proprietors in
the operation of their businesses would be covered, including prom-
ises made by individual employers to their employees. Presumably
promises made by employees to their employers could also be en-
77. F & M also indicate that the term "economic activity" is to include the operations
of organized charities, although the significance of this is not clear. Since the promises
made by charitable organizations as part of bargained-for exchanges are already enforce-
able as ordinary contracts, F & M may merely have wanted to stress the possibility that
promises incidental to such exchange activity would be enforceable under their scheme
when made by organized charities just as they would be when made by business corpora-
tions. Conceivably they could also be suggesting-wittingly or not-that when an organ-
ized charity makes a donative promise, that promise should be deemed made in the course
of its "economic activity," and should therefore be enforceable without the need for a
showing of either consideration or reliance. Since organized charities obviously do make
many "donative" transfers, to make their promises of such transfers enforceable per se
would be a not insignificant policy decision.
Donative promises made to organized charities by non-charitable promisors would
probably also be enforceable under the F & M scheme. If made by a business organiza-
tion, such a promise would be regarded as made in the course of the promisor's business
activity. (Corporate theory allows such donations as potentially permissible exercises of
the business judgment of the corporation's directors. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).) When made by an individual, such promises would probably not
be covered by the "economic activity" rule, but they already are usually enforceable on
some basis: consideration, reliance, or public policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 90,
Comment; Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations: Are They En-
forceable and Must They be Enforced? (1993) at 3 (Program on Philanthropy and the Law,
N.Y.U. Law School), also published at 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 47 (1992).
78. F & M comment c indicates the continued pertinence here of the distinction be-
tween a true commitment and a "statement of opinion" or "mere prediction of future
events." Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 933.
79. Such authority may, of course, under established agency principles be either ac-
tual or apparent; the principal might also bind itself by a later affirmance or ratification of
an originally unauthorized commitment. See id. at 935 cmt. d. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 26,27, 82, 83, 103. 104 (1957).
80. F & M indicate clearly their intention to preserve the existing range of promissory
activity under the Restatement (Second), including express terms both written and oral, as
well as circumstances such as course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade.
See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 934 cmt. d.
81. See id. at 930 cmt. a.
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forceable under this rule, although this result is not spelled out."
Some intra-family promises surely could be regarded as having been
made in the course of economic activity, and thus enforceable under
this section. Most intra-family promises, however, probably would
not be enforceable.'
As thus explained, the "economic activity" rule for promise-
enforcement would substantially shift contract doctrine toward
greater enforcement of promises. Where the promissory liability of a
business enterprise is concerned, "consideration" (at least as defined
by the first and second Restatements) would be out the window. A
"bargained-for exchange" would no longer be required. Whether
adoption of the rule would make a significant difference in practice,
in terms of the outcomes of decided cases, is another question. F &
M support their argument principally on the basis of the already de-
cided cases, so it might be thought that little or no change in results
would follow, merely some shift in the way in which courts explain or
rationalize their decisions.84 That may underestimate, however, the
degree to which timid or unimaginative courts might thus be encour-
aged to do what they have hitherto felt constrained in doing. (The
original section 90 seems to have had that effect.) And any shift in
doctrine which strengthens the plausibility-if not the inevitability-
of a pro-plaintiff outcome may, in the real world of litigation, increase
the likelihood of a settlement favorable to the plaintiff where a slim-
mer settlement, or none at all, would have been forthcoming before.
It should also be recalled that even in their advocacy of this doc-
trinal shift, F & M do not brush aside the very real difficulties the
plaintiff may encounter in proving either that a sufficient commitment
was made at all, or that it was made on behalf of the defendant by
someone authorized to do so.8 Even if a lack-of-consideration de-
fense were precluded by the "economic activity" rule, most business
82. F & M give four illustrations of promises made by employers, one of which is spe-
cifically a corporation and one a "large department store chain." See i(L at 931-34. There
are no illustrations involving promisor/employees, however. For many individual employ-
ees, their job is their only "economic activity," so logically their promises should be cov-
ered, too. On the other hand, since the balance of power is usually thought to favor em-
ployers over individual employees, one might at least hesitate before strengthening the
employer's bargaining position in this respect.
83. F & M give, as an example of an individual commitment not enforceable under
this rule, an agreement between ex-spouses modifying an existing separation agreement,
because not made "in furtherance of an economic activity." Ia- at 932. Presumably this
could come as news to, inter alia, Donald and Ivana Trump.
84. F & M report that many cases are decided for the plaintiff on promissory estoppel
grounds even though they could with little or no strain have been fitted into the bar-
gained-for consideration mold. See iL at 908.
85. See i& at 914-20.
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enterprises by their nature are particularly well situated to invoke
these other defenses. They act through multiple agents, often with
different spheres of authority, who may speak inconsistently about
the transaction at issue. When standardized forms or other "fine
print" or "boilerplate" writings are employed, an organization may by
words and actions create the appearance of commitment while simul-
taneously denying (in its forms) that any such commitment is in-
tended. Moreover, a business organization with substantial market
power will often have the power to invoke or not invoke formalities
as it chooses-to impose on the other party its election whether to
express the entire agreement formally in writing, or to express some
or all of it either in informal writing or in no writing at all.
Besides asserting that their proposed rule does indeed harmonize
otherwise inexplicable results, F & M attempt to justify it in a variety
of ways. They argue that the rule may not be dependent on a show-
ing of reliance, but it will in practice protect promisees in situations
where reliance is likely to exist in fact, but would be difficult or im-
possible to prove. Moreover, they argue, the proposed rule is also ef-
ficient: By providing a clearer rule for enforcement, it will deter rash
promises and encourage actors to be candid about their true inten-
tions, in order to avoid the appearance of commitment where no real
commitment is intended. Not only that, but by shoring up society's
interest in the general reliability of trust-invoking activity, the pro-
posed rule is responsive (albeit in an economically realistic way) to
communitarian concerns. Maybe it doesn't go as far as others might
wish in the direction of promise-enforcement, they conclude, but the
proposed rule does provide firmer and more useful guidance to the
courts in deciding whether to enforce possibly unrelied-on promises.'
In the course of their discussion of the proposed new rule, F & M
provide a stirring exposition of its policy underpinning, which de-
serves quotation at length:
[T]he cases in which courts have pushed the doctrine of promissory
estoppel beyond its stated justification and technical limitations are
characterized by a strong need both by the parties and society for a
high level of trust. They involve relationships in which one party
must depend on the word of the other to engage in socially benefi-
cial reliance.... The point in these cases is not that reliance has
taken place in a particular instance, but rather that reliance should
be encouraged among participants in a class of activities. To restate
our initial observation, the role of reliance in establishing liability
and determining damages in individual cases is on the decline-but
reliance, in the form of trust, is on the rise as the policy behind legal
86. See id. at 934-38.
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rules of promissory obligation.87
In an article of relatively modest length, F and M have accom-
plished a great deal, combining careful analysis of what courts have
already done with a useful suggestion of what courts and commenta-
tors might do in the future to build on that foundation. In light of
their substantial and generally admirable achievement, to cavil seems
churlish. Nevertheless, in our particular context, F & M have taken a
long step toward the marginalization of promissory estoppel.
The question is one of perspective. Viewed as an examination of
the role of "promissory estoppel," the F & M account is, in one sense,
enthusiastic. Look at all the good decisions that have been made in
the name of promissory estoppel, they seem to be saying. Seen as a
discourse on the role of reliance, their story is quite different: Reli-
ance doesn't matter any more (or at least not very much). Viewed
closely, however, their story really isn't about either the expansion of
promissory estoppel or the withering away of reliance; it's about the
gradual reform of consideration.
If consideration, in the form of bargained-for exchange, requires
an explicit price for each promise, a quid pro quo, then many prom-
ises made in the context of economic activity will not be seen as con-
sideration-supported. As F & M rightly point out, many promises
made in a commercial context do not meet that test, even if they do
appear to express the promisor's genuine commitment to perform-
ance. But such promises are likely to have been seriously intended, in
any event are likely to be reasonably regarded as expressing a reliable
intention to perform, and thus are likely to generate substantial reli-
ance (some of which might be easily proven and some not). And they
play a part in some ongoing transaction-either contemplated or al-
ready in progress-which has as its ultimate goal the successful con-
duct of the promisor's profit-seeking activity. One need only to
slightly relax the definition of a "bargain" to regard this sort of
promise as consideration-based.
The new rule proposed by F & M for a future Restatement is
thus not a revised rule of promissory estoppel at all, as they in effect
concede, by numbering it not with promissory estoppel's well-known
section 90, but as section 71, to replace the Restatement (Second)
definition of consideration as bargained-for exchange." What prom-
issory estoppel has really done for contract law, F & M turn out to be
saying, is to give the courts a vehicle with which to effect their own
silent revision of the consideration requirement, a looser and more
87. Id. at 928-29 (emphasis in original).
88. See id. at 930 n.99 ("proposed rule covers the vast majority of situations previ-
ously handled by the doctrine of consideration").
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realistic version than its present expression in the Restatement (Sec-
ond). It has become possible, F & M declare, to revise the definition
of consideration to encompass all economically generated commit-
ments. Once brought within the ambit of consideration, such prom-
ises need no additional bolstering by reliance-in-fact; the mere prob-
ability of reliance is enough to justify their enforcement, as it
traditionally is for any consideration-supported promise.
Strengthening that conclusion is the F & M observation that the
presence of economic activity introduces the element of potential
benefit (at least ultimately) to the promisor.89 Although benefit to the
promisor is not one of the stated section 90 requirements for promis-
sory estoppel, it does serve to make the promise credible, and there-
fore to make reliance reasonable, as they point out. To the extent
that the promisor may in fact have benefited from the promisee's re-
liance, that factor can also strengthen the conclusion that injustice
would flow from nonenforcement. But "benefit to the promisor" in
this context has symbolic value as well. Before being elbowed out of
the way by "bargained-for exchange," benefit to the promisor (along
with "detriment to the promisee") was one of the two touchstones of
consideration.'
In fairness to F & M, they nowhere assert that their proposed
new definition of consideration is a comprehensive summation of the
law of promissory enforcement. No "single legal rule," they freely
admit, "can begin to capture the full spectrum of social relations.'
If, as they suggest, section 71 is the particular rule to be redesigned,
then section 90 is presumably still out there somewhere, doing its own
thing. But given their professed purpose-to "investigate the current
evolution of Promissory estoppel," 92 perhaps even to find "the key" to
that doctrine -it is difficult to avoid the implication in the F & M ac-
count that because promissory estoppel is "losing its link with reli-
ance," 9 4 reliance must therefore be shrinking in importance. In fact,
however, what they report is not a shrinking in the importance of re-
liance, but a shrinking in the importance of "bargained-for ex-
change." Under the camouflage of reliance-protection, the exchange
test for consideration has been substantially relaxed-"modernized,"
if you will.
89. See id. at 930-31 ("requirement that the promise be 'in furtherance' of the eco-
nomic activity carries the implication that the promisor must expect a benefit to result
from the promise").
90. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
91. Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 938.
92. Id. at 907.
93. Id. at 904.
94. Id. at 945.
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As F & M tell the story, it might be thought that the section 90
version of promissory estoppel has completely performed its most
important function, by spearheading a successful movement for the
reform of consideration. If so, and the F & M reformulation of the
consideration requirement finds general favor, what then? Having
tamed the bad guys, and brought civilization to the wilderness, should
promissory estoppel holster its gun, murmur "Guess my work here is
done," and, like Shane, ride off into the sunset? If not, can it find
useful work to do in a town where the same guys-reformed or not-
appear to be still in charge?
B. Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Reliance Reassigned
Two years after F and M had put promissory estoppel in play, so
to speak, Professor Juliet Kostritsky addressed the subject, with re-
sults that generally squared with the F & M analysis, while going be-
yond theirs in significant respects. In her 1987 article, entitled A New
Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging under the Guise of Prom-
issory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense,95 Kostritsky advances
the thesis that promissory estoppel can best be understood, not as a
ground of recovery independent of bargain-enforcement, but rather
as a subsidiary means of identifying bargains deserving of enforce-
ment. Supported by extensive analysis of decided cases, she argues
that promissory estoppel claims tend predictably to succeed in par-
ticular situations, situations which she identifies (acknowledging the
presence of substantial overlap) as follows: (1) cases where the par-
ties are of different status, or for other reasons have different degrees
of knowledge about the subject of their dealings; (2) cases involving
parties who are already "enmeshed" in some broader relationship;
and (3) cases where a relationship of trust and confidence already ex-
ists between the parties. Although these elements have frequently
been visible in promissory estoppel cases, they have not been for-
mally identified as integral to a promissory estoppel recovery; never-
theless, she argues, they should be so recognized, because they ex-
plain and rationalize the role that promissory estoppel has in fact
played in contract law. 6
In Kostritsky's analysis, the role of contract law is not reliance
protection, it is bargain enforcement. The various situations she iden-
tifies as conducive to promissory estoppel recovery are all, she ex-
95. Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the
Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895(1987).
96. See id. at 906.
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plains, situations in which there are "persuasive barriers to, or expla-
nations for the parties dispensing with, explicitly reciprocal or for-
malized contracting." Parties operating with an equality of bar-
gaining power, with an equal and sufficient amount of expertise, and
at arm's length, can readily fit their transactions into the mold of a
formal bargain, which conventional contract law will enforce. Parties
operating with unequal status or knowledge, already involved in some
sort of joint endeavor, or situated in a confidential relationship, are
less likely to employ the conventional means to formalize their trans-
action.98 Thus, Kostritsky argues, promissory estoppel has served
well-and should continue to serve-as an adjunct to bargain theory,
to help courts identify bargainers who deserve the law's assistance,
but-for excusable reasons-lack the formal credentials that conven-
tional contract law demands.
These "barriers to bargain," Kostritsky concedes, do not com-
pletely account for the promissory estoppel case law. While specifi-
cally emphasized in some decisions, and obviously present in many
others, they do not explain the cases in which relatively equal par-
ties-equal in economic status and in sophistication-have been al-
lowed to recover. To account for this residual category, Kostritsky
adds another element: The presence of at least a "plausible" benefit
to the promisor. In many cases, she asserts, the promisee's reliance,
while not explicitly bargained for as the "price" of the promise, was
likely to have been both desired by the promisor and beneficial to her
(or so it may appear from the available facts)." This presence of a
benefit to the promisor not only accounts for the residual cases, it
strengthens the result in the "barriers to formal bargain" cases as
well, because it serves as an indicium of the underlying sine qua non
of "assent-based" obligation: The presence, on the part of the promi-
sor, of an intent to be bound.1°°
Kostritsky's work to some extent echoes the views of F & M in its
emphasis on "benefit to the promisor" as an element in the prom-
isee's recovery. Her article is distinctive, however, in its emphasis on
the central role of the so-called "barriers to bargain" that she identi-
fies. And her account of promissory estoppel as a means of compen-
sating for such barriers is well-documented, and persuasive. As she
asserts, her analysis is based on a real-world perception of how and
97. Id. at 905.
98. Cf Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable
Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (1996) (asserting that businesses in on-
going relationships will not utilize writings to the extent that strangers will).
99. See Kostritsky, supra note 95, at 943-47.
100. See id. at 947.
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why people behave, suggesting a host of reasons why they do or do
not resort to formal bargain in their dealings with each other. And
her identification of those factors in the decided cases jibes with the
hunch many of us have long had that judges are indeed affected and
influenced by those factors, even where the rules do not specifically
invite them to be."' Kostritsky certainly isn't arguing that promissory
estoppel should be shut out of the game entirely; helping contract law
to adjust for these "barriers to bargain" is an important position for
promissory estoppel to play. So what peril do her views possibly hold
for the notion of reliance protection?
To the extent that Kostritsky's observations stress the promisor's
intention to be legally bound, they substantially reflect the "assent-
based" approach of Professors Barnett and Becker, to be discussed
immediately below, and what is said about their work will be applica-
ble to hers as well."° Beyond that, if there is a particular problem
with Kostritsky's analysis, it seems to me to lie with her vision of
promissory estoppel as a sort of doctrinal doorman, admitting to the
feast of bargainers those guests who have a good explanation for their
failure to arrive with an engraved formal invitation. As will be dis-
cussed below, the core of promissory estoppel seems to me to be not
merely the absence of formal bargain, but the damage caused by one
party's trust in the other's sincerity of intention, when that trust is be-
trayed after reliance has occurred. Kostritsky's "barriers to bargain"
analysis does describe a large number of the cases where this combi-
nation of trust and betrayal can be seen, but as she herself concedes,
it doesn't account for all of them." In the end, the difference may be
merely one of emphasis: Should promissory estoppel be viewed as a
sort of "Special Contracts" program, designed for the doctrinally
challenged? Or does it also have a larger role to play, and if so, what
is that role, and how does it relate to the larger body of contract law?
C. Promises, Promises: Reliance Restricted
In an article appearing on the heels of Professor Kostritsky's
piece discussed above, Professors Randy Barnett and Mary Becker
further pursue the elusive question: What is promissory estoppel
really like? Their discussion, entitled Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations,"° is reminis-
101. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
102. See infra part 11(C).
103. See Kostritsky, supra note 95, at 907, n.30.
104. Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987).
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cent of the F & M article, not merely in its title but in its conclusions;
nevertheless, it makes some distinct points of its own. To the extent
that it discusses the issue of damages in promissory estoppel cases,
Beyond Reliance reflects Becker's separate discussion of that issue.
She reaches the conclusion that whatever the commentators or the
Restatement (Second) may think, the courts consistently award ex-
pectation remedies in promissory estoppel cases, where that can be
done consistent with the ordinary limitations on contract damage-
certainty, foreseeability, and the like."'5 And Beyond Reliance also
can be seen as one of a series of articles in which Barnett advances his
reconstruction of contract law as dependent throughout, in one way
or another, on the factor of consent to be legally bound."°
In Beyond Reliance, Barnett and Becker (together, B & B) re-
spond to one of the over-arching themes of Gilmore's Death of Con-
tract-that contract is gradually being absorbed into tort, and that
promissory estoppel's expansion is symptomatic of that process.
' °7
Relying, like F & M and Kostritsky, on their own survey of the de-
cided cases, B & B divide the promissory estoppel decisions into two
groups. One group, much the larger, belongs on the contract side;"°
the other group of cases-smaller, but still of importance-can and
should be better understood as a subset of tort law. °0
As to the first, larger category, B & B begin with the conven-
tional opening gambit of contract theory: What promises are to be
enforced? Apparently accepting the F & M survey, which indicated
the relative unimportance of reliance in the promissory estoppel area,
B & B argue that what matters most in such cases is the nature of the
commitment that the promisor has made. In their eyes, the various
formal requirements that attend contract formation are all in one way
or another attempts to answer the same question: Did the promisor
intend to be legally bound by the commitment expressed? Formal
requirements like the statute of frauds address that question most di-
rectly, by using form as a marker for seriousness of intention.'0 The
105. See Becker, supra note 62.
106. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOc. PHIL. &
POLICY 179 (1986). Professor Barnett's more recent article, The Death of Reliance, 46 J.
LEG. EDUc. 518 (1996), is also concerned primarily with promissory estoppel. It neces-
sarily repeats much of the analysis in his article written with Professor Becker, but also
surveys the intervening literature and adds further analysis of his own. It is discussed be-
low. See infra notes 204-48 and accompanying text.
107. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 87-94.
108. Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 449 et seq.
109. See id. at 485-95.
110. See id. at 450.
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conventional consideration requirement of a bargained-for exchange
can also, they suggest, be seen as a kind of formal requirement. The
presence of the element of bargain-in-substance helps to ensure the
serious intention of the promising party. Conversely, any party in-
tending to be bound and aware of that conventional rule can fit the
contemplated transaction into a bargain mold, thereby invoking the
"form" of consideration to achieve the desired result.'' In many
promissory estoppel cases, the promise is made in an informal setting,
but it nevertheless appears likely that the promisor did intend to be
bound; in such cases promissory estoppel may serve as a convenient
vehicle for enforcement. 112
In the course of their discussion, B & B examine at length a vari-
ety of situations in which promissory estoppel has been successfully
invoked. Where a promise is made in a non-commercial setting-a
promise to a charity, or an intra-family promise-it may well be made
with sufficient formality to evidence the promisor's intention to be
bound. In the case of promises made to charities, courts have com-
monly striven to find bases for enforcement. Both promissory estop-
pel and consideration have been pressed into service in this effort-
not always comfortably. Intra-family promises may also be made in
circumstances of relative formality, with reliance a foreseeable result;
these factors combine to make enforcement appropriate."'
Many "gratuitous" promises are made in commercial settings,
however, including "firm" offers, promises of modifications or waiv-
ers, and other "assurances" given in a business context. In such cases,
B & B declare, we can generally be confident of the intent to be le-
gally bound, and so we need pay little attention to reliance. And,
they point out (here echoing the F & M survey), that is just what
courts in fact are doing. 4 Where enforcement of the promise runs
afoul of some requirement of "form"-a statute of frauds, the parol
evidence rule, the requirement of definiteness, etc.-some demon-
strated reliance may be necessary to enable promissory estoppel to
trump the formal requirement. In many cases that reliance will in fact
have been bargained for (a consideration-supported bargain was pre-
sent, but subject to a formal barrier). In other cases unbargained-for
reliance may strengthen the likelihood that the asserted promise was
in fact made."5
Turning to the tort side of the ledger, B & B contend that some
111. See id. at 450-51.
112. See id- at 449.
113. See id. at 451-55.
114. See id. at 455-70.
115. See id. at 470-85.
July/August 1998] PROIHSSORY ESTOPPEL
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
decisions bottomed on promissory estoppel do not in fact fall within
the domain of contract at all. Using as examples some well-known
cases,116 they suggest the category of "negligent promissory misrepre-
sentation" to explain cases in which the promisees were induced to
rely on promissory representations made recklessly or negligently,
without serious intention to perform. In these cases the promisor
knows (or should know) that the promisee will regard the promise as
more reliable than it was in fact intended to be."'
As noted above, the B & B treatment of promissory estoppel is
for both authors part of a more extended discussion. In Becker's
case, the discussion is about the remedies which will be available for
promissory estoppel; in Barnett's, it is about the true nature of prom-
issory liability. As to the former, Becker seems to be in good com-
pany with her assertion that expectation remedies are routinely
awarded in promissory estoppel cases, "reliance-based" obligation or
not."' As to the latter, however, more must be said.
Barnett's central thesis is that contract law can be generally ex-
plained on the basis of consent.119 This does not merely mean that
agreements are voluntarily entered into, so that contract law, unlike
tort, enforces standards of conduct that have been voluntarily as-
sumed. Barnett goes farther, to assert that contractual liability is-
and should be-imposed only against parties who have expressed
their consent to be legally bound. As an argument for the imposition
of liability based on formally expressed promises, Barnett's story
makes sense. Promises made in a formal manner are likely to be
legally binding (and may well be viewed as probably legally binding,
even when they would not be), and so the making of such a promise is
likely to evidence the intention to make a legal commitment. Moreo-
ver, when a promise appears to have been made with the intent to be
legally bound, the promisee is likely to rely in a variety of ways, prov-
able and unproveable. The intention to be bound and the likelihood
of reliance go hand in hand, and enforcement of such promises can
satisfy both those who focus on the importance of consent and those
who seek fully to protect foreseeable reliance.
But in their discussion of promissory estoppel, B & B make two
related assertions that appear to me to be, if not aimed directly at the
heart of promissory estoppel, at least likely to do it serious bodily
harm. One is that the potentially enforceable promise-here as else-
116. See, e.g., Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
117. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 485-95.
118. See Kelly, supra note 61; Slawson, supra note 61; but see Hillman, supra note 43.
119. See supra note 106.
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where-must be a promise that the promisor intended to be legally
binding. We may identify it in a variety of ways, but the underlying
essence is the same: The promisor apparently intended to be legally
bound."2 The other assertion is that the reasonableness of reliance on
a promise will necessarily turn on its legal enforceability.
2
'
The first assertion is (as Barnett realizes) over-inclusive in terms
of present doctrine. More importantly, it is also under-inclusive, in
terms of reliance protection. Frequently, of course, it will appear that
a promisor did in fact intend to be legally bound. Many well-known
promissory estoppel cases, where the promisor died and some succes-
sor in interest resisted enforcement, fall into this category.1" And in
other cases it may appear that the promisee reasonably believed the
promisor to have had such an intention, even if that belief may have
been erroneous. But the fallacy of the B & B conceptual scheme is
the apparent assumption that there is no middle ground between the
promise meant to be legally binding and the promise meant to have
no force whatever. In the real world, however, probably millions or
even billions of such middle-level promises are made every day.
These are promises made without any conscious intention one way or
the other as to their legal enforceability, but made with the apparent
serious intention that they will be performed. If performance is in
fact intended when the promise is made, then the promisor at that
time may well have no particular thought about legal enforceability
one way or the other, because no question of legal enforcement seems
likely to arise. Such promises may or may not be enforceable under
reliance principles; they should not be per se unenforceable merely
for lack of explicit intent to be bound.
The second assertion referred to above also appears in the B & B
account, although it is not stressed, or developed at length. It occurs
in the course of a discussion of the traditional test for promissory es-
toppel, a test which B & B dismiss as "too circular to have descriptive
or predictive power."'" "[H]ow," they ask, "can enforcement turn on
the reasonableness of reliance when the reasonableness of reliance
will necessarily depend on enforceability?"'24
If pressed to its ultimate conclusion, this position has serious
negative consequences for promissory estoppel. If reliance is only
reasonable when the promise relied on is in fact enforceable for some
reason other than promissory estoppel, then promissory estoppel has
120. See, e.g., Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 451,485.
121. See iL at 446-47.
122. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
123. Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 446.
124. IL at 446-47.
July/August 19981 PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
no independent legal existence at all. That argument proves too
much. Perhaps B & B mean that reliance can only be reasonable
when the promisee reasonably but mistakenly believes the promise to
be enforceable. In that case, promissory estoppel would still have a
role to play, but a narrow one. Successful promissory estoppel cases
would only be those where promisee could reasonably have been un-
aware of the rule that would otherwise preclude enforceability-ei-
ther because the rule itself is obscure or counter-intuitive, or because
the promisee was particularly unsophisticated about legal matters."
But just as most promises are probably made without regard to
their legal enforceability, so does much reliance take place in the
same spirit. If the promisor apparently intends to perform, and the
promisee relies substantially on that intention, is the reliance that
follows necessarily unreasonable merely because it took no account
of the promisor's intention to be (or not to be) legally bound? To so
assert is simply to ignore the reality of daily life. We constantly trust
others to do what they commit themselves to do, not because we
think the law would compel them to, but because it doesn't occur to
us that the law might have to. We expect performance because a
commitment has been made, by someone whom we trust to keep her
word.
In trying to apply the traditional test for promissory estoppel, as
enunciated in Restatement (Second) section 90, the hard issue is not
whether one can reasonably rely on an apparently seriously intended
promise without actually thinking about its legal enforceability. Un-
less the vast majority of humankind is persistently unreasonable,
clearly one can-because everyone does. So reliance without regard
to enforceability can hardly be per se unreasonable. A harder ques-
tion is whether reliance on a promise can ever be reasonable when
the relying promisee does in fact have conscious doubts about its en-
forceability (or perhaps merely has reason to doubt). Here it appears
to me that reasonable people could differ-which would mean that
some reasonable people could say yes, at least sometimes, it can. Af-
ter all, each one of us does in fact rely daily in innumerable ways on
commitments made to us, the enforceability of which we would, if
pressed, have to concede to be doubtful at best.
1 26
The hardest question of all, however-the truly "indeterminate"
aspect of the section 90 rule-is the question of "injustice." Even if
reliance was foreseeable or indeed foreseen, and even if that reliance
was reasonable, does justice demand that the cost of that reliance be
125. Here Kostritsky's discussion of "barriers to bargain" is apropos. See supra notes
97-103 and accompanying text.
126. This is particularly true of those of us who have had legal training.
1218 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
shifted to the promisor? Here the B & B analysis can supply part of
the answer: An apparent intention on the promisor's part to be le-
gally bound could certainly help to answer that question in the af-
firmative. But, B & B analysis to the contrary notwithstanding, inten-
tion to be bound should not be the only issue, nor necessarily the
decisive one. In a later article, Barnett further examined reliance's
role in promissory enforcement, and suggested some rules of his own;
we will consider them at a later point below.1"
D. Back to the Future: Reliance Rejected
By 1980, a substantial body of case law had developed addressing
the extent to which promissory estoppel could and should be em-
ployed by courts in cases involving sales of goods, cases which would
nearly everywhere be governed directly by Article 2 of the U.C.C.
The Code in general, and Article 2 in particular, is well known to be
the brainchild of Karl Llewellyn, who drafted Article 2 initially and
shepherded it through many drafts until its ultimate promulgation as
a Uniform Act. With its strong emphasis on good faith and commer-
cial reasonableness as potentially enforceable standards of behavior
and on course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade as
sources of agreement, "Karl's New Kode" was not only widely
adopted by the states, but generally regarded as the voice of "mod-
em" commercial law, with at least an "analogical" impact on contract
law at large."
Llewellyn had written extensively about the shortcomings of
classical contract law, and many portions of Article 2 are attempts
within the sales area to remedy what he saw as the defects of consid-
eration theory; defects which imposed an undue formalism on the
formation of commercial agreements." The "firm offer" section,'3
the negation of any consideration requirement for modifications,
the liberalized statute of frauds,'32 and the somewhat "Corbinized"
parol evidence rule 33 all bespeak Llewellyn's effort to free business
from what he regarded as the excessive formalism of Willistonian
127. See infra part II(G).
128. For a discussion of the effects of the Code on contract law in toto, see Eugene F.
Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of
our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1966).
129. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I.,
48 YALE L.J. 1,14-17,32 (1938).
130. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1995).
131. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1995).
132. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995).
133. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
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contract law."A
At the same time, however, the common law on its own hook
was also moving away from those earlier positions, often with the aid
of promissory estoyel theory. With his famous opinion in Drennan
v. Star Paving Co., Justice Roger Traynor had shown the way to a
kind of "firm offer" enforcement not dependent on consideration.
This position became clearly preponderant at least in "subcontractor
bidding" cases. In a series of leading decisions, not only California,
but other states as well had moved beyond the tentative position of
the Restatement (First) to a much more expansive application of
promissory estoppel in statute of frauds cases. 36 And the "pre-
existing duty" rule was often relaxed, particularly in cases where
"one-sided" modifications were enforced in favor of parties who had
in good faith relied in a substantial way on the defendant's apparently
genuine agreement to a change in terms.37 It would seem that during
this period the Code and the common law were proceeding, if not in
tandem, at least in complementary fashion, in rebuilding the structure
of contract law.
Thus, it probably seemed natural to many that the Drennan rule
was often applied in situations involving goods, or that the Article 2
statute of frauds, U.C.C. section 2-201, also began to bend to demon-
strated reliance. Commentators noted these developments, generally
with approval, and in one of a series of notable articles, Michael
Metzger and Michael Phillips strongly argued that the employment of
promissory estoppel to overcome the statutory bar of section 2-201
was both substantively and doctrinally appropriate.1 3 8 Many of the
courts which had so far addressed the point appeared to agree.
Seen through the rear-view mirror, the Metzger and Phillips arti-
cles appear to have been the last hurrah of the "modern" approbation
for promissory estoppel. The 1988 article by Professor Michael Gib-
son, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the UC.C., and the Restatement
134. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 341, 355-80 (1937).
135. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
136. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 178 cmt. f; see also Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d
737 (Cal. 1950); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 122 P. 847 (Cal. 1912); McIntosh v. Murphy, 469
P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970); Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole, 600 P.2d 229 (Nev. 1979).
137. See, e.g., Finly v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 499 A.2d 64 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Farm
Crop Energy v. Old Nat'l Bank, 685 P.2d 1097 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
138. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 50.
139. See id. at 104 n.274. Other articles by Metzger and/or Phillips include Promissory
Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1980); The Emergence
of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, supra note 49; The Parol
Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, supra note 51.
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(Third) of Contracts,"4 while not the first of the new wave of revi-
sionist commentary, is the most harshly critical of the whole notion of
reliance-protection in the area of commercial contracting. In his vo-
luminous and scholarly discussion, Professor Gibson maintains that
Karl Llewellyn himself strongly felt that the presence of reliance-or
at least the proof of its presence or absence-should play little or no
part in the enforcement of commercial agreements generally.
With the support of chapter and verse from the "legislative his-
tory" of Article 2-early drafts, committee hearings, letters, and
memoranda to and from Llewellyn and his contemporaries-Gibson
argues vigorously that Llewellyn personally rejected and resisted any
incorporation of promissory estoppel principles in the Code. Llewel-
lyn's objections, Gibson reports, were principally these: a) Every
commercial transaction generates reliance early on, often before an
agreement has actually been reached. The presence of such reliance,
while a "tacit presupposition," is not by itself a sufficient basis for en-
forcement. b) Proof of reliance-particularly if "passive"-is apt to
be difficult. To make the enforcement decision turn on such proof
would be "administratively baffling." c) Reliance-based protection is
a one-way street; as applied in the "firm offer" situation-a la Dren-
nan-it binds only the offeror, and not the offeree. d) Enforcement
based on reliance could become enforcement even in the absence of
true agreement. In contrast, enforcement based on agreement-but a
true agreement, freed of the technical constraints of consideration
and its corollaries-provides as much protection as is appropriate for
reliance-in-fact. And such agreement-based enforcement will protect
not only "overt, easily-proved reliance" but "subtle or passive" reli-
ance as well.14" '
Having established to his own satisfaction Llewellyn's jaundiced
view of reliance as a basis for legal obligation, Gibson then addresses
the various parts of Article 2 which have sometimes been supple-
mented in one way or another by promissory estoppel, attempting to
show such supplementation to be wrong both historically and sub-
stantively."' Then he takes a giant step back to the days of Learned
Hand' and launches a broadside assault against promissory estoppel
in general. Llewellyn's misgivings about promissory estoppel apply
equally well outside of Article 2, Gibson asserts, and those misgivings
were well-founded. Seen through Gibson's eyes, Article 2 becomes
140. Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the U.C.C., and the Restatement
(Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 659 (1988).
141. I& at 672-74.
142. See id. at 674-706.
143. See James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
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(at least as applied by courts that truly understand it) a successful ex-
periment in doing away with promissory estoppel, an experiment that
courts and future Restatement drafters should heed and emulate. On
the one hand, Gibson concludes, they should continue by relaxing
formal rules to make it ever clearer that "the presence of agreement
is the key basis for determining enforceability.'" On the other, they
should relegate promissory estoppel to its original role, the area of in-
trafamily promises and donative gifts.4 1 "In this manner," he con-
cludes, "today's unnecessary, unlimited, and unwarranted expansion
of promissory estoppel can be checked, and contract fully resur-
rected.
, 146
When faced with an archaeological dig of the magnitude of Pro-
fessor Gibson's, anyone not disposed to pick up a shovel of his own
can only marvel at the achievement. And, in the absence of such in-
dependent excavation, there seems little basis for quarreling with
Gibson's conclusions about Llewellyn's thoughts on this or any other
topic. But that of course need not end the discussion. Llewellyn may
have been the architect of Article 2, but he doesn't control it now, any
more than Frank Lloyd Wright controls what hangs in the Guggen-
heim Museum. The Code has become-as Karl Llewellyn hoped and
believed it would-a living thing in its own right.' 47 What Llewellyn
thought about the Code is certainly entitled to thoughtful considera-
tion, but it should not be seen as controlling today.
What matters to us, here, is not whether Gibson is right about
Llewellyn. More important is whether Gibson (and, presumably,
Llewellyn) are right about the role of reliance in Article 2. And even
more important is whether they are right, not just about Article 2, but
about promissory estoppel in general. If they are, their view has seri-
ous implications for the direction contract law should be taking in this
postmodern period.
As to Article 2, the question for us is complicated by the immi-
nent arrival on the legal scene of Article 2, the Sequel-"Article 2 II,"
the revised version of that statute. At this writing, its final form is not
apparent, and among the unresolved matters are some of consider-
able relevance here, such as the retention of the statute of frauds, sec-
tion 2-201.148 But looking just at the existing Article 2, it is possible to
144. See Gibson, supra note 140, at 716.
145. See id. at 716.
146. Id. at 662.
147. See Llewellyn, supra note 134. Llewellyn spoke approvingly of the Uniform Sales
Act because "[t]he Act moves into free and fertile creation, in terms of buyers and sellers
at work in life." Id.at 381. And also, "[p]olicy and principle must fit the facts, and must be
rebuilt to fit the changing facts." Id. at 409.
148. Early versions of the revised draft of Article 2 would have repealed the statute of
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argue that the Gibson view is one-sided, and that Article 2 in its own
way is just as "schizophrenic" as the Restatement (First) appeared to
Gilmore.
Gibson stresses repeatedly that in Llewellyn's eyes it was the
"agreement" that mattered, not any reliance on it. Free the parties
from the artificial constraints of consideration doctrine and excessive
formality, he asserts, and the agreement is all we need to know. 9 But
this is only half the story. Article 2 and related sections of the Code
are permeated with invitations-indeed, exhortations-to the courts
to consider not only what the parties have said, but how they have
behaved. The parties' course of performance of the agreement in
question and their course of dealing in carrying out other similar
agreements, can be by implication a source of the agreement, and not
just clues for interpretation." Since any course of performance of an
agreement would necessarily be a kind of reliance on that agreement,
reliance will be relevant to the enforceability of the relying party's
version of the agreement.
Once past the initial agreement stage, the role of reliance under
the Code is even plainer. Section 2-209(1)-Lewellyn's answer to
the "pre-existing duty" limitation on "one-sided" modifications-ex-
pressly negates any consideration requirement for the modification of
an existing agreement. However, 2-209(3) reminds us that enforce-
ment of a modification might depend upon its satisfying the statute of
frauds (2-201), and 2-209(2) adds another potential hurdle, by vali-
dating the "written-modifications-only" clause, thus permitting the
creation of a "private statute of frauds" (a step which the common
law had generally declined to take).' Up to that point, 2-209 appears
to have given with one hand and taken with the other. The considera-
tion barrier to modification is removed, but the formal barriers are
raised. In the latter part of 2-209, however, a dramatic shift occurs. If
the parties have agreed to a modification but failed to satisfy either
the statute of frauds or (if present) a "private statute of frauds," the
frauds, section 2-201. In 1997, however, its retention was recommended by the Drafting
Committee and approved by the American Law Institute at its May meeting. As of May 1,
1998, the proposed revision of section 2-201 would generally continue the policy of the
present section 2-201. Unlike some earlier proposals for its revision, the new section
would not explicitly provide that reliance might overcome the statute's bar to enforce-
ment; however, Notes to the proposed new section indicate that commentary will state
that revised section 2-201 does not preclude the estoppel defense, the application of which
should be guided by Restatement (Second) section 139. See U.C.C. Revised Article 2,
Sales, 19-21 (Discussion Draft, May 1,1998).
149. Gibson, supra note 140, at 662.
150. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205,2-202,2-208 (1990).




attempted modification may amount at least to a "waiver" under 2-
209(4). Under 2-209(5), that waiver may be non-retractable (i.e.,
binding) if retraction would be "unjust in view of a material change of
position in reliance on the waiver."
Gibson does not discuss these provisions of the Code, so we can-
not tell from his account how he (or Llewellyn) would regard them.
But these sections do indicate that, at least once Article 2's initial
"agreement-in-fact" hurdle has been jumped, the existence (and the
proof) of reliance on promises to modify or vary that agreement can
be crucial to their enforceability. The commentary to the section of-
fers little explanation of subsection (4), and none at all of (5). They
have been used, however, as must have been intended, to override
both the formal legal requirement of the statute of frauds and the
formal extra-legal requirement of the "private statute of frauds," in
cases where substantial reliance had occurred and injustice would
otherwise result . So whether Gibson is right about Llewellyn's view
of reliance as irrelevant to the initial enforcement of an agreement
which failed to satisfy the formal barrier of the statute of frauds,
Llewellyn certainly intended reliance to have the power to trump
formal shortcomings of a later agreement to waive or modify ele-
ments of the initial agreement.
In any event, regardless of whether Gibson's research has yielded
an accurate picture of Llewellyn's views, Gibson has at least given us
a picture of his own views, which are strongly opposed to the ex-
panded use of promissory estoppel in the business context. Whether
Llewellyn's too or only Gibson's, those views cannot be lightly dis-
missed, representing as they do a reasonable, consistent position-
one with venerable historical antecedents, one that is probably held
by many today, and one that if conscientiously adhered to would ulti-
mately undo nearly a century's worth of significant development in
the common law of contract. To be sure, Gibson would allow for a
continuing role for promissory estoppel, but its domain would be, if
not trivial, at best marginal: intrafamily promises and charitable gifts.
For a doctrine that only a decade or so ago was thought by some
to be on the verge of swallowing up contract law whole, that's pretty
slim pickings. Even if promissory estoppel is no longer the guest of
honor, should it really be given a table in a corner near the kitchen,
where it won't disturb the other guests, and be forced to survive on
152. See, e.g., Albany Roller Mills, Inc. v. Northern United Feeds & Seeds, Inc., 397
N.W.2d 430,433 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing waiver of clause through behavior under
U.C.C. section 2-209(4)); Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436
N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (N.Y. 1982) (referring to U.C.C. section 2-209(5) to overcome no-oral-
modifications clause).
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leftovers? Gibson seems to think so. But among the recent commen-
tators he seems to be alone in taking such a jaundiced view of the role
of reliance protection in contract/commercial law!" As we have seen
(and will see again), the perils to promissory estoppel come not just
from its enemies, but from its friends as well.
E. Life at Aunt Sally's: Reliance Reformed
After Gibson's broadside attack, all was briefly quiet on the
promissory estoppel front. But in 1991, Professors Edward Yorio and
Steve Thel joined the fray, with an article entitled, with admirable
brevity, The Promissory Basis of Section 90.'-4 Their article in some
respects resembles several of those discussed already, but its combi-
nation of several themes into one powerful argument deserves special
attention.
Like F & M before them, Yorio & Thel (Y & T) have looked at
the decided cases and concluded (like F & M, assertedly to their own
surprise) that the essence of promissory estopgel appears to be not
reliance-protection, but promise-enforcement.' Section 90 calls for
actual reliance, and the courts usually profess to require it as well, but
in many cases recovery is granted on this theory where little or no re-
liance is discernible.6 Conversely, they report, when recovery is de-
nied ostensibly for lack of reliance, that result can usually be equally
well explained by some other factor-"lack of a promise, unforesee-
ability of reliance, or failure to comply with a condition of the prom-ise.,,5
A substantial part of the Y & T article is devoted to the question
of the proper measure of relief for promissory estoppel. 5' Although
the Restatement (Second) and most of the earlier commentators ap-
peared to favor a rule that would call for reliance damages in many if
not all section 90 cases, the reality, according to Y & T, is that this is
simply not what the courts in fact are doing.' An expectation rem-
edy-sometimes specific relief, usually expectation damages-is rou-
tinely awarded in promissory estoppel cases, usually without even lip
153. One might add here Professor Jay Feinman, whose work is discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 170-203, but as we shall see Feinman takes a jaundiced view not
merely of promissory estoppel but of the whole neoclassical structure.
154. Yorio & Thel, supra note 4.
155. See id. at 112-15.
156. See 1L at 152.
157. 1I at 158.
158. See id. at 116 -23.
159. See i at 119.
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service being paid to the possibility of a lesser degree of remedy. °
Rejecting other possible explanations for this phenomenon (greater
use of promissory estoppel in commercial cases, for instance), Y & T
point out that the expectation remedy was from the beginning Profes-
sor Williston's vociferously stated preference for the remedy in
promissory estoppel cases. Wheeling out once again the ubiquitous
"Johnny and the Car" colloquy from the A.L.I. debate over adoption
of the Restatement (First), Y & T demonstrate Williston's tenacious
support for a full-expectation remedy, no matter what. 6' This goes to
show, they argue, that at least in Williston's eyes section 90 was not
really directed to the protection of reliance per se-if it had been, the
commentators would be right; reliance damages would be the appro-
priate remedy.1 62
Just as Gibson invokes the spirit of Llewellyn to castigate any in-
corporation of reliance-protection into Article 2, so Y & T invoke the
equally venerable and considerably more classical shade of Samuel
Williston for the proposition that section 90 is centrally concerned
with the identification of enforcement-worthy promises. The bargain
principle does a good job of that, as far as it goes, but there are
promises which may fail that test and yet deserve the law's protection.
As articulated by the original section 90, these can be identified by
the nature of the promise itself. First, it must indeed be a promise-a
true commitment. Second, it must be a promise which the promisor
can foresee is likely to induce reliance. Third, that foreseeable reli-
ance must be of a definite and substantial character. When a promise
meets those tests, it will also serve the purposes of a formal require-
ment, as delineated by Professor Lon Fuller.63 The most important of
these is the cautionary effect: The promisor will be (or should be)
conscious of the seriousness of her act, in light of the potential conse-
164
quences.
Once such a promise is made, it won't take a lot of reliance to
160. Accord Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 909.
161. Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 116-19 (quoting Proceedings at Fourth Annual
Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 95 etseq. (1926). A fuller version can be found in PETER LINZER,
A CONTRACT ANTHOLOGY 339 (2d ed. 1995)).
162. Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 118.
163. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941).
164. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 126-27. Y & T criticize the deletion of the
"definite and substantial" language from section 90 in the Restatement (Second). Id. at
125-29. These changes, apparently made in order to facilitate remedy limitation in appro-
priate circumstances, appear to them to miss the point of the original version, in Willis-
ton's eyes: that we can identify a seriously intended promise when we know the promisor
had reason to anticipate reliance that was both "substantial" (i.e., of significant magni-




produce enforceability, Y & T suggest. This is not because reliance
will be absent, but because the nature of the potential reliance that
the promisor should reasonably have foreseen is what matters, not
the degree of actual reliance.
165
The Y & T analysis echoes F & M in its downplaying of actual
reliance as a requirement for recovery, but is more ambitious in its
reach. The Y & T discussion of the relation between foreseeability of
reliance and seriousness of intention rings true, in its stress on the
cautionary effect of reliance. Unlike Barnett & Becker,'6 however, Y
& T do not appear to insist on intention to be legally bound as a
touchstone for enforceability. They find a broader utility than did
Kostritsky67 in the section 90 rule, and they surely are far more hospi-
table than Gibson ' to the notion that promissory estoppel can play a
useful role even in commercial transactions. Does the Y & T analysis
pose any peril either to promissory estoppel as an accepted doctrine
or to reliance protection as a goal of contract law?
This is not an easy question. On the face of it, the answer might
well appear to be no, it doesn't. After all, Y & T never say that courts
should stop using promissory estoppel at all, or even that they should
use it less than they do. In their profession of fealty to Samuel Willis-
ton's original vision, Y & T would give promissory estoppel the full
remedial force that some others have found doubtful, on the one
hand perhaps weakening its relation to reliance, but on the other
strengthening its potential force. So "promissory estoppel" viewed as
a category of promise enforcement seems safe in their hands. And as
far as reliance-protection is concerned, they nowhere suggest that re-
liance, if it is indeed induced by a "reliable" promise, should go un-
protected-merely that reliance may not be a requirement for liabil-
ity. So why should it matter that they stress the "promissory basis" of
promissory estoppel to the near exclusion of everything else?
As we shall see immediately below, in the eyes of some it doesn't
matter-not at all. As for me, if it does matter, it's because the Y & T
analysis is one more step toward the obliteration of promissory es-
toppel, rendering it virtually indistinguishable from something else.
For F & M, it's really like consideration-only a little looser. For
Kostritsky, it's like the rules that protect against duress, undue influ-
ence, fraud, or anything else that impedes knowledgeable and effec-
tive bargaining-only a little less focused.!9 And for Y & T, it really
165. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 152.
166. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104.
167. See Kostritsky, supra note 95.
168. See Gibson, supra note 140.
169. And in that respect bearing a family resemblance to the doctrine of unconscion-
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behaves just like "real" contract law, so that must be what it is. For
Gibson, it's not even that-just a pseudo-contractual halfway house
for needy relatives and charity cases. And to the extent that promis-
sory estoppel actually does focus on real injury, B & B would exile it
to the other side of the legal tracks-over there with the accident vic-
tims and the ambulance chasers.
If promissory estoppel wants to hold on to its place in the house
of contract, everyone seems to agree, it has to clean up its act-to
comb its hair, wear a tie, and tend to business just like all the rest of
classical contract law. Like so many well-meaning Aunt Sallys, the
promise theorists are determined to "sivilise" promissory estoppel.
But Huck Finn with his hair slicked down and his shoes shined be-
comes, well, just another Tom Sawyer. Should promissory estoppel
become just another name for conventional, conservative contract
law? Like Huck, we been there before.
F. Over the Rainbow: Reliance Repudiated
Among the many commentators who have joined in the ongoing
debate over the future of promissory estoppel, Professor Jay M.
Feinman is notable not only for the breadth of his vision, but for the
persistence of his pursuit. In a pair of articles published in 1984, fol-
lowed by a third in 1992, Feinman has reached the conclusion that
promissory estoppel, far from being a possible solution to the prob-
lem of classical contract law, has itself become part of the problem.
In the first of his 1984 pieces, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial
Method,l° Feinman surveys the development of promissory estoppel
and its use as a dispute-resolving device. After briefly tracing its his-
torical development, much as this and countless earlier articles have
done, Feinman-like Gilmore before him-concludes that the reli-
ance principle, as developed both in the Restatement (First) and in
the Fuller and Perdue reliance interest articles,' has in it the poten-
tial to overwhelm the bargain principle almost completely. Since vir-
tually every bargain-based contract dispute involves some degree of
reliance, reliance-protection could be seen as the core principle in all
such cases. The only cases necessarily dependent on bargain theory
are those involving unrelied-on, wholly executory agreements. Nev-
ertheless, Feinman declares, bargain has remained the central con-
cept, with reliance protection regarded as the exception, a corrective
ability, perhaps.
170. Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV.
678 (1984).
171. See id. at 685.
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device to be employed only where bargain fails to serve adequately."
This continued primacy of bargain is buttressed, Feinman adds, by the
persistence of expectation damages as the normal remedy in all
cases.1
3
Turning to an examination of promissory estoppel in action, as
viewed in the decided cases, Feinman finds it incapable of generating
principled results. As enunciated in section 90, the requirements of
the doctrine are, he declares, simply too indeterminate to be helpful.
Even with the aid of various supplementary modes of analysis-
Llewellynian "situation-sense, Eisenbergish "normative
analysis,"'75 Speidellic "mediating concepts,"'76 etc.--Feinman finds
the section 90 elements elusive. In the end, he concludes:
[T]he search is futile. The problems... cannot be solved within a
liberal legal system. Neither intensive fact scrutiny, nor normative
analysis, nor any combination of the two can provide an objective
method for judicial decision. As a matter of process as well as of
substance, the fundamental dichotomies cannot be reconciled
within our system of adjudication.Y7
In his companion piece, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical
Perspective,'78 Feinman addresses the problem of how and why reli-
ance-based protection in the form of promissory estoppel came to oc-
cupy its current place. Initially he considers two possibilities. First,
the rise of reliance-based protection could be viewed as the logical
development of increasing legal sophistication on the part of lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars. Alternatively, it might be the legal sys-
tem's response to forces generated by external economic and social
developments 9 But, he concludes, neither of those will do; neither
the behavior of judges and scholars nor the needs of society furnish a
satisfactory explanation of this (or indeed any other) complex legal
phenomenon." However, he suggests, one can identify a number of
forces that appear to have played a part in this development, and
Feinman proposes a list of several, ranging from existing legal doc-
trine and its academic critiques, through the legal process with its in-
terplay of lawyers and judges, up to and including the prevalence of
large-scale economic organizations and the growth of popular cul-
172. See id. at 686.
173. See i at 687-88.
174. I1 at 698.
175. Id. at 708.
176. Id at 712.
177. Iad at 718.
178. Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L.
REV. 1373.
179. See id. at 1375-77.




Having in his earlier Judicial Method article concluded that
promissory estoppel as a legal doctrine is fundamentally indetermi-
nate of legal results, and followed that up with a parallel conclusion
that neither logic nor social needs provide a more helpful basis for
understanding the reliance-protection phenomenon, Feinman ulti-
mately concludes in The Meaning of Reliance that we are essentially
on our own here. This conclusion he declares to be not "paralyzing,"
but "liberating:"
Deprived of certainty, some people adopt postures of abandon-
ment, cynicism or nihilism. But we ought to rejoice in the law's in-
determinacy, for it is that indeterminacy that gives us the freedom
to choose. We are constrained in our choice by tradition, by logic,
and by social circumstance only to the extent that we accept them
as constraints.
What, then, do we choose? Donning his C.L.S. cap n3 which of
course he has been wearing all along'-Feinman steers us past the
Scylla of classical contract's "abstraction and unreality 1 85 and the
Charybdis of conventional reliance's equally "false image of a just
economic sphere regulated by moral principles,"' 86 through the golden
gate of "counterhegemonic dereification,"" into the safe harbor of-
what? The outlines are dim, but the brave new world Feinman envi-
sions appears to have a place for a revitalized reliance doctrine, tran-
scending its present fixation on mere "actions induced by promises,"
and invoking norms expressive of "mutuality, solidarity, and
power."'"
Apparently provoked (in both senses of the word) by the Y & T
article discussed above, Feinman returned to the topic of promissory
estoppel in 1992. In an article entitled-perhaps hopefully, perhaps
ironically, certainly vainly-The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 89
he sounds again the themes familiar from eight years earlier, played
now against the counterpoint of a larger chorus of neoclassical voices.
181. See id. at 1383-84.
182. Id. at 1385.
183. See id. at 1387 & n.21.
184. See id. at 1373-74 & n.2.
185. Id. at 1386.
186. Id. at 1387.
187. Id. at 1388. This is the point at which Dave Barry would say, "I am not making
this up," a fact of which Feinman is well aware; he preemptively concedes that such termi-
nology is "sometimes derided as critical jargon," but declares it nevertheless to be "evoca-
tive and accurate." Id. at 1387.
188. Id. at 1389.
189. Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
303 (1992). Maybe he just means it's his last promissory estoppel article.
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Directing his attention to the above-discussed pieces by B & B,1"
Kostritsky 19' and F & M,1" Feinman finds them all, in varying de-
grees, symptomatic of the same underlying malady: an inability to
transcend the limiting and stultifying framework of neoclassical con-
tract law. In their preoccupation with the enforcement of promises,
he observes, all these commentators start with the basic assumption
of limited liability-no obligation exists in the absence of discrete
promise. Even as tempered by more modem concepts of trade usage,
implied warranties and the like, neoclassical contract law continues to
insist on the primacy of promise, without which there can be no li-
ability."'
Reliance theory might have jolted contract out of this frame-
work, Feinman suggests, but-as evidenced all too clearly by the
commentary he discusses-has failed to do so. "It is time", he de-
clares, "for a paradigm shift."" Drawing on the works of Professor
Ian Macnei195 as well as writings by himself and others, Feinman pro-
poses a shift in the baseline approach to obligation, from neoclassical
to relational contract theory. Stressing the relation rather than the
discrete transaction as the source of obligation, relational theory
"emphasizes the interdependence of individuals in social and eco-
nomic relationships," by focusing on "the necessity and desirability of
trust, mutual responsibility, and connection among people."' 96 Even if
a relational approach would ultimately yield results indistinguishable
from those now reached in some types of cases, Feinman argues,
those results would be better. They would be grounded, being the re-
sult of more complex analyses of individual situations, and focusing
on a wider variety of applicable norms, both those generated inter-
nally by the parties and those generated externally by society."
Feinman's conclusion is sweeping:
Is it likely that we will soon stop talking in terms of promissory
estoppel and of the neoclassical framework of which it is a part?
Perhaps not, as the weight of tradition is very great. There is, how-
ever, a growing recognition that the framework is ailing, if not
moribund. The repeated attempts by neoclassical scholars to rede-
scribe, reclassify, and reconceptualize section 90 cases seems to me
to be a recognition of difficulty.... The prescription... is to stop
190. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104.
191. See Kostritsky, supra note 95.
192. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61.
193. Feinman, supra note 189, at 309-11.
194. Id at 309.
195. See id. at 312 & n.51 (citing Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and Ex-
ternal, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983)).
196. Feinman, supra note 189, at 312.
197. See id. at 313.
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addressing old questions-by debating whether the core of section
90 is promise or reliance, for example-and address the more fun-
damental issue of what kind of framework we should have, for that
will determine the questions we should ask.98
Despite its title, it is clear that Feinman's latest thrust is aimed
not merely at promissory estoppel, but at neoclassical contract law as
a whole, top to bottom. And unlike his earlier The Meaning of Reli-
ance, it does not appear from The Last Promissory Estoppel Article
that "reliance doctrine," even in a broader sense, is to play any par-
ticular part in the New World Order of contract law that he envisions.
Frustrated apparently by neoclassical contract's stubborn refusal to
throw down its sword, Feinman has, like some modern Mercutio,
pronounced with even-handed vehemence a plague on both the
House of Bargain and the House of Reliance.
How might one respond to Feinman's challenge? In the face of
such scorn for the existing order, a timid neoclassicist might be
tempted, like Bert Lahr's Cowardly Lion, to skip the whole thing and
exit through the nearest window. But, despite the smoke and flames
arising from his apocalyptic vision, Feinman is, after all, just another
man behind the curtain, cranking up his particular machine. His vi-
sion of an Emerald City is gleaming and green, but it's like the one in
L. Frank Baum's original book-you have to be wearing his tinted
spectacles to see it.1 Ten or fifteen years ago, it just might have
seemed possible that a host of judicial Scarecrows would follow the
lead of a vanguard of academic Glindas, down the Yellow Brick Road
leading to an Oz where all hegemonies would be dereified. Right
now, though, we're still in Kansas, and if the wind is indeed blowing,
it seems to be from a different direction.2 °
The foregoing comments are, of course, both too flip and too
sweeping. The complex and thoughtful analyses of Jay Feinman and
his colleagues-I am thinking particularly of Duncan Kennedy, but
there are many others-have done much in this postmodern period to
nudge the complacent rest of us to at least imagine, if only briefly, the
possibility of better worlds than this one. The problems with Fein-
man's approach, however, are twofold. First, it really does not appear
that the time is ripe for a judicial/academic palace revolution of the
type apparently envisioned in the critical/relational camp. In The
198. Id. at 315-16.
199. L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF Oz 187-88 (Morrow 1987)
(1900).
200. My friend Jay Feinman will recognize here my acknowledgment of our mutual
propensity to resort to Oz as the all-purpose metaphor. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Com-
ments on Professor Spann's Paper, 1 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 259 (1988); Charles L. Knapp, In
Honor of Norman Redlich, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 5 (1988).
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Meaning of Reliance, Feinman himself concluded that the flowering
of a legal doctrine like promissory estoppel is a complex, many-
faceted event, with numerous unquantifiable contributing causes.
The same would be true of the blossoming of relational contract law,
were it to occur. No single law review article or judicial appointment
or presidential election or cyberspace event could bring it to pass. All
of those things and many more besides might be necessary. It may be
in the cards, but it may not. In the meantime, we have to get from
day to day with what we have. In his sweeping condemnation of all
the existing neoclassical plumbing, Feinman seems to be suggesting
that we throw out not just the bath water but also the baby, and
maybe the bathtub as well.
On a more mundane level, we simply can't tell how Feinman's
system would work. Feinman and other writers in the Critical Legal
Studies vein have here and elsewhere attempted to respond to such
criticism, by offering sketches of a reformed judicial process in ac-
tion.m Even if one were persuaded that such a system could in fact
exist-and many clearly are not-it seems clear that a relational law
of contract would be no more "determinate" than the contract law we
have now. Feinman and others have repeatedly and with justification
stressed the indeterminacy of the existing "liberal legal system," but
their proposed new model seems, in that respect at least, to be a scant
improvement.
Indifferent though Feinman may be to any further neoclassical
nit-picking, it does appear from his writings that the notion of promis-
sory estoppel/reliance-protection once held in his eyes some potential
for producing constructive change in the contract law system, by
shifting focus away from the narrow bargain-based classical scheme to
a greater emphasis on the role of trust and confidence in society. In
the eyes of some of us, it still has that potential. Unless and until we
all find our safe harbor on that far relational shore, it seems to this
voyager prudent to keep reliance protection on board, if only as bal-
last to avoid too sharp a list to starboard.
G. Felix Unger Cleans House: Reliance Refurbished
In a recent issue of the Journal of Legal Education, Professor
201. See Feinman, supra note 178, at 1382-85.
202. Jay M. Feinman, A Case Study in Critical Contract Law, 1 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
273 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEG. EDUC. 518 (1986).
203. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Comments on Professor Spann's Paper, 1 ANN. SURv.
AM. L. 265-69 (1988) (commenting on Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Per-
spective on Contract Law and Practice, 1 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223 (1988)).
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Randy Barnett revisits the subject of promissory estoppel. With an
ironical tip of the hat to Grant Gilmore, Barnett entitles his new dis-
cussion The Death of Reliance. °  Commencing by recalling Gilmore's
claim that contract is collapsing into a reliance-based branch of tort,
Barnett observes that an earlier generation of law teachers and stu-
dents probably accepted that thesis as essentially accurate.205 But, he
asserts, modern scholarship has demonstrated that in fact this has not
happened, and is not likely to happen. Instead of uniting around
some "comprehensive explication of a reliance theory of contract"
(which, he suggests, no one has furnished because it is not a viable en-
terprise), we have come to a "new consensus" that the doctrine of
promissory estopel is not primarily about compensating detrimental
reliance at all.2  Instead, it is about the nature of promises that are
deserving of enforcement.:
7
As would be expected from the above discussion of recent schol-
arship in this area, Barnett relies heavily on the articles discussed
above by F & M and Y & T, along with his own earlier article written
with Becker. Despite their differences, these three pieces sound es-
sentially the same theme: The foreseeability of reliance to the promi-
sor can be used as a means of identifying "reliable" promises. Once a
promise is identified as "reliable," however, its enforcement is not
dependent on the further question of whether or not it was relied on.
What we call "promissory estoppel" is just another way (and not the
primary way) of sorting out the wheat of enforceable promissory
commitments from the chaff of other stuff. As further evidence of
the "new consensus" he sees, Barnett points to the recent work of Jay
Feinman correctly noting that Feinman also has pronounced
promissory estoppel as essentially dead (but hurrying past the fact
that Feinman's obituary notice applies as well to all the rest of neo-
classical contract law-presumably including Barnett's own work in
this and prior articles).
Having thus set the stage, Barnett like others before him suc-
cumbs to the seemingly irresistible neoclassical temptation to bring
204. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 518 (1996).
205. See id. at 518. Barnett also discusses and attempts to refute Gilmore's argument
that contract as we know it began as an offshoot of tort, contending instead that both
"contract" and "tort" law as we know them probably date back only to the mid-nineteenth
century. Id. at 520. Barnett's concluding observation on this point is that contract no
more grew out of tort than tort did out of contract, which seems perfectly plausible al-
though for our purposes largely irrelevant. See id.
206. Id. at 521-22.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 525 (referring to Jay M. Feinman, supra note 189).
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forth a Restatement of his own.' Since courts seem increasingly
loath to move beyond the Restatement (Second),21 it may, he sug-
gests, be necessary to supply them with a new Restatement, one more
reflective of the "new consensus." And he forthwith does just that, in
a set of proposed new Restatement sections defining three categories
of promise which in his eyes qualify for enforcement.,"
Barnett's first category of enforceable promises is identical to the
one proposed by F & M in 1985: the promise "made in furtherance of
an economic activity.,2" This rule (which he numbers section 71A7)
is, along with most of its supporting text, lifted verbatim from F & M,
as Barnett makes clear.1  The comments made above in the course of
our discussion of the F & M article are therefore equally applicable to
this portion of Barnett's thesis.
21
In the remaining sections of his proposed Restatement, Barnett
expresses his views on the relative importance of formality and reli-
ance. In a suggested section 71B, he indicates when promises failing
to qualify under the "economic activity" rule might nevertheless be
enforceable:
§ 71B. Enforceability of Noncommercial Promises
(1) A promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity is
binding if the promise is in writing that is signed by the promisor
and either
(a) is under seal, or
(b) recites a nominal consideration, or
(c) contains an expression of intention to be legally bound, or
(d) is also signed at the same time by the promisee.
(2) A promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity that
209. See id. at 529-36. If I'm throwing a small stone here, it's coming from a neoclassi-
cal glass house of my own. See Knapp, supra note 52, at 938-41 (proposing a restatement
section asserting the enforceability of seriously intended promises).
210. Perhaps a little peevishly, Barnett laments the tendency of the courts to stay
within the "safe-haven framework" of the Restatement (Second), rather than availing
themselves of "very practical and accessible legal scholarship." Barnett, supra note 204, at
527.
211. See id at 529-36.
212. I- at 529.
213. As noted earlier, F & M had numbered their proposed new rule as section 71, re-
flecting their view that it would replace the present definition of consideration, without
necessarily displacing the existing section 90. See supra text accompanying note 88. Bar-
nett follows suit, numbering his new sections as section 71A, etc., but as we shall see he
appears to regard the proposed four new sections as replacing not only the present section
71 but section 90 as well.
214. Barnett, supra note 204, at 529 n.1.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 71-94.
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fails to meet the requirements of (1) is not ordinarily binding.
Barnett at this point is pursuing his earlier expressed preference
for making promissory enforceability congruent with expressed inten-
tion to be bound.217 Certainly, there is much to be said for the propo-
sition that one should be bound whenever one manifests the intention
to be bound. Writers both remote218 and recent219 have explored the
notion of expanding our universe of enforceable promises to encom-
pass apparently seriously meant expressions of intention to make a
legally effective commitment, even if "gratuitous. '" 22 So at least prima
facie, Barnett's proposed rule in this section has much to commend it,
although in the course of making this particular omelet he breaks a
lot of eggs in the form of venerable case-law and existing Restatement
provisions.221 On the cautionary side, however, it should be noted that
216. Barnett, supra note 204, at 532.
217. This section 71A is complemented by his proposed section 71D, which further
emphasizes the centrality of that factor. Of course, to make this factor controlling Barnett
has to concede the necessity of a lot of implying and inferring, which he does in the com-
mentary to section 71D. See id. at 534-35.
218. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 163, at 814-815; Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for
Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1958).
219. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
CAL. L. REV. 821, 822-825 (1997); E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 359, 361 (1995); James D. Gordon, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Di-
chotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285 (1991); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous
Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 39 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in
the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 569-570; Richard Pos-
ner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,412-414 (1977).
220. See Knapp, supra note 52, at 938 (proposing as a general rule that "[eivery prom-
ise made apparently with serious intention to perform is enforceable by any person fore-
seeably injured by its unjustified nonperformance").
221. Thus, in a mere six illustrations, he manages to do the following:
(1) In illustration 1, he declares that in a case like Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365
(Neb. 1898), the classic early promissory estoppel case, the promise should be enforceable
without reference to any reliance by the promisee. (Ricketts is discussed further in the text
infra at note 384.) See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533.
(2) In illustration 2, he asserts that in a case like Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y.
1891), the uncle's promise should not be enforceable even though acknowledged in writing
(apparently because the writing does not explicitly express an intention to be legally
bound), without any suggestion at all that reliance in the form of performance by the
nephew might make the promise enforceable. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533. Given
the tendency of courts and commentators over the years to regard the actual facts of Ha-
mer (which did of course involve performance/reliance by the promisee) as justifying en-
forcement either on the basis of consideration or reliance, this repudiation seems bold, to
say the least.
(3) In illustration 3, Barnett would make a written but clearly gratuitous intra-family
promise (gift of a $10,000 car) enforceable on the strength of the recital of a $1.00 consid-
eration. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 71 cmt. b
(denial of this result). Of course, the Restatement (Second) does suggest, in section
87(1)(a), that "recital of a nominal consideration" could have the effect of making a
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in neither his comments nor his illustrations to this section 71B does
promise binding, but that only applies to promises of irrevocability-the promise that an
offer is "firm," and will remain open for some stated time. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §
87(1)(a). If the section 87(1)(a) rule applies, and the offer therefore remains open for ac-
ceptance despite an attempted revocation, the end result is not to make a gift promise
binding, but simply to preserve the offeree's ability to accept the offer, thereby creating a
potentially enforceable, consideration-supported exchange agreement. Compare U.C.C.
section 2-205, which similarly relies on the formality of a writing to make a firm offer
binding. In apparent support of his rule, Barnett invites us to "compare" section I of the
Uniform Written Obligations Act, which was promulgated by the NCCUSL in 1925 and
thereafter uniformly ignored. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 532. (That doesn't make it
per se a bad idea, of course, but as Tevye says in "Fiddler on the Roof" about being poor,
it's no great honor either.)
(4) Barnett's Illustration 4 demands to be quoted here in full:
4. A and B are living in the same household and are in an intimate sexual rela-
tionship. A, an executive, orally promises B, a musician, to support him for the
rest of her life. The promise is unenforceable regardless of whether B relies on
the promise.
Barnett, supra note 204, at 533 (emphasis supplied).
One scarcely knows where to begin. Can it be that B is unworthy of any protection
whatsoever, despite perhaps months or even years of reliance on this promise, because he
is a musician? Can it be that A should not have to keep any promises because she is an
executive? (If anything, it could appear that those two facts in tandem make it somewhat
more reasonable for A to have meant her promise seriously, or at least for B to have
thought she did.) Is A's promise unenforceable because she is a woman, and men have no
right to expect women to support them, ever? And in that case, might the promise have
been enforceable if the genders were reversed? (That's so politically incorrect I could
hardly bring myself to write it down.) Or can it be that Barnett, like so many courts before
him, is scandalized to discover that these people have been living not merely in the same
household, but in an "intimate sexual relationship"?
No, probably not. It's probably just that the promise was oral, not in legalistic writ-
ing. Unfortunately, Barnett doesn't give us the flip side of this case, in which the lady ex-
ecutive (played by Joan Crawford, perhaps?) does express in writing her intention to be
legally bound by her promise to her musician lover (John Garfield, maybe). Under Bar-
nett's scheme, would that promise be binding? It's hard to see why not-although
whether it should be binding in the complete absence of any reliance or performance on
B's part might at least be questioned. This suggestion is by way of noting that Barnett's
insistence on the irrelevance of reliance presumably means that if a promise under his sec-
tion 71B is binding at all, it's binding as soon as made, before any change of position on
the promisee's part. One suspects this would create a lot more work for the doctrines of
duress, fraud, undue influence and unconscionability, to mention a few.
(5) Finally, in illustration 6 to his section 71B, Barnett includes a donative promise to
a charity (a "religious college"-Allegheny College, most likely), in a signed writing that
includes a statement of intent to be legally bound. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533.
This promise, he declares, should be enforceable regardless of whether the college relies
upon it. See id. In the present section 90, the Restatement (Second) would also make
donative promises to charities enforceable per se-without requiring proof of reliance, but
also without any particular requirement of form. The suggestion that in this area perhaps
some minimal amount of formality should be required (at least in the absence of demon-
strable reliance) seems worthy of consideration, however. Cf. CHARLES L. KNAPP &
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 208 (3d ed. 1993).
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Barnett take any note of the possibility that formalities may be ma-
nipulated by the knowledgeable at the expense of the less sophisti-
cated.222
For our purposes here, however, the heart of Barnett's suggested
"restatement" of promissory liability is in his next section, regarding
the role of reliance:
§ 71C. Enforceability of Promises by Virtue of Reliance
(1) Detrimental reliance upon a promise is neither essential to the
formation of a contract nor sufficient to justify enforcement of a
promise.
(2) Nonetheless, a promise is enforceable by virtue of reliance
when
(a) with the knowledge of the promisor, a promisee substantially
relies upon it in a way that would be unlikely in the absence of a
manifested intention by the promisor to be legally bound, and
(b) the promisee is aware that the promisor has knowledge of the
promisee's reliance, and
(c) the promisor remains silent concerning the promisee's reli-
223
ance.
Barnett's commentary to this section indicates that the touch-
stone here remains the promisor's intention to be legally bound. Re-
liance can therefore have a legal effect only if the reliance is so exten-
sive, so obvious to the promisor, and so acquiesced in that we can
infer an intention on the promisor's part to be legally bound to her
promise:
When a promisee makes large expenditures in reliance on a prom-
ise of a size that would not ordinarily be made in the absence of a
legally binding commitment by the promisor and the promisee
knows that the promisor is aware of these expenditures, by failing
to warn or discourage the promisee from so relying the promisor's
silence communicates an intention to be legally bound. Compare
Restatement, Second, of Contracts § 69 (when silence constitutes
an acceptance). In sum, the existence of these circumstances re-
solves the ambiguity that may have existed at the time the promise
was made as to the contractual intentions of the promisor and justi-
224fies enforcing the promise.
222. Compare U.C.C. section 2-205, which attempts to counter the possibility that a
knowledgeable offeree might manipulate an offeror into signing a "firm offer," by requir-
ing a separate signing of the irrevocability clause in such a case. Whether the Code's rem-
edy will always be effective may be questioned, but at least the drafter of 2-205 was realis-
tic enough to realize that legal forms may well present the knowledgeable party with an
opening for opportunistic behavior.
223. Barnett, supra note 204, at 533.
224. Id. at 534. Besides his commentary, Barnett accompanies this section with only
one illustration, which may have been modeled on Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan.
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To a reader not quite so convinced of the correctness of Bar-
nett's position, his section 71C(1) seems gratuitously insistent almost
to the point of petulance, a sort of academic stamp of the foot. The
section does, however, have a model in Restatement (Second) section
79,"' and is apparently intended to serve the same function-to direct
courts away from now-discredited doctrines that they might otherwise
be tempted to employ. Nevertheless, in this case such a directive
seems not only gratuitous but misleading, since in subsection (2),
Barnett is about to define a category of enforceable promises where
reliance indeed does matter, perhaps decisively. At the very least (I
know this sounds like nit-picking here-indulge me), a better-drafted
subsection (a) would have begun, like so many other sections of the
1930), and seems both an accurate (if spare) precis of that case and a good illustration of
the effect of the section 71B rule, as explained by Barnett's commentary:
1. A promises to convey to B, her son, a parcel of land for farming. B moves on
the land and makes substantial improvements to it with the knowledge of A. A
remains silent while B improves the land. A's promise is enforceable.
See Barnett, supra note 204, at 534.
If the Greiner case was indeed the model for this illustration, it is an apt choice. The
senior Mrs. Greiner ("A") did apparently intend to be legally bound; over time she ex-
plored various ways (making a deed, writing a "contract", making a will) for expressing
her commitment to her son Frank ("B"), although she never followed through on any of
them, and eventually tried to evict him.
Compared to Barnett's nutshell version, quoted above, Greiner is also a good exam-
ple of the richness of case law that is likely to get lost in the translation to Restatementese.
Not only did young Frank Greiner rely on his mother's promise, that reliance might have
benefited the mother by improving the land (a restitutionary factor?). The plaintiff and
some of his siblings were disinherited by their late father in favor of other children, an in-
equity which their mother was apparently trying to correct, possibly feeling she should
have prevented it (moral obligation?). The mother was apparently illiterate, which helps
explain her failure to invoke the formalities mentioned above (recall Kostritsky's discus-
sion of "barriers to bargain," discussed in the text supra at notes 97-103). The mother was
also apparently subjected to pressure by a rival son (possible undue influence, not by the
promisee, but against him). In addition, unlike the promisors in many other family-
promise cases, Mrs. Greiner was still alive when Frank's suit was brought, which may
strengthen the importance of the various other factors mentioned above. In many of the
well known cases, there is no reason to suppose that the promisor ever had a change of
heart about performing, but his or her successor in interest nevertheless declined to per-
form without judicial compulsion. The Greiner case is further discussed in the text infra at
notes 378-83.
225. That section provides:
If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of
(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or det-
riment to the promisee; or
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) "mutuality of obligation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 79. Similar language, but including a reference to reliance, is
contained in the F & M commentary to their proposed section 71, which is repeated by
Barnett. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 931; Barnett, supra note 204, at 529.
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Restatement and the U.C.C., with the cautionary phrase, "Except as
provided in this section .... "
That's a question of drafting emphasis, though, not substance.
The real questions of substance come in section 71C(2), the heart of
Barnett's treatment of reliance. Here, as noted earlier in our discus-
sion of his article with Becker, the problem is not with what Barnett
would include in the area of enforceability, but what he would ex-
clude. 6 As far as it goes, the section would appropriately describe
cases where enforcement has been and should be given. But there
are some narrowing aspects to this rule, intended or not. For one
thing, Barnett seems to insist that the promisor actually know of the
reliance as it is happening, and "remain[] silent., 227 Does he actually
mean by that language to exclude the case where Aunt Betty says,
"Susie, for your birthday next month I'm going to give you $5,000 to
buy a car," to which niece Susie replies, "Thanks, Aunt Betty, I'll buy
one next week," and then does so-by which time Aunt Betty is off
on a vacation to Bermuda? Does Susie have to fax Aunt Betty, "I'm
at the car dealer's, Aunt Betty, and about to buy the car; it's your last
chance to warn or discourage me from so relying on your promise,"
and then wait a reasonable time for Aunt Betty's reply? There is no
obvious bright line between knowledge that the promisee is relying
right now and knowledge that the promisee is going to do so at some
future time, except in the degree of urgency with which an immediate
disclaimer might be called for. A cynic might be pardoned for sus-
pecting that Barnett is just putting up procedural roadblocks here, to
make reliance enforcement as difficult as possible without doing away
with it entirely.
Even that may appear to be haggling over drafting, though, or
changes in emphasis. The real heart of Barnett's proposed rule, and
of my differences with it, is the key phrase in (2)(a): The promisee's
reliance must be such that it "would be unlikely in the absence of a
manifested intention to be legally bound. '' 228 As we have seen ear-
lier,229 Barnett's whole concept of contract is of liability that the
promisor incurs because, and only because, he or she manifests an in-
tention to be legally bound. In his first suggested rule (borrowed, of
course, from F & M), the consent to be bound is not explicit, but
226. See also supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
227. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533. Even this choice of words is interesting.
Since Barnett is concerned that the promisor never be held to any obligation she didn't
apparently intend to assume, the phrase "remains silent" works better for him because it
seems somehow to connote an act on the promisor's part-even though "does nothing"
would have meant exactly the same thing.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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merely presumed from the fact that the promise is made "in further-
ance of economic activity." In Barnett's second rule, either explicit
expression of an intention to be bound or the invocation of some le-
gal-type formality"' serves that purpose. True to his libertarian prin-
ciples, Barnett refuses in section 71C to countenance enforcement
based on reliance unless it too can somehow be squeezed into the
Procrustean bed of "expressed intention to be bound." But to reach
that position, he has to amputate a sizable portion of the cases that
would otherwise easily qualify for enforcement under the present Re-
statement (Second) section 90. Unlike F & M, or even Y & T, Bar-
nett isn't intent merely on rationalizing our willingness to enforce
promises in the absence of reliance, he also wants to severely cut back
our ability to enforce them even in the presence of reliance. In my
earlier discussion of the article by B & B, I have already suggested my
differences with the "intention to be bound" analysis as a standard for
reliance protection.' In this proposed set of new rules, Barnett has
made very clear what was only hinted at before: Much perfectly rea-
sonable and substantial reliance upon apparently serious promises
would not be protected under his scheme-at least not by contract
law.23
The implications of all this become even clearer in the light of
Barnett's final suggested rule:
§71D. Intention to Create or Alter Legal Relations
(1) To be legally enforceable as a contract, a promise must be
made in such a way as to manifest the promisor's intention to be le-
gally bound.
(2) When the conditions of §§ 71A, 71(B)l or 71C(2) are satisfied,
it is presumed that the parties intended that their commitments be
legally enforced.
(3) A promisor may rebut the presumption created by (2) by
showing that a reasonable person would not have understood the
promisor to have intended the promise to be legally binding.
Commentary amplifying subsection (3) indicates that "mani-
fested intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations" may
serve to rebut what would otherwise be the inference of intent to be
drawn from the making of a promise in a commercial setting.25
230. Barnett, supra note 204, at 532.
231. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 533. Merely "legal-type," because without Bar-
nett's rule or something like it these various "formalities" would probably have no legal
effect today, even if they might have at some earlier time.
232. See supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.
234. Barnett, supra note 204, at 534.
235. 1&
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It is tempting to regard section 71D as further evidence of an in-
tention on Barnett's part to carry us all back to the bad old days of
form-over-substance, where the sophisticated and well-counseled can
easily take advantage of the less-so, either by inserting boilerplate
disclaimers of liability where one would otherwise assume it to be
present, or by foisting statements of intention to be bound on willing
but ignorant adherents to already drafted forms which they expect to
have less binding effect.36 Tempting, but perhaps unfair. Subsection
(3) is, after all, couched in terms of what a reasonable person would
take to be the promisor's intention, not merely what the writing
237says. Also, as one of two illustrations to this last of his suggested
rules, Barnett provides the following:
2. A, a long-term employee with B corporation, sues for severance
pay after being separated from the company. The basis of A's
claim is a portion of the employee handbook entitled "Separation
Allowance." The Separation Allowance section states that "[t]he
inclusion of a schedule of separation allowances in the handbook,
together with the conditions governing their payment.., is not in-
tended nor is it to be interpreted to establish a contractual relation-
ship with the employee." The last page of the handbook also con-
tains an express, conspicuous disclaimer. Absent other
circumstances indicating that B corporation had an express policy
of not observing the stated limitations or that a reasonable em-
ployee would not have seen or understood the disclaimers, A's
claim fails.
2 38
This illustration supplies to some extent a needed corrective to
Barnett's emphasis on "manifested intention"; boilerplate disclaimers
might be insufficient in themselves, or might be overcome by words
or conduct. Interestingly, however, the corrective comes not from
Barnett, but from F & M. Barnett simply retains this comment from
their earlier article, where it served to illustrate their "economic ac-
tivity" rule.239
As his parting shot, Barnett in a final comment to his section 71D
suggests that promises not enforceable under his scheme might yet be
236. This misleading of the ingenuous by the ingenious is often accomplished by oral
representations that are likely later to be excluded from judicial consideration by the parol
evidence rule, particularly if-as is probable-the form contains a strong merger clause
designed to invoke that rule.
237. The suggested standard of section 71D(3) seems a little narrow in another re-
spect. Should the question be merely what some hypothetical "reasonable person would
have understood" the promisor to intend? Or should it be a two-step inquiry: (a) What
did the promisee in fact understand the promisor to have intended?; and then (b) Could a
reasonable person have so understood? Of course, this is apart from the question of
whether "intent to be legally bound" is the appropriate standard of intent at all.
238. Barnett, supra note 204, at 535.
239. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 933.
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bases for liability on some other ground. One possibility he mentions
is "restitution," referring to Restatement (Second) section 86. He
provides two illustrations of that possibility, one a very truncated ver-
sion of Webb v. McGowi 2" , the famous "falling block" case.241 An-
other possibility is that a promise might be actionable in tort if it
amounts to "negligent misrepresentation."'24 2 This suggestion was
made in the B & B article discussed above,2 3 and is illustrated here
with two examples, both apparently based on well-known and much-
discussed promissory estoppel cases, Goodman v. Dicker2" and
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.24 5
Why this contract/tort line is such a sore spot with commentators
like Barnett has never been clear to me. A writer who stresses the
possibility that contract law might actually be concerned with the in-
tentional or negligent infliction of harm by one actor on another is
seen by them as a "tort" theorist. Contract law, they seem to feel,
must be concerned only with "promises," and their enforcement. But
promises induce reliance, and reliance unmitigated (and unmitigate-
able) is a kind of injury, even if the only injurious impact is the loss of
a hypothetical expectancy of profit.
If anything, it seems to me that those of us who inhabit the do-
main of contract ought to welcome the law of promissory misrepre-
sentation (innocent, negligent or even intentional) into that domain
(perhaps with dual citizenship),2 rather than attempting to deport
240. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
241. See Barnett, supra note 204, at 536. The implication here seems to be that such
cases should be shifted out of the Restatement of Contracts and over to the restitution
area. As Professor Henderson has suggested, such cases are more than pure restitution,
however, and can more appropriately be labeled "promissory restitution." Stanley D.
Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law
of Contracts, 57 VA. L. RaV. 1115,1118 (1971). Such cases have been encompassed by the
Restatement of Contracts until now, and there seems no obvious reason-short of analytic
rigidity-to expel them. For that matter, the Webb case itself could probably have been
decided for the plaintiff on Barnett's section 71A, given the extra facts of that case sup-
plied by Professor Farnsworth. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS, supra note 16, at § 2.8 n.27.
242. Barnett, supra note 204, at 536.
243. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 485-87.
244. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
245. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
246. Shifting the law of promissory fraud wholesale into contract and out of tort could
result in a drastic limitation on the availability of punitive damages (a development hardly
designed to delight plaintiffs' attorneys). On the other hand, modern contract law has
been increasingly hospitable to the notion of punitive damages where fraudulent conduct
is involved. See, e.g., Greenstein v. Flatley, 474 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
See generally, John A. Sebert Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages Based on Contract
Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. Rev 1565, 1606-1611
(1986).
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reliance-protection as an undesirable alien. Certainly the possibility
of a fraud count (either for rescission or for damages) is something
that the plaintiff's counsel pursuing an intentional breach of promise
must frequently consider. Indeed, in many cases it would probably be
actionable malpractice not to consider it. And yet our first-year-of-
law-school mentality insists on compartmentalizing fraud with torts,
even though anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that many torts
teachers spend little or no time on it. 7 The insistence on doctrinal
purity by Barnett and others smacks of nothing so much as the com-
pulsive tidiness of a bunch of academic Felix Ungers, so intent on
neat ordering that they ignore the uses to which the lawyering Oscar
Madisons of the real world may put these doctrines. People make
promises, people break promises, other people get hurt. Is this tort?
Is this contract? As Karl Llewellyn once pungently remarked, "What
the hell!,
248
H. The Game's Afoot: Reliance Rediscovered
Just as Professor Barnett's death notice for promissory estoppel
was reaching publication, there appeared in two western law reviews
a pair of remarkable articles by Professor Eric Mills Holmes, Re-
statement of Promissory Estoppel24 9 and The Four Phases of Promis-
sory Estoppel."° Both articles stem from the work Professor Holmes
has done in revising a portion of Professor Arthur Corbin's multi-
volume treatise on contract law. In the revised Volume 3 of that
work, Professor Holmes has reported the results of his survey of the
courts' use of promissory estoppel. 2" Drawing on that material, he
furnishes in his Restatement article an exhaustive textual treatment
(over 200 pages) of the case law of every American jurisdiction, from
Alabama to Wyoming and from Maine to Guam.f2 In the introduc-
tory section of that article Holmes also provides his own version of
the evolution of promissory estoppel over the years, a shorter version
247. Fortunately for today's law students, current contracts casebooks are more likely
than those of an earlier day to devote at least some space to the issue of fraud and misrep-
resentation in agreement-making. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS-CASES
AND DOCTRINE 1103-24 (1995); KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 221, at 622-58; EDWARD
J. MURPHY, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, CONTRACT LAW 471-98 (5th ed. 1997);
ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 526-39 (2d ed. 1992).
248. KARL LLEWELLYN, PUT IN HIs THUMB 39-40 (1931).
249. Holmes, supra note 19.
250. Eric Mills Homes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 45 (1996).
251. 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1996).
252. Plus Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.
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of which history he recounts in the substantially similar Four Phases
piece.
Although some earlier writers have surveyed the case law and
reported that promissory estoppel is dead 3 or at least dying, Pro-
fessor Holmes' reassures us-invoking predictably but appropriately
Mark Twain's best known remark-that the reports of its death ap-
pear greatly exaggerated. Every American jurisdiction, he reports,
has adopted and applies some version of promissory estoppel, most
by judicial decision, two by statute. 6 In separate discussions for each
American jurisdiction, he shows how both state and federal courts
have used various versions of that doctrine in numerous ways to pro-
vide relief unavailable under standard contract doctrine.28  Well-
known leading cases take the stage when their particular jurisdiction
is being considered,29 but obscure decisions-and conflict among the
decisions-receive careful consideration as well. With an investiga-
tive zeal and a dogged devotion to detail worthy of his British name-
sake, Holmes appears to have run to earth and laid at our feet virtu-
ally every scrap of promissory estoppel law and lore one could hope
for, and perhaps a little bit more.
For practicing attorneys, Holmes's Restatement provides a wealth
of material, from their own and any other potentially relevant juris-
dictions, with which to evaluate the possible utility of promissory es-
toppel doctrine in litigation or settlement negotiation. Although ob-
viously a partisan of promissory estoppel (freuently lecturing courts
that have reached results he finds untenable ), Holmes nevertheless
is at pains to report rejections as well as acceptances of the doctrine,
and to distinguish among the various uses of promissory estoppel, the
different ways of characterizing its elements (some courts being more
253. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 204.
254. Pham, supra note 60.
255. In this portion of our discussion, assume that references to "Holmes" mean Eric,
and not Oliver W., unless otherwise stated.
256. But see infra note 264.
257. One of his interesting findings is the existence of a new and growing body of fed-
eral promissory estoppel law, as part of the federal common law. Holmes, supra note 19,
at 266.
258. Holmes points out that an earlier survey by Phuong N. Pham failed to take into
account federal cases applying state law, with the result that much case law of importance
was not reported. Holmes, supra note 19, at 425 n.626 (discussing New York law).
259. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77
N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
260. See, e.g., Holmes's discussion of Alabama case Davis v. University of Montevallo,
638 So.2d 754 (Ala. 1994). Holmes, supra note 19, at 303-04. And his discussion of Ari-
zona law. See id. at 310-15.
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restrictive and demanding than others2 61), and the wide assortment of
remedies that have been awarded .2 ' An encyclopedic treatment, not
necessarily intended to be swallowed and digested whole, this latter-
day Restatement from a latter-day Holmes is intended ultimately, it
appears, to persuade us not only that promissory estoppel is far from
dead, but that it has grown so in depth and breadth that it has indeed
become a proper candidate for a true Restatement of its own.263
For our purposes here, Professor Holmes's article is important in
a number of respects. By furnishing chapter and verse on the case
law, he provides a counter-balance to the "dead or dying" view of
promissory estoppel. Even allowing for some optimism on Holmes's
part in finding examples of promissory estoppel where others might
not,26 Holmes has provided substantial evidence in the form of de-
cided cases, many from the 80s and 90s, that promissory estoppel is
pervasive and, for the time being at least, enduring.26 Reporting
findings somewhat at variance from those of other recent scholars,
Holmes also provides more support for the position that reliance
damages are frequently the remedy of choice in promissory estoppel
cases.'66 Where other writers discussed above have conjured up the
spirit of Samuel Williston or Karl Llewellyn, Eric Holmes-with some
claim to legitimacy-invokes the patron saint of promissory estoppel,
261. Compare Holmes's discussion of Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So. 2d 770
(Ala. 1976) (representing Alabama's limited phase one level of promissory estoppel appli-
cation), Holmes supra note 19, at 302, with his discussion of Aldrich v. Forbes, 385 P.2d
618, 621 (Or. 1963) (stating that promissory estoppel can serve as a standard of elementary
fairness). Id. at 294 n.73.
262. In particular, he is careful to distinguish between reliance and expectation dam-
ages, and to report and explain innovative hybrids in this area. See, for example, his dis-
cussion of Colorado law in which remedy is primarily reliance damages, Holmes, supra
note 19, at 347-48; his discussion of Connecticut law, pointing out that courts will grant
expectation damages as well as specific performance, restitution and reliance damages, see
id. at 348-350; and his discussion of the Delaware case, Chrysler Corp. V. Quimby, 144
A.2d 123 (Del.), affd on rehearing, 144 A.2d 885 (1958), in which the court allowed both
reliance and expectation damages. Id. at 352-353.
263. Holmes, supra note 19, at 516. Despite his article's title, Holmes-unlike so many
of his contemporary colleagues-resists the temptation to draft some rules for us, proba-
bly because he appears to envision the projected enterprise not merely as a few new or
revised sections in a sometime Restatement (Third) of Contracts but as a separate Re-
statement of its own, like the Restatement of Restitution. He does, however, essay a
"summary" of such a restatement. See infra text accompanying note 278.
264. Holmes's discussion of Virginia law concludes that, however tortuously, Virginia
courts have applied promissory estoppel in effect, and in an appropriate case would do so
overtly. Holmes, supra note 19, at 478-83. In W.J. Schafer Assocs., Inc. v. Cordant, Inc.,
493 S.E.2d 512, 516 (Va. 1997), however, the Virginia Supreme Court recently declared
"promissory estoppel is not a cognizable cause of action in the commonwealth." Id.
265. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19, at n.516.
266. See id. at 291; see also Hillman, supra note 43.
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Arthur L. Corbin.27 And, like Corbin in Gilmore's account of the
birth of section 90,' Professor Holmes has spread before us the em-
pirical case for promissory estoppel, implicitly challenging those who
would ignore or minimize it in the name of doctrinal purity.' 9
Besides his contribution to our empirical knowledge, Holmes
makes an attempt of his own on the theoretical side, providing a
scheme with which to order and categorize the employment of prom-
issory estoppel by the courts. In his historical introduction, he posits
four stages in its evolution.'0 Initially, he asserts, Stage One promis-
sory estoppel can be discerned as it evolves from equitable estoppel.
Stage One cases employ the estoppel device to deprive promisors of
the ability to invoke defensively the statute of frauds, the statute of
limitations, and perhaps the parol evidence rule." Particularly inter-
esting here to a non-historian is the extent to which Holmes's study
furnishes evidence of nineteenth century case law of this sort. Used
to thinking of promissory estoppel as initially a consideration substi-
tute, only later to become a counter-defensive device, I was surprised
to find Holmes treating these stages in the reverse order. He does
not, however, assign them to particular time periods because he sees
the different jurisdictions evolving through the stages at different
rates of speed, with some still in the earlier stages.
In Holmes's Stage Two, promissory estoppel becomes the con-
sideration substitute familiar to all of us.' In this stage, the courts
tend to insist on promises that meet the tests of "certainty" and
"definiteness" traditionally applied to offers, and the remedy for
promissory estoppel will be a classic, benefit-of-the-bargain remedy,
in true Willistonian, Johnny-and-the-car fashion. 3 A significant mi-
nority of jurisdictions, Holmes reports, 4 remain stuck at this stage of
evolution-appearing in his eyes, one suspects, like-mired amphibians
unable to finally relinquish their gills, or frustrated mammals awaiting
the appearance of the opposable thumb.
In his Stage Three, Holmes sees a subtle shift away from the
267. See Holmes, supra note 19, at 269 n.8.
268. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 63.
269. Holmes fittingly quotes Corbin's observation that legal "generalizations" are not
purely theoretical, but must be "'tested and altered and restated and abandoned in accor-
dance with their application (or rejection) by the courts to the ever-changing problems of
life."' Holmes, supra note 19, at 269 n.8 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process
Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 201 (1961)).
270. Holmes, supra note 19, at 270.
271. See id. at 277-78.
272. See id. at 284.
273. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
274. From 14 to 16, by his reckoning. See Holmes, supra note 19, at 286.
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promise-as-offer and toward the recognition of promise-as-
commitment, including an increasing willingness to enforce assur-
ances that although incomplete or indefinite are capable of inspiring
reasonable reliance.15 Here, the gist of promissory estoppel is reli-
ance-protection (which is seen as, if not actually sounding in tort, at
least being tort-like), and the remedy may well be fashioned in terms
of the reliance interest rather than benefit-of-the-bargain. The spirit
of the shift which Holmes sees from Stage Two to Stage Three is ap-
parently similar to the shift in tone from the Restatement (First) for-
mulation of section 90 to the revised version in the Restatement
(Second).
In the 1980s and 1990s, Holmes sees many courts moving beyond
even that view of promissory estoppel, transcending the troublesome
tort/contract division, to a yet higher stage. Holmes's Stage Four is
characterized by the vision of promissory estoppel as a present-day
manifestation of the spirit of equity, with a lineage that in Holmes's
eyes is traceable back to the Lord Chancellor's royal mandate in
1349.276 One possible effect of this latest evolution could be a firmer
vesting of control over the application of promissory estoppel in the
hands of judges, and away from juries." Apart from that, Holmes
paints a picture here of promissory estoppel as exhibiting the tradi-
tional characteristics of equity jurisprudence: the absence of rigid or
mechanical rules, the importance of discretion, and the willingness to
fashion remedies on a case-by-case basis.
Although Holmes eschews the temptation to present a proto-
Restatement, featuring black-letter rules with accompanying com-
mentary and illustrations, he does in conclusion provide what he calls
a "terse restatement," a summary of what such a full-fledged restate-
ment might reflect:
[Promissory estoppel] was born in ancient equity and assumpsit,
and thereafter developed in four stages .... [A]t its most devel-
oped stage [it] is an equitable theory.... Subordinate legal classifi-
cations like contract and tort are covered under the umbrella of eq-
uity that can grant, among other relief, traditional contract damages
as a consideration substitute or tort-like detrimental reliance dam-
ages. With its equitable underpinnings-good faith, conscience,
honesty, and equity-promissory estoppel recognizes the prom-
isee's right to reasonably rely, arising from the reasonable expecta-
tions created and foreseen by the promisor. The promisor's state-
275. See id. at 288-89.
276. See id. at 292 n.70.
277. See, e.g., Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah 1993);
Nimrod Mktg. (overseas) Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th Cir.
1985).
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ments and manifestations must objectively evidence a sufficient
commitment or assurance on which a reasonable person foresee-
ably would rely. In such a case, the promisor has a duty to prevent
a promisee's detrimental reliance. The remedy for breach is discre-
tionary and personalized .... Courts can award expectation, reli-
ance, restitution, specific performance, exemplary, injunctive, or
other approriate relief to ... achieve corrective justice between
the parties. P
How persuasive is Holmes's account? To one who has neither
read all his history nor studied all his cases, the distinctions he draws
between the various evolutionary stages are sometimes elusive-the
distinction between offensive and defensive estoppel, for instance.
But putting my own, perhaps simplistic, spin on his analysis, I see two
points that seem particularly important to address.
The first is the distinction between the role of promissory estop-
pel as a basis for enforcing promises that otherwise would be unen-
forceable for lack of consideration, and its use to overcome defenses
of form. In some future world of universal promise-enforcement, the
consideration-substitute aspect of promissory estoppel may become
superfluous. But until it is, promissory estoppel is still available, and
can and should be employed in this way. Whether one calls this "de-
fensive estoppel," "offensive estoppel" or "consideration substitute,"
the fact is it comes down to basically the same thing: It provides a
reason to enforce a promise that otherwise would fail of enforcement
because the plaintiffs basic case had not been made.
The defenses of form, on the other hand, are just that-defenses.
In this area, the defendant's promise may well pass whatever version
of the consideration test is currently being applied, but still fail to
meet some formal requirement. The statute of frauds (public or "pri-
vate" 9) may apply, and not be satisfied. The statute of limitations
may have run. The parol evidence rule may preclude the plaintiff's
proof of an ancillary oral agreement. The defendant's promise may
be deemed too indefinite or incomplete to warrant contractual en-
forcement. If the promise is as yet unrelied-on, then the formal de-
fense may prevail. If, however, the plaintiff has proceeded either to
perform her side of the bargain or to rely in other ways on its per-
formance by the other party, promissory estoppel may apply.
Whether one regards this as an "estoppel" to invoke the defense, or
as a kind of doctrinal end-run around it by employing a different the-
ory of action than contract, or a sort of free-form manifestation of the
court's inherent power of equitable dispensation, the end result is
likely to be the same-some form of enforcement.
278. See Holmes, supra note 19, at 515-16.
279. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995).
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Holmes's case-summaries vividly illustrate the variety of names
by which the rose of reliance may be called. On the one hand, the
court's choice of rhetoric can be significant, for it may control the
scope of remedies available, the choice between judge or jury, or in
borderline cases even the granting of any relief at all. But it should
not obscure the underlying truth that by and large the courts are re-
sponding to the same perceived kinds of injustice, in basically similar
ways.
The other point that emerges from Holmes's writings more viv-
idly than in any of the other recent commentaries is the relationship
of promissory estoppel to the long-standing tradition that in Anglo-
American law we call "equity." By portraying promissory estoppel in
its most fully-developed form as essentially an equitable doctrine,
Holmes is able to brush aside as largely irrelevant the conflict be-
tween "contract" and "tort" theorists. That stuff, after all, is just
"Law," the jurisprudential compartmentalizing that is our modern
version of the old English writ system. "Equity" is not that kind of
law, at all; that's precisely the point. It's a kind of meta-law, a super-
hero with a roving commission to do justice wherever justice cries out
to be done. With his four-stage evolutionary structure, Holmes has
constructed a metaphorical phone-booth where promissory estoppel
can shed that three-piece suit, to reveal the cape and tights that were
there all along.
Of more practical importance, probably, than the doctrinal tran-
scension that Holmes's analysis suggests is the potential influence of
equity jurisprudence on this area of law. As mentioned above,
Holmes stresses the personalized, discretionary, case-by-case nature
of equity which he sees reflected in the developing case law of prom-
issory estoppel. But there is another aspect to the equity tradition
that may be important as well: its traditional inclination to weigh the
conduct of the parties in the balance along with their legal claims. In
order more fully to do justice, equity invokes such concepts as "clean
hands" and "unconscionability," and maxims like "he who would seek
equity must do equity." Since its formulation in the original section
90, promissory estoppel has differed from conventional contract law
in its overt emphasis on "justice;" in Holmes's Stage Four, this ap-
proach may if anything be broadened. Indeed, in the brave new
world of equitable promissory estoppel, it seems the court might take
into account virtually any aspect of the case that affects the "equities"
of its decision. This is a far cry from classical contract's attempt to
squeeze most disputes into a narrow and legalistic mold, with as few
material facts as possible.
The world of promissory estoppel that Eric Holmes envisions,
then, is not the cold, marble-floored world of Lionel Barrymore's old
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Banker Potter, insisting on his full legal rights as proclaimed by for-
mal documents of his lawyers' devising. It is the warm, Wonderful-
Life world of Jimmy Stewart's George Bailey, where the harshness of
legal rules is tempered by justice and mercy for all-the poor and
downtrodden, most especially.
M. The Relevance of Reliance
In their discussion of the role of reliance protection in contract
law, recent commentators have stressed the indeterminacy of that fac-
tor in judicial action. It is clear from the reported decisions, they de-
clare, that reliance is simply not a decisive factor in contract cases.
Recovery is often given under the rubric of "promissory estoppel"
even when there has been no reliance; conversely, promissory estop-
pel recovery may be denied, even when there has been reliance.'
There is nothing to be gained from arguing with that pair of ob-
servations; they are probably true."' The problem is to state what
follows from them. One conclusion that logically does follow is the
negation of a purely reliance-based contract law. Whatever else can
be said about the role of reliance in contract law, it's not the whole
story. No problem there. The farthest one might go in that direction
would be to suggest, as Fuller & Perdue did lo those many years ago,
that the desire to foster reliance may underlie even our willingness to
protect injuries to expectation, so that reliance-protection in a sense
could be the generating force behind contract law.2 Even so, if indi-
vidual plaintiffs can be compensated for pure lost expectation in the
absence of any change of position at all, then we cannot conclude that
the protection of actual reliance is the single goal of contract law.
But once that point has been conceded, it by no means logically
follows that the desire to protect reliance is irrelevant to the imposi-
tion of liability. Such a conclusion is compelled neither by logic nor
by experience. The question rather is, what is the connection (or
connections), and how should we fit reliance into our scheme of con-
tract law?
To address that question, let's begin by dividing the subject into
two parts. The first question posed by the F & M analysis is: Why do
courts apply promissory estoppel in some cases where reliance seems
280. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 909; Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 151-
61.
281. The slight hedging is with respect to the first conclusion, that recovery often oc-
curs without reliance. As will be discussed below, one might differ with F & M about
some of the cases they categorize as lacking in reliance.
282. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, supra note 38, at
57-66.
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to be absent? The second is: Why do courts in some cases deny reli-
ance-based recovery even though reliance is demonstrably present?
These two questions will be addressed in order in the discussion
which follows.
A. Reliance-Based Liability in the Absence of Reliance
In their Invisible Handshake article, F & M make the following
assertion:
The essential requirement for liability on a promissory estoppel
theory has traditionally been some specific action in justifiable reli-
ance on the promise. This requirement of an identifiable detriment
no longer defines the boundary of enforceability.28'
They then proceed to discuss several cases in which it appears to
them that the plaintiff claiming the benefit of promissory estoppel
was not in fact any worse off as a result of his actions-his "reliance"
on the defendant's promise.' This proves, they conclude, that detri-
283. Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 910.
284. In support of their recovery-without-reliance thesis. F & M cite and discuss Vas-
toler v. American Can Co., 700 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1983), and Oates v. Teamsters Affiliates
Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp. 481 (D.D.C. 1979). In Vastoler, an employee of defendant
American Can was persuaded to accept a promotion from hourly production worker to
salaried supervisor by, among other things, a promise that his retirement benefits in the
latter position would include credit for some years already worked, even though these
would have not normally been covered by the plan. In Oates, an employee of the Seafar-
ers Union was induced by Teamsters president James Hoffa to move to a similar position
with the Teamsters (a competing union) by, among other things, a promise that Oates
would receive retirement benefits from a Teamster pension plan (contemplated, but not
yet in place) that would include credit for his years already worked for the Seafarers Un-
ion. Both promises were upheld on a reliance basis. F & M correctly point out that each
case seemingly could have comfortably been fit into the bargained-for-exchange mold and
recovery granted on that basis. In that event, they correctly assert, a showing of detrimen-
tal reliance would not have been necessary, merely a showing of consideration. But F &
M also assert that a rigorous comparison of the plaintiffs' before-and-after positions would
have shown that in neither case did significant detrimental reliance take place, because
each plaintiff was economically better off as a result of his change of position, even in the
absence of any enforcement of each defendant's promise. They dismiss the Vastoler
court's argument that plaintiff's new position was a more stressful one as being mere
"straining" by the court to reach a result. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 912.
If "psychological factors" like this are sufficient for enforcement, F & M suggest, then
"relatively few promises will fail to qualify for enforcement." Id. Perhaps university pro-
fessors are more inclined than ordinary folk might be to minimize the significance of
crossing the line from labor to management, or of switching one's allegiance from one
union to another, thereby inducing a "'mass exodus of officers and rank-and-file."' Id. at
913 (quoting Oates, 482 F. Supp. at 483 n.2).
In an important recent study of promissory estoppel in the courts and the law re-
views, Professor Robert Hillman expresses his disagreement with the F & M conclusion,
echoed by Y & T, Farber and others, that present-day courts are prone to apply promis-
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mental reliance is no longer insisted on as an element of recovery.
The difficulty here is that F & M are confusing two issues com-
monly presented in promissory estoppel cases. One is whether the
promisee actually took some action after the promise was made, in
reliance on-or "on the strength of," if you prefer-that promise.
The other is whether the promisee is measurably worse off than she
would have been as a result of that action.' The first of those ques-
tions is mandated by the text of section 90 itself: Did the promise ac-
tually induce the promisee's change of position? The second question
has become part of the promissory estoppel literature not because the
text of section 90 expressly demands it, but because of that section's
requirement that "injustice" will result unless the promise is enforced.
How can there be injustice, courts have asked from the beginning, if
the promisee is no worse off as a result of her change of position? So
the courts and commentators assume that to trigger section 90 the re-
liance must have been "detrimental" to the promisee-so detrimental
as to justify enforcement of the promise.
But "detriment" as reflected in the promissory estoppel tradition
and "detriment" in the law of consideration are two different things.
Where section 90 reliance is at issue, we usually assume that it must
be detrimental in some "substantial" sense-probably economic, or at
least in some way that makes the promisee clearly worse off, even if
in an unquantifiable way. Otherwise section 90 would not apply, be-
cause our sense of injustice would not be aroused. Where the re-
quirement of consideration is at issue, however, contract law has tra-
ditionally settled for the most insignificant of performances as a
sufficient "detriment"-a hawk, a horse, a robe, a peppercorn.'
Holmes's stress on the bargained-for exchange in no way nullified
that aspect of earlier consideration doctrine; if anything, it accentu-
ated it.27
sory estoppel without insisting on a show of reliance. See Hillman, supra note 43, at 597-
601 (in cases studied where promissory estoppel was successful, reliance played a "crucial
role;" in cases where promissory estoppel was denied, failure to establish reasonable, fore-
seeable, detrimental reliance was apparently a factor in more than half of the cases).
HilIman also voices strong reservations about the case analyses used by F & M to illustrate
the irrelevance of actual reliance to the application of promissory estoppel. See id. at 610-
15.
285. Restatement section 90 in both its first and second versions contemplates for-
bearance as a type of reliance, so "action" in this context also includes the possibility of
inaction, reliance of a passive type.
286. For discussion of the "peppercorn" theory of consideration, see FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACrs, supra note 16, at § 2.1, indicating that "nominal" consideration could be ef-
fective if truly bargained for, but not if merely a sham.
287. As Professor Farnsworth points out, the bargain theory of consideration makes it
unnecessary to consider the issues of detriment and benefit in assessing the presence of
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Although F & M report that many purported section 90 cases in-
volved no real "detrimental" reliance, they also concede that in some
of those "non-reliance" cases the facts probably would have justified
the court in finding that a true bargain existed.m In such a case, it's
not surprising that the plaintiff's change of position will be deemed
sufficient for enforcement even if it hasn't really made her economi-
cally worse off. Even if they use the language of promissory estoppel,
the courts in those true-bargain cases were probably content with
only minimally "detrimental" reliance for the same reason courts
usually are: When the promisor has proposed an exchange, and has
actually received what he bargained for, this is sufficient "detriment"
to enforce his promise, even if the plaintiff is not substantially worse
off. Reliance that was not bargained for must be substantially detri-
mental to justify enforcement; bargained-for reliance need only be
"technically" detrimental-something the plaintiff could have with-
held, but did not.9
Take as an example a case not discussed by F & M, but similar to
many others they do cite and discuss, Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc.29° I.G.
Katz was a long-time employee of the Danny Dare company, having
been at one time an officer of the corporation. He was also the
brother-in-law of Danny Dare's president, Harry Shopmaker. 29' By
1975 Katz had reached the age of 67, and was in poor health, having
been injured in a vain attempt to resist a robber stealing money from
the company's store. Shopmaker and other officers of Danny Dare
wanted Katz to retire, but were reluctant to fire him.2 After several
attempts, they finally in 1975 presented a package of retirement bene-
fits that Katz found acceptable, and memorialized the promise of
those benefits in a corporate directors' resolution. Katz did retire,
and for a time the company made periodic payments to him. Eventu-
ally, however, a dispute developed, and the company refused to con-
tinue the benefit payments as promised. When Katz sued to enforce
consideration. Indeed, "[o]ne could argue that if a promisor chooses to bargain for some-
thing it must be a benefit to the promisor, and if the promisor needs to bargain for some-
thing in order to extract it from the promisee, it must be a detriment to the promisee." Id.
at § 2.4. Farnsworth does not, however, accept Gilmore's account of Holmes as the father
of bargain theory. See id. at § 2.2 n.4.
288. Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 913 n.43.
289. Under classical doctrine, consideration cannot consist of the promisee merely
doing (or promising to do) something she was already obligated to the promisor to per-
form. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 73, 75; see also FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, su-
pra note 16, at § 4.21 n.6.
290. 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
291. Shopmaker was the brother of Katz's wife. See id. at 122.
292. Despite many years of service for Danny Dare, Katz was apparently an at-will
employee, with no contractual protection against discharge.
[Vol. 49
the promise on a promissory estoppel basis, the defendant argued
successfully to the trial court that Katz had not detrimentally relied
on its promise. Since he would have been fired anyway (a factual as-
sertion by Shopmaker that the trial court apparently accepted as
true), Katz's resigning his employment was not a detrimental change
of position; he would have been without a job in any case.
On appeal, the decision was reversed by the Missouri Court of
Appeals, which ordered judgment for the plaintiff. Rejecting the de-
fendant's argument that Katz had not detrimentally relied, the court
held that even if the defendant could have fired Katz whenever it
chose, nevertheless it had not done so, electing instead to negotiate
patiently with him for more than a year until it obtained his voluntary
retirement. Citing earlier cases in Missouri and elsewhere,2' the court
concluded that Katz indeed had detrimentally relied, so that injustice
would result if Danny Dare's promise were not enforced.
Were the elements of section 90 satisfied in Katz? It depends in
part on whether one accepts the defendant's evidence that Katz
would in fact have been fired (with no retirement benefits at all, pre-
sumably) if he had refused to retire voluntarily. The trial court ap-
parently believed this testimony; the appellate court, one suspects, did
not, and maybe we don't either. After all, Shopmaker never was able
to bring himself to fire Katz-probably because of the family rela-
tionship, plus perhaps a recognition that Katz's physical infirmities
stemmed from loyal service to Danny Dare. 94 If the company
wouldn't in fact have retired him involuntarily, then Katz really did
rely detrimentally on its promise when he resigned-he gave up a job
he otherwise could have kept.
But suppose Shopmaker was telling the truth-his patience ex-
hausted, he really would have fired Katz, brother-in-law or no. Does
that negate a recovery by Katz under section 90? The company ar-
gued that it should, because Katz's retirement in those circumstances
was not detrimental. But section 90 itself imposes no such require-
ment of "detriment." 29 5 What it does explicitly require is that the
293. The court discusses at length Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959). Strikingly similar to illustration 2 to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) section 90, Fein-
berg was in turn used as the basis for illustration 4 to Restatement (Second) section 90.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 90 reporter's note. The court also relies on Trexler's Est.,
27 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 4 (1936).
294. In that respect the Katz case bears some resemblance to the famous "falling
block" case, Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
295. In the Restatement (First), section 90 did require that the plaintiff promisee's
change of position be "definite and substantial." See supra notes 31-2 and accompanying
text. Clearly Katz's resigning his job was a definite action. The defendant might argue
that it was not "substantial," if Katz would have been fired anyway. But in light of the
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plaintiff's change of position be such that "injustice" will result if the
promise is not enforced. Here that question is easily answered. Un-
derstandably reluctant to fire Katz, the Danny Dare officers made a
promise to Katz to induce him to resign voluntarily. They got what
they wanted. He resigned. Will injustice result if they don't keep
their promise? Yes, because when one party proposes a bargain to
another, and the other performs its side of that bargain, justice re-
quires that the first party should render its performance in return-or
compensate the other party for its failure to perform. All the Fuller
& Perdue "remedial interests"-expectation, reliance and restitu-
tion-seem to unite in favor of some degree of enforcement.
When Katz is viewed in that light, it is evident that although the
case was decided on the basis of promissory estoppel, it could just as
well be explained as a half-completed bargained-for exchange.
Danny Dare made an offer (probably for a unilateral contract); Katz
accepted its offer (by doing the act called for), and earned the prom-296
ised return. Bargain rhetoric identifies the crucial elements as offer,
acceptance, and consideration; promissory estoppel rhetoric identifies
the elements as promise, foreseeable reliance, and injustice. In Katz,
is one way of describing the case more correct than the other? The
bargain version may be more "correct" if some rule of contract law
etiquette requires bargain analysis to be used whenever both are
equally applicable. And indeed, many courts and commentators ap-
pear to take that position. According to them, promissory estoppel
analysis should be employed if and only if conventional bargain
analysis fails to yield enforcement.' But, as Jay Feinman has cor-
rectly pointed out,298 there is no obvious reason for this ranking, other
than a historical one. Both ways of telling the story of Katz v. Danny
Dare, Inc. are accurate, the two versions just stress different things in
justifying the outcome.
company's evident desire to get Katz to go gentle into his good night, if that could possibly
be achieved, Katz's giving Danny Dare his voluntary resignation could arguably have been
a "substantial" action for Katz-at least it appears to have been substantial from Danny
Dare's point of view. Cf the quotation from Professor Farnsworth supra note 287.
296. The opinion nowhere indicates whether Katz also attempted a conventional
breach-of-contract suit, or if he did, what happened to it along the way.
297. See, e.g., Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 449 P.2d 462, 469 (Cal. 1969);
Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn Int'l, Inc., 601 N.E.2d 956, 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
LeStrange v. Korowothy, No. 94046929S, 1997 WL 707101 (Conn. Super Ct. Nov. 4, 1997);
Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: II, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 873, 888 (1952) (describing reliance-based recovery as a necessary but secondary ba-
sis of recovery). See also Metzger & Phillips, supra note 49, at 508 (discussing the limita-
tions of the standard view of promissory estoppel in which it acts only if classical contract
doctrine does not yield the desired result).
298. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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The problem that F & M and others have with fitting cases like
Katz into a promissory estoppel mold is that we contracts teachers
and writers traditionally conceptualize (and teach) the sort of reliance
that triggers section 90 as being "unbargained-for." 29 We assume that
other rules will protect bargained-for reliance-and usually they will.
But in cases like Katz, reliance and bargain overlap. The promisee's
reliance is not merely foreseeable but is actually the bargained-for
price of the promisor's performance. In such cases, one's sense of
injustice doesn't particularly demand that the reliance be "detrimen-
tal" to the promisee in some substantial economic sense, because the
promisor has had the benefit of his bargain-he has gotten what he
specified as the price of his promised performance.
In these cases of reliance/bargain overlap-which include not
only Katz but many of the cases discussed by F & M -it seems to
me both understandable and appropriate for courts to use the rheto-
ric of promissory estoppel. It describes such cases just as accurately
as does the bargained-for-exchange analysis, and it does two things
that bargain theory does not do. It focuses our attention on the de-
gree to which the promisee actually took action on the strength of the
promise, and it allows-nay, requires-us to talk about justice.
The preceding discussion addressed cases in which there was at
least a change of position by the promisor in response to the promise,
albeit possibly not a "detrimental" one. There is a second type of
"non-reliance" case, in which some post-promise change of position
does take place, but that action may not be seen as "reliance" because
it apparently would have happened anyway. A case of that sort,
which contrasts neatly with the Katz case discussed above, is Hayes v.
Plantations Steel Co."° Plaintiff Edward Hayes had been employed by
defendant for 25 years when he announced his intention to retire, ef-
fective in six months. Shortly before his retirement was to take effect,
one of defendant's officers assured Hayes that the company "would
take care" of him after retirement. And indeed the company did pay
him a pension for four years, but payments were stopped after finan-
cial conditions worsened and ownership of the company changed."°
299. See, e.g., MURPHY ET AL., supra note 247, at 152 ("Promissory Estoppel: Promise
Plus Unbargained-for Reliance"). Of course, promissory estoppel when employed to
overcome noncompliance with a formal requirement-indefiniteness, lack of writing,
etc.-is likely to be founded on the plaintiff's actions in performance of the asserted
agreement, actions which (if the plaintiff's story is believed) indeed were bargained for.
300. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 907 n.18.
301. 438 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 1982).
302. At the time of Hayes's retirement, Plantations Steel was closely held by two
families, the Mainellis and the DiMartinos. By the time Hayes's payments ceased four
years later, a dispute had arisen, resulting in the DiMartino family buying out the Mainel-
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Suing for continuation of the payments, Hayes was successful at the
trial level, but on appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the de-
cision was reversed. Since Hayes had already communicated his in-
tention to resign when the company's commitment to him was ex-
pressed, the court held, his retirement could not constitute bargained-
for consideration. Nor could it be a sufficient change of position to
constitute detrimental reliance, for essentially the same reason. The
decision to retire preceded the company's promise, and therefore
could not have been made in reliance on that promise.
On just the facts stated above, Hayes appears to be a good can-
didate for drawing such doctrinal lines. Even assuming that the de-
fendant did make a promise sufficiently definite for enforcement (ei-
ther on a contract or an estoppel basis),3 3 that promise was made
after the plaintiff decided to retire, so it could only be, at most, "past
consideration"-i.e., no consideration, under conventional bargain
rules." Similarly, the act of retiring could not have been a change of
position induced by a promise that came later. No exchange, no reli-
ance, no recovery-no problem.
But there is a problem here, nevertheless. The trial court ruled
for Hayes. Why? In the Supreme Court's opinion, there is an indica-
tion that the plaintiff's case may not have rested merely on the defen-
dant's assurance, referred to above. Hayes testified that although he
wished to retire because he had worked for 51 years, "he would not
have retired had he not expected to receive a pension." 5 Since the
trial court held for plaintiff Hayes, it may well have accepted the truth
of that testimony in reaching its decision." Such an expectation
would presumably have been based either upon earlier promises or
statements made to Hayes himself, or on the company's treatment of
other retired employees, or perhaps a combination of the two. How
lis. The officer who promised Hayes he would be taken care of was Hugo Mainelli, a
member of the departing family. See id. at 1093.
303. Compare the well-known early case of Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., 20 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937), in which the defendant's alleged promise to pay retirement bene-
fits was denied (along with the officer's authority to make any such promise). The court in
that case never decides the factual issue, because it disposes of the case on a lack-of-
consideration ground.
304. Conceivably, a court determined to enforce in Hayes could have posited at least a
theoretical possibility that the plaintiff might have retracted his decision to retire up to the
point when it actually took effect, in which case his forbearing to do so could have been at
least a technical detriment, sufficient to satisfy the consideration requirement.
305. Hayes, 438 A.2d at 1093.
306. That fact may not have been crucial to its decision, however, since the trial court
held that Hayes's act of retiring could be consideration for Mainelli's promise as well as
justifiable reliance upon it; if that promise is seen as the basis of defendant's obligation.
then earlier events may not appear material.
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might such additional facts-the possibility of which is not directly
addressed by the Supreme Court in its opinion3o-affect one's view of
the case?
For the bargained-for consideration analysis, the additional facts
would at least have complicated the case, whether or not they would
have been sufficient to change the outcome. To the extent that classi-
cal contract law might regard the defendant's express post-retirement
promise as too indefinite to enforce, evidence of the defendant's con-
sistent payment of benefits to other retired workers could have sup-
plied some parameters for the promised performance.' And if the
words and conduct of the defendant taken together added up to at
least an implied-in-fact promise made before the plaintiff elected to
retire, then both his continued employment and his eventual retire-
ment could have been treated as consideration for that implied
promise, sufficient to make it enforceable.
From the viewpoint of promissory estoppel, liberally applied,
how might Hayes fare if his reasonable expectation of a retirement
benefits actually arose before he communicated his decision to retire?
A number of observations can be made. First, if the company's ear-
lier words and/or conduct did in fact lead Hayes to believe he had al-
ready been assured him of retirement benefits, those assurances
would in many courts be more readily seen as a "promise" for section
90 purposes (a "commitment") than as an "offer" in the bargain
sense. Sedond, Hayes's decision to retire and his forbearing to seek
other employment could both be seen as reasonable (and foresed-
able) actions in reliance on that implied promise.' Third, under sec-
tion 90 it would not be necessary for Hayes to establish that his con-
307. The court does at one point state: "Although Hayes may have had in mind the
receipt of a pension when he first informed Plantations, his expectation was not based on
any statement made to him or on any conduct of the company officer relative to him in
January 1972." Hayes, 438 A.2d at 1095 (emphasis added). The court thus does not ad-
dress the possibility either that earlier communications to Hayes could have taken place,
or that his expectation of a pension may have been based on the company's prior treat-
ment of other non-union employees. We are told at one point that Plantations had no
"formal provision for a pension plan" for its non-union employees such as Hayes. Ik at
1093.
308. By the time the dispute arose, defendant had made four annual payments to
Hayes of $5,000 each. The trial court took those as establishing the otherwise indefinite
term of defendant's promise to Hayes. See id. at 1094. A pattern of similar payments to
other employees would have further supported both the general credibility of Hayes's
story and his claim to a specific annual sum.
309. The trial court is said to have "held" that Hayes refrained from seeking other
employment in reliance on the promise of retirement benefits. See id. at 1094. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court brushes that possibility aside, stating that "Hayes left his em-
ployment because he no longer desired to work. He was not contemplating other job of-
fers or considering going into competition with Plantations." Id. at 1095.
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tinued service or his eventual retirement were intended by the com-
pany to be the "price" of its assurance of a pension. They need only
have been rendered by Hayes in the belief that the commitment ex-
isted and would be honored.
Those are all ways in which promissory estoppel has been tradi-
tionally more "flexible" than classical bargain doctrine. If a court ad-
dressing the Hayes case were to apply the "Stage Four" variety of
promissory estoppel that Professor Eric Holmes describes,310 taking a
personalized, Equity-style approach to Hayes, it could presumably
take into account many factors. Some of those seem potentially to fa-
vor the plaintiff: What did the defendant do or say to Hayes or its
other employees that led them to expect retirement benefits? What
did the defendant get out of that, in terms of employee behavior or at
least employee morale? Why did defendant's officer choose, on the
brink of Hayes's retirement, to renew its assurance that he "would be
taken care of"?
But some questions could elicit answers that might paint the de-
fendant in a more sympathetic light. Why did the defendant cease its
payments to Hayes? Was it truly financially unable to keep them up?
If Hayes was only one of many retired employees, did the defendant
treat them all equally, and if not, why not? When the DiMartino
family bought out the Mainellis' interest in Plantations Steel, " were
the new owners ignorant of-or even misled about-the dealings that
the Mainellis had with Plantations's employees, including Hayes?"'
Hard-nosed bargain theorists will perhaps argue that the seem-
ingly endless number of such questions that might be asked serves
only to strengthen the primacy of bargain theory in such cases. The
new owners of a company like Plantation Steel should be able to ac-
quire that enterprise as a package with confidence that if there are
any enforceable obligations to employees like Hayes, those are re-
flected in written, signed documents, clearly and unambiguously
stated, with merger-clause protection against extrinsic, potentially
trumped-up claims like this one. This is not a weak argument; it has
310. See Holmes, supra note 19, at 292-97; see supra notes 248-51 and accompanying
text.
311. See supra note 302.
312. The facts stated in the court's opinion are consistent with the possibility that the
DiMartinos were innocent or even misled, but they do not particularly suggest it. I raise
that possibility here because the equities in favor of innocent third parties as defendants
seem to me to be considerably stronger then they would be against a defendant who was
also the original promisor, still in control of the enterprise. If Mainelli, the promisor, had
been and remained a sole proprietor of the Plantations Steel business, then we would have
merely another "Gold Watch" case. See Knapp, supra note 52, at 945-48 (discussing a se-
ries of hypothetical cases put in Farnsworth, Contracts).
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been decisive in many cases and will be in many more. But the price
of a government of laws is-should be-submission of all actors to a
legal system empowered not only to enforce the Law, but to do Eq-
uity.
In Hayes, a full weighing of the equities may require addressing
one of the most basic issues of legal analysis: When one of two inno-
cent parties must suffer because of the wrongdoing of a third, on what
principled basis can we choose between them? If assurances of a pen-
sion were made to Hayes over the years by then-officers of the defen-
dant, but the present owners of Plantation Steel truly were ignorant
of that fact when they bought the business, on whom should the bur-
den fall? On the one hand, enforcing an informal and unwritten
promise has the potential for surprise and hardship to the defendant's
new owners, ignorant of that promise's existence. On the other hand,
the impact of non-enforcement on the plaintiff is severe. A court in-
clined to place a high value on formality might rule in favor of the de-
fendant. To counter that factor, a court more concerned with "rela-
tional" values might point out that if the new owners of the defendant
corporation were concerned about unknown and undisclosed obliga-
tions, they could have bargained for an indemnity against such liabil-
ity-as perhaps they did.313
The cases just discussed are examples of situations where the
post-promise "reliance" is perhaps equivocal-maybe not truly "det-
rimental," maybe not "induced" by the promise-but at least it exists.
The harder question remains: Should promissory estoppel be em-
ployed by courts or attorneys in cases where there has been really, no
kidding around, really no reliance? Not cases like Katz, where the
313. It should be noted here that Hayes also might have fared better under several of
the approaches earlier discussed:
a) Presumably the promise made to Hayes by Mainelli could have been binding un-
der the F & M "economic activity" rule. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
Hayes would still have had the burden of showing that the promise was really made, was
definite enough to enforce, and was sufficiently authorized by the defendant, but it ap-
pears that the trial court in effect did answer all these issues in Hayes's favor.
b) Since Hayes and Plantations were "enmeshed" in an existing long-term relation-
ship, Kostritsky's "barriers to bargain" analysis suggests an appropriate role for promis-
sory estoppel here. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. Under that approach,
Hayes's failure to insist on a more formal structuring of his retirement arrangement could
be viewed as the result of those factors-as in fact it may well have been-so that applica-
tion of promissory estoppel would be particularly appropriate.
c) Having abandoned such notions as consideration and reliance, what would Fein-
man do with this case? Hayes couldn't have been treated any worse by Feinman's "social
norms" of "mutuality, solidarity and power" than he was by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's classically neoclassical approach. See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
As suggested in the text above, the "relational" approach favored by Feinman and others
seems well-suited to this case.
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plaintiff performed exactly as the defendant expected and hoped he
would on the strength of its promise. And not cases like Hayes,
where in the circumstances perhaps an implicit pre-reliance promise
could and should have been recognized. But cases where the promi-
sor reneges at a point where there has been literally no change of po-
sition of any kind by the promisee. As others have pointed out,
314
such cases are rarer than we might imagine.315 But they do exist,
and-particularly where the promise was completely gratuitous, not
made in an exchange context-there may well be a potentially reme-
diable injury at least to the plaintiff's expectation interest, an injury
which the plaintiff cannot otherwise mitigate.
Does promissory estoppel have a role to play in such cases? In a
sense, that's like asking if the submarine has a role in interplanetary
travel. Promissory estoppel by its nature requires at least some
change of position on the part of the plaintiff, some action or forbear-
ance on the strength of the promise. Even if one quarrels with some
of the F & M case analyses, one may still accept their underlying
premise: In a case where there truly has been no change of position
induced by the promise, there is no proper role for promissory estop-
pel, and courts that do employ it in such cases are insufficiently ex-
plaining their decisions.
F & M have proposed an "economic activity" rule for some such
pure-expectation cases.316 Seconding that proposal, Barnett would
add another rule justifying liability on the basis of mere intention to
be legally bound, as manifested in various ways.317 Other commenta-
tors have entertained the notion that some promises should be en-
forced just because they are made and broken, without regard to ei-
ther "consideration" or "reliance" in the conventional sense.3"8 All of
that is interesting and creative, and it may now or at some future
point correspond to how courts actually behave (in terms of outcomes
reached). But it seems to have little or nothing to do with protecting
actual reliance, or with "promissory estoppel." If the courts do per-
sist in talking about promissory estoppel in such cases, it's probably
because in our system they have to say something, and "promissory
314. See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 52, at 211-12.
315. If any appreciable amount of time has passed since a promise was made, there is
the possibility either that the promisee may already have taken some action, or at least
that she may have forborne taking some action which she otherwise would have taken (if
the promise had never been made, or if it had been sooner repudiated). So the com-
pletely-unrelied-on promise is likely to be a promise that is repudiated virtually as soon as
it is made. Such quick retractions are probably rare, but certainly not unheard of.
316. See supra text accompanying note 75.
317. See supra text accompanying note 216.
318. See, e.g., Kull, supra note 219.
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estoppel" may seem to be the best available rationalization for a re-
sult that demands to be reached.
B. Non-Liability Despite the Presence of Reliance
Having considered the problem of promissory estoppel without
reliance, let us move to the complementary question: How and why
do we have reliance without promissory estoppel? Superficially, at
least, this second promissory estoppel conundrum would appear
likely to cause us much less trouble than the first one. From the start,
section 90 has prescribed a set of requirements for reliance-based re-
covery. These include: a promise by the defendant; the reasonable
foreseeability of reliance; and actual reliance319 by the promisee."2 To
those elements, the cases and commentaries have added two others:
The reliance must in some sense have been "detrimental" to the
promisee"' and the reliance must have been "reasonable."' 32 Given
this list of requirements, it should not be surprising that recovery has
been denied in many cases where some form of reliance-some
change of position by the promisee-is demonstrably present. If
some other element is missing, then recovery will still be properly de-
nied, reliance or no. Thus, no recovery would be available in cases
where the promisor's commitment was not clearly expressed' or not
made by someone with authorization to do so,'24 or where the prom-
isee's reliance was deemed unforeseeable or unreasonable in the cir-
319. In the Restatement (First's) formulation of section 90, "definite and substantial"
reliance. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 90 cmt. b (listing the "definite and substantial
character" of the reliance as one factor (along with many others) to be weighed in making
the decision to enforce).
320. Or, in the Restatement (Second) formulation of section 90, by a third party.
321. This element has been discussed in the text above. See supra text accompanying
notes 285-89.
322. Section 90 does in its text (both versions) state that the promise should be one
"which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance," but this
reference to "reasonableness" seems to refer to the element of foreseeability, not the na-
ture of the reliance itself. However, the section is presently captioned "Promise Reasona-
bly Inducing Action or Forbearance," which may be intended to suggest that the action or
forbearance must be "reasonable" in the circumstances, not just "reasonably foreseeable."
The drafters presently appear to so interpret the section. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §
90 cmt. b (listing "the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" as another element to be
considered in deciding whether enforcement is appropriate under that section, in addition
to the element of foreseeability).
323. See, e.g., Liberty Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Builders Square, Inc., 788 F. Supp.
1438 (E.D. Mich.), appeal dismissed, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992).
324. See, e.g., Reamer v. United States, 532 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), discussed in Far-
ber & Matheson, supra note 61, at 918.
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cumstances.3z
Obviously, these elements contain a lot of elbow room for judges
or juries to exercise discretion. Rules that turn on the "reasonable-
ness" of reliance or its "reasonable foreseeability" are not exactly the
hard-edged, maximally predictable rules that contract classicists pro-
fess to prefer, and whether a given communication amounts to a
"promise" is often difficult to decide. But then, many rules with im-
peccable classical credentials are equally indeterminate at the margin.
The doctrine of consideration is notorious for its manipulability.
3 16
Whether an "offer" was indeed made has given many a law student
fits over the years precisely because of the fuzziness of the bounda-
ries.27 Even the supposedly mechanical "mailbox" rule is susceptible
to purposive application.3 Were its elements of "reasonableness"
the worst that promissory estoppel had to offer in the form of inde-
terminacy, one would be tempted merely to invoke the proverbial pot
and kettle, and move on.
But there is more to the problem than that. Section 90 also con-
tains a requirement that the situation be such that "injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. ''329 From the wording of
the section, it appears that the reference to injustice is not simply a
verbal summation of all the elements that have been listed so far.
Rather it is an additional element, distinct from the others. Even if a
promise has induced foreseeable, substantial and reasonable reliance,
meeting all the specific tests imposed by section 90, the final question
must still be answered. Will injustice result from its nonenforcement?
To the drafters of section 90, this is an open question-the answer
will often be yes, but it can be no.
Here if anywhere is the heart of the indeterminacy of section 90,
of which Jay Feinman is perhaps the most vocal but certainly not the
only critic.3 1 If justice-or, more precisely, injustice-is the ultimate
standard, how can we predict the outcome? And if outcomes are un-
predictable, can promissory estoppel do the job we usually expect
325. See, e.g., RCM Supply Co., Inc. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 686 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir.
1982).
326. See K.N. Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Meas-
ures?, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 866 (1941).
327. Compare Moulton v. Kershaw, 18 N.W. 172, 174 (Wis. 1884) (holding "offer" is
not an offer, but only invitation to deal) with Fairmount Glass Works v. Grunden-Martin
Wooden-Ware Co., 51 S.W. 196, 197 (Ky. 1899) (holding price "quote" is not merely a
price quotation, but an offer).
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 63 cmt. b (inviting courts to manipulate interpre-
tation of offer so as to avoid application of "mailbox" rule to cases involving lost accep-
tances).
329. See id. at § 90.
330. See generally Feinman, supra note 170.
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contract law to do, which is to provide not merely an ex post compen-
sation system for injury, but an ex ante basis for transactional plan-
ning?
331
Putting the question thus may seem to overlook the fact that tra-
ditional contract law is, after all, not completely unconcerned with
justice. But traditional contract law tends to address the issue of jus-
tice in an across-the-board fashion. When the elements of offer, ac-
ceptance, consideration and unexcused breach are present, liability is
automatic. In such cases, we don't have to specifically address issues
of morality or fairness, because the contract law system has already
decided-however shrouded in mist the origins of that decision may
be-that justice will be served by some measure of enforcement in
such a situation.3
To be sure, both conventional contract principles and promissory
estoppel may agree on some examples of injustice. Thus, in our ear-
lier discussion of the overlap between the two, it was suggested that
when a proposed exchange has been performed on one side, justice
could appear to call for some form of enforcement of an obligation to
perform the return performance, whichever approach was being em-
ployed. But unlike conventional contract analysis, application of
promissory estoppel as expressed in section 90 requires that the issue
of injustice be specifically addressed.
This does not preclude the possibility that a given type of prom-
issory estoppel case, recurring in substantially the same form, will
tend to be resolved in the same way, so that eventually a "rule" is dis-
cernible in the decisions, and the discussion of injustice in later cases
is perfunctory at best. Thus, in the line of cases following Justice
Traynor's seminal opinion in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,333 court af-
ter court has applied promissory estoppel so as to provide a remedy
where a sub-bidder revokes its bid after a general contractor has re-
lied on that sub-bid in preparing and submitting its bid on the general
contract.3' Although Traynor's opinion carefully pointed out factors
that might cut against the application of promissory estoppel in simi-
lar cases,335 courts generally have accepted Traynor's explanation of
331. The need to provide a basis for transaction-planning is conventionally seen as a
hallmark of contract law, although modem, economics-based tort law assumes that ra-
tional economic actors in approaching transactions will take account of the legal rules in
this area as well. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
332. This of course does not reach the very real problem of what form that enforce-
ment will take.
333. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
334. See, e.g., Montgomery Indus. Int'l, Inc., v. Thomas Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Texas law). See generally KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 221, at 239-44.
335. These included the possibility that the defendant's bid would be clearly based on
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why the equities in this situation tend to favor the general contractor,
even though (as numerous commentators have pointed out336) there
are institutional arguments on the other side as well.337  In section
87(2), the Restatement (Second) attempts to elevate that line of cases
to a higher level of abstraction, potentially applicable in cases not in-
volving contractor-bidding.3 But that attempt has not been notably
productive of additional applications.339 Even though the reliance-
based rule of section 87(2) is indeed consistent with the Drennan-type
cases, it apparently fails to capture the particular aspects of that case
which made its decision persuasive in similar cases.
To further consider how the question of injustice might be ad-
dressed in the area of reliance protection, let us consider a case in
which promissory estoppel was advanced but rejected as a basis for
protecting an offeree against the revocation of an offer, Berryman v.
Kmoch.34 Plaintiff Berryman, the owner of Kansas farmland, made a
written offer in June to sell a tract of farmland to Kmoch, a Colorado
real estate broker. The writing (which the court refers to as an "op-
tion agreement") was apparently specific about all or most of the
terms of sale, 1 and stated that Berryman did "hereby grant" to
Kmoch "an option for 120 days after date," in return for "$10.00 and
error or expressly revocable, and the possibility of unwarranted delay or pre-acceptance
"bid-shopping" by the plaintiff. See Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-61. In Lahr Construction
Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc., 640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), a New York trial
court judge expresses strong doubt as to whether the Drennan rule has actually become
New York law, but ultimately concludes that the plaintiffs reopening of negotiations with
the defendant precludes application of promissory estoppel to hold defendant to its bid.
336. See, e.g., Joe C. Creason, Jr., Note, Another Look at Construction Bidding and
Contracts at Formation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1720 (1967); see generally, Michael L. Closen &
Donald G. Weiland, The Construction Industry Bidding Cases: Application of Traditional
Contract, Promissory Estoppel and Other Theories to the Relations Between General Con-
tractors and Subcontractors, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 565 (1980).
337. Professor Alfred S. Konefsky has recently published a fascinating examination of
the Drennan case in its historical context. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interde-
pendence in Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estop-
pel, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169 (1997).
338. The formulation is as follows:
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to
the extent necessary to avoid injustice.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 87(2).
339. See Margaret N. Kniffin, Innovation or Aberration: Recovery for Reliance on a
Contract Offer, as Permitted by the New Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 62 U. DET. L.
REV. 23 (1984).
340. 559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977).
341. Terms expressly covered included price, inclusion of growing crops, water rights
and irrigation equipment, and the time for delivery of possession. See id. at 792.
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other valuable consideration."' 2 In late July, Berryman by telephone
"asked to be released from the option agreement," but "nothing defi-
nite was worked out between [Berryman and Kmoch]."' 34 In August,
Kmoch "decided to exercise the option," but was informed" that
Berryman had already sold the land to someone else. After "unpro-
ductive" conversations with Berryman, Kmoch recorded the option
agreement in the land records of the county where the land was lo-
cated in Kansas345 Berryman then brought a declaratory judgment
action to void his agreement with Kmoch (in order to remove a cloud
on his vendee's title, presumably). Summary judgment for Berryman
was granted by the trial court on the ground that the "option agree-
ment" was merely an offer made without consideration, hence was
revocable at any time before acceptance, and in fact had been effec-
tively revoked by the offeror in July, before Kmoch's attempted ac-
ceptance.3 On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, that ruling was
affirmed.
Along with the requirement of consideration, the free revocabil-
ity of an offer is one of the touchstones of classical contract law, so
much so that an offer will remain freely revocable even if it was stated
to be "irrevocable," or the offeror expressly promised not to revoke it
for a period of time. Assuming that the language "grant unto
you.., an option" should be understood as the making of an ex-
pressly irrevocable offer, that was exactly the situation presented in
Berryman. By 1977 (the date of that decision), this principle of free
revocability had been circumscribed by a number of exceptions; none
of those, however, was held to be applicable in that case.
The most obvious limitation on free revocability-which Kmoch
in his drafting of the agreement 47 had apparently sought to invoke-is
the creation of a true "option contract," the offeror's promise of ir-
revocability made binding by the receipt of consideration. The Ber-
ryman/Kmoch agreement recited the payment of ten dollars as con-
sideration for Berryman's grant of an option. If that sum had in fact
been paid, an option contract would have resulted, protecting Kmoch
for 120 days from the prospect of Berryman's revocation. But the
342. Id
343. Id at 793.
344. Not by Berryman, but by a federal land bank representative. See id.
345. Id
346. IM at 792.
347. The court indicates that the option agreement was drafted by Kmoch, who was a
real estate broker. See id at 792.
348. The courts generally appear willing to enforce option contracts on the basis of
very small amounts of money as consideration. See, e.g., Keaster v. Bozik, 623 P.2d 1376
(Mont. 1981) (five dollars as consideration for one-year option to purchase land for
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money never did change hands, and the so-called "option agreement"
therefore did not result in the creation of an option contract. Even if,
as Kmoch contended, he did expend time, money and effort at-
tempting to find investors to join with him in purchasing Berryman's
land, those actions were not deemed by the court to have been the
"price" of Berryman's promise not to revoke, and hence could not
under conventional bargain theory serve as the consideration to bind
an option contract.
But there are other avenues to irrevocability, besides the actual
payment of consideration. In section 87(1)(a), the Restatement (Sec-
ond) proposes a rule making a signed, written offer irrevocable where
it merely "recites a purported consideration," provided the offer pro-
poses a fair exchange to be performed within a reasonable time. 9
The rule is justified on the basis that the recital of consideration is
merely intended as a kind of legal formality, which in this context
should be given legal effect °.3 " Assuming the stated purchase price
was a fair one for Berryman's property,31l the requirements of section
87(1)(a) appear to have been met in Berryman. But, although it
elsewhere quotes and relies on the Restatement (Second) the appel-
late court in Berryman never addresses the possible application of
that rule.352
Had Berryman involved an offer to buy or sell goods, U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-205 might have been applied in Kmoch's favor to protect him
against revocation by Berryman, since that provision does create
short-term irrevocability (for up to three months) in the case of writ-
ten, "firm" offers. But that rule only applies where the offeror is a
merchant, and it requires a separate signing (or at least initialing3 3)
where the form was "supplied" by the offeree. Both those elements
are problematic in Berryman. Although Kmoch as a real estate bro-
$200,000).
349. See supra note 221 (discussing that rule in the context of Professor Barnett's pro-
posed rules of liability).
350. Assuming that the agreement in Berryman would be regarded as having been
made in the course of economic activity, it appears that the option agreement would have
been binding on the prospective seller Berryman under either the F & M "economic ac-
tivity" rule or the Barnett "intention to be bound" rule. See supra text accompanying
notes 75 and 216.
351. The court in Berryman never tells us either the option price or the amount for
which Berryman sold the land, so we cannot compare them.
352. Relatively few courts appear to have adopted the rule of Restatement (Second)
section 87(1)(a), so even if it had been addressed in Berryman, it might well have been re-
jected. Compare Smith v. Wheeler, 210 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. 1974) (recital of consideration
makes option agreement enforceable) with Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834 (Idaho 1980)
(contra).
353. See U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 2 (1995).
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ker would clearly be deemed a "merchant" in the U.C.C. sense (al-
though not of goods, of course), Berryman might not."M Moreover,
Kmoch is said to have drafted the agreement which Berryman signed.
Although the rules of the U.C.C. are sometimes applied "by analogy"
in non-Code cases, section 2-205 does not appear to have been even
noted by the parties or the court.
From the various rules discussed above, it is clear that the princi-
ple of free revocability-which is after all, merely an application of
the principle of freedom not to contract-bends fairly readily to the
principle of freedom to contract. Yet none of the exceptions so far
discussed overcame Berryman's freedom of revocation. What about
promissory estoppel? Although the court in Berryman discusses the
possible application of that principle, there is no indication in the
opinion that the court specifically addressed either the Drennan line
of cases or the possible application of Restatement (Second) section
87(2). The court does consider general promissory estoppel,35 but
declares (after a rather unsatisfactory and conclusory discussion) that
it should not apply because the acts advanced as detrimental reliance
were not reasonably foreseeable. 356
As courts often do, the Berryman court has evident difficulty in
sorting out its discussions of consideration and of promissory estop-
pel.3 In explanation of its decision on the promissory estoppel issue,
the court asserts that Kmoch's actions in seeking other investors were
not "acts which could reasonably be expected as a result of extending
354. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1995) ("merchant" for some purposes includes one skilled
in business practices).
355. The court quotes an earlier Kansas opinion, but the discussion generally mirrors
the requirements of Restatement (Second) section 90. See Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d
790,793-95 (Kan. 1977).
356. Most of the court's discussion concerns the possible presence of consideration.
As for promissory estoppel, it declares:
The requirements are not met here . ... Kmoch was familiar with real estate
contracts and personally drew up the present option. He knew no consideration
was paid for the same and that it had the effect of a continuing offer subject to
withdrawal at any time before acceptance. The acts which appellant urges as
consideration conferred no special benefit on the promisor or on his land. The
evidence which appellant desires to introduce in support of promissory estoppel
does not relate to acts which could reasonably be expected as a result of extend-
ing the option promise. It relates to time, effort and expense incurred in an at-
tempt to interest other investors in this particular land.
Id. at 794. The absence of benefit-to-the-promisor should not of course have been fatal to
the claim of promissory estoppel. Other issues raised by the court are discussed in the text
which follows.
357. In his discussion of Kansas case law, Eric Holmes says merely that the court in
Berryman did not apply promissory estoppel "based on special facts of case." Holmes, su-
pra note 19, at 382 n.436.
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the option promise.""35 To one reader, at least, this is simply unper-
suasive. Kmoch surely had to give some reason to justify asking for a
four-month option period. It is implausible that he would not have
discussed with Berryman some of the actions that Kmoch would be
taking during those four months. On the other hand, two other fac-
tors discussed in Berryman seem to have been particularly influential
with the court. One is the fact that the agreement was drafted by
Kmoch, who was a real estate professional while Berryman was not;
the other is the ease with which a true option contract could have
been created (i.e., by paying the ten dollars). Kmoch made his own
bed, the court is saying; let him lie in it.
Let us assume for the sake of this discussion that Kmoch's post-
offer actions were undertaken in the reasonable belief that Berryman
would honor his promise of an "option contract," and that-the
court's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding-those actions in-
deed reasonably could have been (and quite possibly in fact were)
foreseen by Berryman. On those assumptions, the case for promis-
sory estoppel under either section 90 or section 87(2) would be made,
so far as the particular elements are concerned: A promise.. not to
revoke the offer; foreseeable and reasonable reliance.36' But that's
only half the story. The real issue in Berryman is the question of in-
justice. Did an injustice to Kmoch result when Berryman was allowed
freely to revoke his offer and sell to another, without any liability to
Kmoch?
In the eyes of classical contract law, justice or injustice are de-
pendent on the existence of a contract. Where no contract exists,
there is no injustice in failing to perform a promise. And the exis-
tence of a contract is in turn dependent on the mechanics of offer and
acceptance: Where an offer has not been accepted, no contract exists;
ergo, no injustice. Classically, the acceptance of an offer is like the
flipping on of a light switch-where an instant before there was only a
358. Berryman, 559 P.2d at 794.
359. In this respect Berryman is stronger than Drennan, where the promise not to re-
voke was not express, but regarded by the court as implicit in the circumstances.
360. Presumably the agreement to create an "option" would have been so understood,
even by someone who was not a real estate professional.
361. A possible problem lies in the timing of Kmoch's actions. It is not clear from the
opinion whether the court treats the July telephone conversation between the parties as
necessarily amounting to a revocation by Berryman, or whether termination of the power
of acceptance only occurred when Kmoch learned from another source that Berryman had
sold to another. The July conversation was apparently inconclusive enough that it might
not have been an effective revocation; even so, it might have so alerted Kmoch to Berry-
man's change of heart that further reliance was plainly risky and therefore unreasonable.
in which event the section 90 case might be held to depend on Kmoch's earlier actions ex-
clusively.
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potential exchange of energy, the exercise of a power of acceptance
produces an instantaneous and full-powered connection, the contract.
That never happened in Berryman, said the court, because revocation
preceded acceptance.
But where the application of promissory estoppel is concerned,
both the creation of a right and the entitlement to a remedy for its
breach may be a gradual process-more like turning up a dimmer
switch in a darkened room. In the Berryman case, since the land
had been sold (possibly to a good faith purchaser with no knowledge
of the prior Berryman-Kmoch dealings), there may have been little or
no chance for Kmoch to actually acquire the land by effectively ac-
cepting Berryman's offer. But he still might have been entitled to re-
liance damages (reckoned by his expenditures in investigating and
promoting the deal) or even expectation damages (measured at least
by the contract-market differential, and perhaps including not only
incidental expenses but even lost profits) if his reliance had been
deemed to trigger the promissory estoppel rule of either section 90 or
section 87(2). And that would depend on whether the court's sense
of injustice had been aroused.
Where did justice lie, and injustice lurk, in Berryman? Many of
the factors in the case appear to jibe with the conventional classical
outcome reached by the court. For one thing, Professor Kostritsky's
"barriers to bargain" approach to promissory estoppe3 63 seems inap-
plicable here. Kmoch, the would-be buyer, was the professional real
estate dealer, not Berryman, and it was Kmoch who supplied the text
of the "option agreement" that Berryman signed.3'6 At one point
Berryman expressed his desire to withdraw the offer, and Kmoch ap-
parently resisted. Kmoch's actions in recording the agreement and
attempting to exercise his option all took place after he knew of Ber-
ryman's sale to another, and presumably were done with the intention
of clouding Berryman's title and setting up a lawsuit, in the hope ei-
ther of derailing the sale to the other buyer or at least obtaining a
profitable settlement to quiet title. Clearly Kmoch could, at the out-
set, have procured for himself a binding option contract if he wanted
362. The same analogy might of course be also applied to more modem notions of
contract formation. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1995); see generally, Charles L. Knapp,
Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotia-
tions, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 217 (1987).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
364. Whether or not this was a "form" is unclear; the option-granting clause has a
boilerplate look to it, but the balance of the agreement apparently contained many provi-
sions particular to their deal. Possibly it was a form with filled-in blanks, accompanied by
attachments.
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to, so why-one may well ask-should a court do for him what he
failed to do for himself?365
And yet, and yet-all that is a little too easy. If, as the Kansas
Supreme Court asserts, Kmoch was a savvy professional, who "knew
that [the option agreement] had the effect of a continuing offer sub-
ject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance, ,366 why in the world
did he hold on to the ten dollars, thereby risking exactly the disap-
pointing outcome that he got? Is it conceivable that Kmoch would
spring for a plane trip to Kansas and back, but balk at spending ten
bucks for a legally enforceable option? Not to me. It is far more
plausible to assume that if he did consciously address the question,
Kmoch expected that the option agreement would be binding, merely
on the strength of its recital of consideration.367 Did Berryman need
or want the ten dollars; was he aggrieved at its nonpayment? Again,
this is highly unlikely; surely he regarded that sum as a mere "formal-
ity," and was simply indifferent to the fact of non-payment. Indeed,
one can easily imagine Kmoch, as he climbs into his rental car to be-
gin the journey home, suddenly remembering and saying to Berry-
man, "Wait a minute, I forgot to give you the ten dollars!," only to be
told in reply, "Don't be silly, my word is good. Buy yourself a drink
on me at the airport."
But what about the imbalance of expertise? Was Berryman just
a naive hick, and Kmoch a city slicker? We really don't know enough
to answer that question. True, Kmoch was a professional dealer in
real estate, and Berryman possibly a simple tiller of the soil. Berry-
man did, however, own 960 acres of land, land that was valuable
enough to draw interest from as far away as Colorado and Nebraska.
True, Kmoch did supply the agreement which Berryman signed. On
the other hand, the language of that agreement was hardly obscure:
"I hereby grant unto you ... an option for 120 days after date to pur-
365. So stated, the argument against promissory estoppel here is intentionally evoca-
tive of Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted pronouncement in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933):
The contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting upon a con-
tract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does not in
the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do
not protect themselves.
James Baird is, of course, the gauntlet which Hand threw down over the years for Justice
Traynor to take up in Drennan v. Star Paving. Despite the minimal acknowledgment of
the James Baird decision in Traynor's Drennan opinion (a mere "cf." cite), Professor Al-
fred Konefsky argues convincingly that Traynor was quite conscious of Hand's opinion in
James Baird, and intended his Drennan opinion as a reply to it. Konefsky, supra note 337,
at 1220-35.
366. Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 794 (Kan. 1977).
367. Recall the rule of Restatement (Second) section 87(1)(a).
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chase the following described real estate." Shouldn't we assume that
Kmoch at least read it? And that if he did, he probably understood
it? And what about the price for the land; do we have reason to think
it was unfairly low? We do know that Berryman asked to be "re-
leased" from his agreement some six weeks or so later, which could
indicate that he had gotten a higher offer. However, that fact also
could indicate merely that he had gotten an offer as good as Kmoch's
(or nearly) from someone who was prepared to move immediately,
instead of taking another two to three months to decide.
Answers to the above questions might reveal a different version
of the case than assumed by the court, one in which Berryman ap-
pears not as the innocent dupe of a craftily manipulative Kmoch but
as a self-seeking promise breaker, taking advantage of a legal loop-
hole to avoid a commitment that he knew full well he had made.
Even so, the basic question still remains: Is it unjust to deny Kmoch
any compensation for Berryman's breach of trust? Here again, we
might want to learn more. How extensive and expensive were the ac-
tions Kmoch took? Were they actions that he would not have under-
taken unless he had an effective commitment protecting him against
revocation, and did Berryman understand that fact? Did Kmoch
commit himself or at least involve himself with other potential inves-
tors to the extent that Berryman's withdrawal was embarrassing and
possibly even injurious to Kmoch in future dealings? Indeed, is it
possible that Berryman even profited from Kmoch's activities, by
selling (either more quickly or for a higher price, or both) to someone
who became aware of this opportunity as a result of those activities?
At this point, you may be thinking: Give me a break, okay? All
of this agonizing over a possible promissory estoppel claim for a dis-
appointed buyer simply imposes too much cost and uncertainty in an
area where certainty could easily be achieved and such costs avoided.
A firm denial of this buyer's claim may deter the next one like it,
saving everybody the cost of a useless lawsuit. In the future, would-
be optionees like Kmoch will know they have to pay for an option (or
at least they should know that), so if they don't pay, we don't have to
feel sorry for them. Granting Berryman's plea will also enable both
him and his unnamed vendee to more quickly get on with their plans,
whatever those may be.
For many, those arguments are probably so decisive that they
could conclude the discussion. But all the factors that might persuade
a court of equity to exercise its powers in favor of Kmoch via promis-
sory estoppel are also factors that could impel a court to give Kmoch
the benefit of a close call on some other ground of decision-the Re-
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statement (Second) "recital of purported consideration" rule, say, or
the possibility of finding a bargained-for consideration." Of all the
possible grounds of decision (pro or con), only promissory estoppel
expressly invites the court to consider the equities of the case-on
both sides-and then to factor them explicitly into its decision.
Of course promissory estoppel is less efficient than some other
alternate basis for decision-making, if efficiency is to be found in the
avoidance of litigation and settlement costs. But that argument can
prove too much. Viewed in that light, the only perfectly efficient le-
gal rule would be a Draconian denial of all recovery, all the time-or,
as summarized in Gilmore's reductio ad absurdum of Oliver Holmes's
vision of the common law: "[I]deally, no one should be liable to any-
one for anything." 69
IV. Reliance Reassessed: The Prognosis for Promissory
Estoppel
For at least a century-much longer than that, by Eric Holmes's
account-various types of promise-reliance have received substantial,
if sporadic, legal protection from American courts. For most of this
century, such protection has often been accorded under the rubric
"promissory estoppel." The two Restatements of Contracts have pre-
sented this doctrine as one of the core concepts of contract law, and
countless numbers of courts have applied it in the resolution of legal
disputes. Yet promissory estoppel remains even today the new kid on
the contracts block, treated politely but coolly by some, derided by
others, and usually picked last when teams are chosen.7 ° Presented
by the Restatements as a rule (or collection of rules) that can be ap-
plied to reach appropriate case-decisions, promissory estoppel as we
have seen has been viewed by some as a rationale often used to justify
decisions that could and perhaps should be rested on other grounds.
Ultimately, anyone seeking to preserve, protect and defend promis-
sory estoppel comes up against the same questions: Why do we need
it? What does promissory estoppel do for contract law that can't ei-
ther be done just as well by better-established doctrines, or else hap-
pily done without?
We live in a time of transition, when much of life and of law is in
368. Cf Smith v. Wheeler, 210 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga. 1974) (holding option enforceable
on strength of optionee's promise to pay $1.00, even though not paid; implicit promise to
pay was sufficient consideration for irrevocability of offer): Mack v. Coker, 523 P.2d 1342.
1344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (holding buyer's efforts to obtain financing for purchase was
consideration for seller's grant of option).
369. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 14.
370. See supra note 297.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
a state of flux. No surprise there, we always live in a time of transi-
tion. Anyone who thinks otherwise hasn't lived long enough, or
hasn't been paying attention. But there are times when we can de-
lude ourselves into thinking that all or most of what we know and
value has always been there, and always will be. The end of the twen-
tieth century is not one of those times. Whether the tides are going
out or coming in, the waters are visibly churning, in contract law as in
other areas. In order to assess whether promissory estoppel can avoid
being swept away, we must ask what, if any, functions that doctrine
serves, and serves better than other bits of contract doctrine. Without
claiming to have exhausted the list of possibilities, it seems to me
there are at least three distinctive contributions made by promissory
estoppel: It helps us to decide cases better; it helps us to understand
cases better; and it helps us to understand ourselves better. These
three possibilities will be addressed in order below.
A. Deciding Cases: Plugging the Doctrinal Holes
The commentaries and case-surveys discussed above indicate
that promissory estoppel has often been applied in situations where,
in earlier times, other doctrines might have been used to reach similar
outcomes. It has been employed in such cases not necessarily because
the plaintiff's reliance has been so overwhelmingly substantial or det-
rimental, but because there probably has been at least some reliance
(albeit possibly intangible, and difficult to prove or quantify), and be-
cause the narrowed definition of consideration and the abandonment
of the seal have restricted the ability of twentieth century courts to
rest the imposition of liability on those other bases.
If the definition of consideration were broadened to incorporate
the F & M "economic activity" principle, then business promises
could in most cases be enforced on that ground alone, even though
reliance might also be present (although if substantial reliance had
obviously taken place, that factor might also be invoked to under-
score the justice of the outcome). Alternatively, if Barnett's en-
forcement category of promises-made-with-apparent-intent-to-be-
legally-bound were to be generally recognized, then many (though
not all) business promises and many intra-family or donative prom-
ises (including many made to charities) would on that basis be en-
forceable per se, without any proof of promisee-reliance. If both of
those expansions of doctrine were to take place, a large part of what
promissory estoppel now does could and quite possibly would be
done without ever mentioning promissory estoppel, and without any
specific comment on the presence (or absence) of reliance.
But for many courts this appears to be a time not of revision but
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of retrenchment. With all due respect to Farber, Matheson, Barnett,
and the others (myself included) who have suggested new "Restate-
ment" sections in this area, none of these faux Restatements-how-
ever persuasive their supporting arguments-has anything like the
authoritative force of the real thing. Until a new Restatement of
Contracts does appear, promissory estoppel will continue to protect
many promisees in situations where other doctrines in their existing
incarnations will not. And even if our notion of consideration were to
be expanded as those commentators have recommended, courts
would still in many cases face the question whether the presence of
reliance should be protected. In addition, in applying our newly ex-
panded concept of consideration we should even more squarely face
the question of whether liability should be imposed in its absence.
The significance of the distinction between conventional contract
and promissory estoppel is most apparent in cases where a promisor
repudiates his promise-either denies making it at all, or declares his
intention to break it-before any substantial reliance has occurred. If
the promise was part of a consideration-supported exchange, our pre-
sent system calls for its enforcement to the full extent of the expecta-
tion generated. If promissory estoppel would have been the only ba-
sis for its enforcement, however, the promisor's pre-reliance change
of heart should be sufficient to avoid liability on the promise."'
Suppose, though, that our notion of consideration were to be ex-
panded as Farber, Matheson and Barnett have advocated. How
should we treat a repudiating promisor whose promise is potentially
enforceable on either an "economic activity" or "intent to be bound"
basis? Since the arguments in favor of expanded liability generally
stress the "reliability" of the promise and the appropriateness of en-
forcement without regard to reliance, such a promise under the Far-
ber/Matheson/Barnett regime would become susceptible of enforce-
ment as soon as the promise was made, change of heart or no change
of heart. And such enforcement would presumably be full-fledged,
expectation-based, "Johnn y-and-the-car" liability, just as Y & T (and
Williston) have advocated. 3"
Should the presence or absence of reliance be irrelevant under
this new dispensation? Consider first the "economic activity" rule
proposed by F & M. To the extent that such a rule would apply to
371. Post-repudiation reliance would not be protected either because it would be
viewed as unreasonable or because its non-compensation would not be regarded as an in-
justice.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62. Again, it must be remembered that
the possibility of mitigating action could reduce the likelihood of substantial liability even
if enforcement were potentially available. See infra text accompanying notes 374-77.
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promises made by one party or the other in the course of performing
an agreement already made, it resembles the U.C.C. approach to
modification, stated in section 2-209(1): A modification of an existing
contract needs no consideration to be binding. By removing the ob-
stacle previously presented by the "pre-existing duty" corollary to the
classical consideration doctrine, the Code in Article 2 did for modifi-
cations of sale-of-goods contracts what F & M would do for all eco-
nomic activity. It made such agreements immediately and fully en-
forceable, without regard to whether they were "one-sided" or not.
So viewed, the F & M approach merely extends to the formation
of all commercial contracts the modification rule of section 2-209(1).
And indeed, many of the cases F & M use to illustrate their thesis
could have been also analyzed as modifications of already existing
agreements. But the rule suggested by F & M would apply also to ini-
tial promises, not merely to promises modifying agreements already
made, and so would Barnett's intent-to-be-bound rule. Assuming
those approaches were to become generally accepted law, the case for
full enforcement would be clearest when the promise at issue falls
into the double category of promise made in furtherance of economic
activity, with apparent intent to be bound. If stated formally, an eco-
nomic-activity promise satisfies both the F & M and the Barnett rules,
and seems an ideal candidate for full enforcement. If stated infor-
mally, however, the issue of reliance might appear relevant to the de-
cision of whether, or how, to enforce.
Take as an example Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v. Medical
Services Ass'n.33 Plaintiff Universal, a computer supplier located in
Westport, Connecticut, was preparing to submit a bid to supply com-
puters to the defendant, a Blue Shield health insurance company.
The bids were due to be submitted at the defendant's office in Har-
risburg, Pennsylvania, by noon on a Monday. In a telephone conver-
sation on the preceding Friday, Universal's president, Wilson, in-
quired of defendant's agent, Gebert, whether Gebert could arrange to
have plaintiff's bid picked up at the Harrisburg airport on Monday
morning. Gebert assured Wilson that Universal's bid would be
picked up and delivered to the defendant in time to meet the dead-
line. By Monday morning, however, Gebert had changed his mind
(probably because of an internal determination that government bid-
ding regulations applicable to the contracting process made such an
accommodation for one bidder improper). By the time Wilson was
notified of this fact, it was too late for Universal to get its bid from the
airport to defendant's office. Even though the bid would have been
the lowest, it was not considered because it arrived late. Plaintiff
373. 628 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1980).
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brought a federal diversity action against the defendant Blue Shield,
seeking the profit it would have made on the contract to supply com-
puters had its bid been timely received. Plaintiff received a jury ver-
dict in the district court, but the district judge granted defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, the jury's verdict was reinstated and judgment for plaintiff
upheld, on a promissory estoppel basis.
Serious questions of authority and causation existed in Universal
Computer. The defendant argued that it could not legally have made
the promise plaintiff asserted, and that its agent had no authority to
do so. The district court judge accepted this defense. Defendant also
disputed the value of plaintiff's lost expectation. But the appellate
court held that Gebert had apparent authority to make that promise
and that the probability of plaintiff as low bidder receiving the con-
tract was sufficiently established to allow the jury to find for plaintiff
on the damage issue.
As decided, Universal Computer's case for liability rested on its
reliance on Gebert's promise (for which Blue Shield was held respon-
sible), and the cost of that reliance-its loss of a profit which would
have been earned had its bid been received and considered as prom-
ised. This was not a promise for which defendant exacted any ex-
change, and thus it would not have been deemed supported by con-
sideration under the currently accepted definition of that term. But it
was clearly a promise made in furtherance of economic activity, and
under the F & M approach would have been enforceable without re-
gard to reliance. Whether Gebert made his promise intending to be
legally bound seems highly unlikely. Presumably he was just accom-
modating a bidder in the hope of maximizing the number of eligible
bids from which the defendant could select.
Despite the potential applicability to this case of the F & M
"economic activity" rule, which would have made Gebert's promise
immediately enforceable upon its making,374 it appears that an imme-
diate or prompt retraction by Gebert-later on Friday afternoon,
say-would have entirely avoided any liability on the defendant's
part. Initially, the promise was one which the plaintiff could reasona-
bly expect to be performed, since performance would have been in
the defendant's economic interest as well as the plaintiff's. However,
as soon as it was clear to plaintiff that performance of that promise
374. In setting forth their proposed rule of liability, F & M are of course careful to
point out that there may be agency problems, see Farber & Matheson, supra note 61, at
934, but the appellate court in Universal Computers resolved that issue against the defen-
dant. See id. at 932-33. They also note that a definite commitment is required, but again
the court's decision seems to have resolved that issue in the plaintiff's favor.
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would not be forthcoming, plaintiff could no longer reasonably rely
on that promise, and at that point would have been required to miti-
gate its damage. If any means remained available for getting the
plaintiff's bid to Harrisburg by noon on Monday, defendant would
not have been liable for withdrawing its promise. Even though the
plaintiff psychologically began to "rely" on the promise as soon as it
was made, a non-mitigatable change of position by the plaintiff oc-
curred only at the point when timely delivery of its bid was no longer
possible. Under both the promissory estoppel approach and the F &
M expanded definition of consideration, the promise could with im-
punity have been retracted until that time, because of the doctrine of
"avoidable consequences"-the principle of mitigation of damages.
The foregoing illustrates that the principle of reliance has an im-
pact much broader than just "promissory estoppel." Even if a prom-
isee has received a promise that under existing doctrine is enforceable
per se, the promisee may still lack any effective remedy for its breach
because the promisee's position has not changed beyond her ability to
mitigate any injury from that breach.37 6 It is not accurate to say that
the rules governing remedies never compensate the non-relying
promisee, but it is fair to say that the promisee whose position has not
changed beyond the possibility of mitigation will often have little or
no legal remedy for a breach.
375. Since Harrisburg is only 220 miles from Westport, obviously plaintiff could have
gotten its bid to the defendant by noon on Monday even if it did not learn of Gebert's re-
traction until late on Sunday.
376. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 350; FARNswoRT, CONTRACrs §
12.12; Charles L. Knapp, Mitigation of Damages: The Doctrine of Avoidable Conse-
quences, in COMMERCIAL DAMAGES § 4.1 (1993).
377. Depending on the possibility of mitigation, there might perhaps be some differ-
ence between the reliance and expectation remedies in Universal Computers. If the de-
fendant's promise had been repudiated even as late as Sunday afternoon, the plaintiff's bid
could still have been timely delivered by Monday noon, but it might have been necessary
for plaintiff either to arrange for someone else to pick up the bid at the airport and hand-
carry it to defendant, or even to transport the bid to Harrisburg in some other way, by car
perhaps. If the defendant's promise were regarded (a la F & M) as being binding as soon
as it was made, then even a timely retraction would leave the defendant at least theoreti-
cally liable for the cost of transporting plaintiff's bid from the airport to the defendant's
office. If the defendant's promise were enforceable only on a reliance basis, however, and
for that reason a reliance-based recovery was deemed appropriate, that remedy would
presumably be computed on the assumption that since plaintiff would have originally
borne the cost of airport-to-office transportation, defendant should be liable only for the
excess over that cost occasioned by plaintiff's reliance on its promise. The relative trivial-
ity of the difference between these hypothetical claims underscores the fact that in the real
Universal Computer case, the battle was not over what we sometimes think of as the "or-
dinary" kind of reliance, out-of-pocket expenses, but rather over the loss of a profit oppor-
tunity occasioned by reliance on defendant's promise. Once the defendant's refusal to
honor its promise had put that opportunity out of reach, both the "expectation" and the
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Thus it appears that even under the F & M regime, the question
of reliance would continue to be relevant in various ways. Let us turn
our attention now to Barnett's "intention to be bound" approach. To
illustrate the problems that could arise in that area, consider some
well-known intra-family cases in which promissory estoppel was ap-
plied. In Greiner v. Greiner,378 the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed
judgment for Frank Greiner, who defended a forcible detention ac-
tion brought by his mother. Frank answered his mother's complaint,
saying she had promised to convey to him a plot of land, if he should
abandon his landholding in another county and come to live near her.
On facts strongly reminiscent of the early Kirksey v. Kirksey3 79 (the
classic "Sister Antillico" case), the court in Greiner invoked Re-
statement section 90 in holding for the defendant on the basis of his
actions in reliance. Judgment for defendant Frank Greiner could
conceivably have been based on a somewhat strained application of
the consideration doctrine,3" but the availability of promissory estop-
pel made that unnecessary. Greiner is thus an excellent example of a
decision that could probably have been reached without promissory
estoppel, but is more easily reached and better justified by that doc-
trine. Greiner also represents a class of cases which would probably
be unaffected by the doctrinal reforms suggested by F & M. Not
having been made in the furtherance of economic activity, Mrs. Gre-
iner's promise to her son Frank would not come within the F & M ex-
panded view of consideration-supported commitments.
As to the effect on Greiner of Barnett's suggested doctrinal inno-
vations, however, the outcome is less clear. Did Mrs. Greiner appear
to intend to be legally bound by her promise? This may have been
unclear at the outset, although as time went on she seems to have
contemplated and discussed a variety of actions that clearly would
have had legal effect, such as making a will in Frank's favor or con-
veying a deed to him. 8t That factor could cut both ways. On the one
hand, by expressing her intention of benefiting Frank through one
means or another, Mrs. Greiner manifested the seriousness of her in-
tent to carry out her purpose, thereby strengthening the reasonable-
"reliance" recovery should encompass compensation for its loss. See generally Knapp, su-
pra note 376, at § 2-1.
378. 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930).
379. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
380. Although facts are lacking, the same is probably even more true of the Kirksey
case.
381. Of course, making a will in Frank's favor probably would not have had any legal
effect in the actual case, since Mrs. Greiner-apparently at the urging of another of her
children-repudiated her promise to Frank during her lifetime. She would presumably
have revoked such a will, if made.
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ness of Frank's reliance thereon. On the other hand, her discussion of
those various legal actions-which she never did carry out-could be
seen as undercutting any intention on her part to be legally bound by
her promise alone. The point is debatable, and the answer is not ob-
vious, but under Barnett's scheme it becomes crucial. By insisting on
the element of intent-to-be-legally-bound, Barnett's suggested
reformulation of promissory estoppel would work a substantial nar-
rowing of the present section 90. By increasing the plaintiff's bur-
den in such cases, it would risk the denial of recovery to future Frank
Greiners. As argued above, this narrowing of promissory estoppel
seems unwarranted and unwise. Whether Frank Greiner believed
that his mother intended her promise to be legally enforceable should
not be controlling. Far more important is the fact that when he took
action in reliance on her promises to him, he trusted her (as his
mother, clearly concerned about his welfare) to. perform what she had
promised-making any thought of legal enforcement on his part un-
necessary and unlikely.
In contrast to Greiner v. Greiner, consider the classic early case
of Ricketts v. Scothom.3m In Ricketts, a grandfather's promissory note
made payable to his granddaughter Katie was enforced against his es-
tate on the basis of an "equitable estoppel" (generally now regarded
as an early version of "promissory estoppel"), because the promisor
had apparently wished by his promise to present his granddaughter
with at least the option of quitting her job, and she had indeed done
so. Like the mother's promise in Greiner, the grandfather's note in
Ricketts was not within the area defined by F & M; although his
promise had an effect on his granddaughter's employment decision, it
was not made in furtherance of any economic activity of the grandfa-
ther. Their proposed expansion of consideration would thus have no
effect on a case with facts like those in Ricketts.
As with Greiner, however, the adoption of Barnett's "intent-to-
be-bound" liability rule could have had an effect on Ricketts, al-
though this time it might cut the other way. Unlike the mother's oral
promises in Greiner, the promissory note in Ricketts was in legal form,
and should easily pass Barnett's apparent-intent-to-be-bound test.
Under that rule, the note would presumably have been fully enforce-
able as soon as delivered (and immediately payable, too, being a de-
mand note), without regard to any reliance. Would Barnett's rule
improve the court's ability to deal with a case like Ricketts?
382. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 90.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 223-33.
384. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 216-22.
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Since the economic loss to the plaintiff in that case appears to
have been less than the amount of her grandfather's note (her quit-
ting work was only temporary), the facts in Ricketts can be used to
support the argument that damages in promissory estoppel cases
could be limited to reliance damages. On the other hand, full protec-
tion of the reliance interest in Ricketts might justify full enforcement
of the promise since Katie's quitting her job even for a period could
have entailed real but unproveable other loss. 3 6 But that argument
rests on the assumption of at least some reliance injury to the plain-
tiff-substantial, if perhaps unquantifiable. Should the grandfather's
promissory note have been enforceable immediately and in the full
amount, in the complete absence of any reliance at all? Barnett,
along with Y & T, would apparently answer yes.3"7 But just as the
presence of reliance made Ricketts a stronger case, its absence would
make it a substantially weaker one. If instead of dying with his
promise unrevoked, the grandfather had survived to retract that
promise before his granddaughter took any action at all in reliance on
it, one might well conclude that on those facts no injustice would flow
from withholding enforcement. This would be particularly true if the
386. Cf Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1979)
(discussing the Kirksey case).
387. Barnett on the basis of apparent intent to be legally bound; Y & T on the basis of
the clear foreseeability of definite and substantial reliance (whether or not such reliance
actually takes place). It should be noted, incidentally, that one virtue that might be
claimed for Barnett's approach is the fact that some third party might pay to acquire the
grandfather's promissory note, ignorant of whether it had been relied on or not. But of
course the principle of negotiability-now as in the day of Ricketts-protects any third
party taker of a negotiable instrument who qualifies for holder in due course protection
against the assertion of, inter ajia, a lack of consideration defense by the maker. See
U.C.C. §§ 3-302 (1995) (defining holder in due course), 3-303(b) (stating that drawer or
maker of instrument has defense if instrument issued without consideration), 3-305(a)
(stating that right of holder in due course subject to "real" defenses-fraud, incapacity,
etc.-but not to defense of lack of consideration). The Barnett approach would go beyond
that well-established principle, in effect turning every promissory note, consideration or
not, into a quasi-negotiable one. Whether that is intended is not clear; whether it is desir-
able is debatable. Of course, Restatement (Second) section 90 now protects third-party
reliance as well. Could that provision be read also to protect the transferee of a non-
negotiable promissory note who relies on the promise by paying for the note? In view of
the ready availability of the negotiability device for just this situation, and the need for
foreseeability here as elsewhere under section 90, it may be that special circumstances
would be needed to turn that action into foreseeable and reasonable reliance. It does not
appear, incidentally, that the promissory note in Ricketts was indeed in negotiable form.
Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) with Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E.
94 (N.Y 1919) (a well-known case in which an intra-family promissory note was not en-
forced for lack of consideration, despite the fact that it apparently was in negotiable form:
as payee on the note, the plaintiff presumably would not have qualified for holder in due
course status).
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granddaughter had not only continued to work, but also had stopped
going to the church her family had traditionally attended, had pub-
licly snubbed her grandfather's new wife, and was dating boys her
grandfather (for not inappropriate reasons) strongly disapproved of.3"
Similar questions can be raised about the enforcement of prom-
ises made to charities. Over the years, courts have generally at-
tempted on one ground or another to uphold promises made to chari-
ties. A famous example is the Allegheny College case,'' in which
Judge Cardozo mustered a majority of the New York Court of Ap-
peals behind the proposition that the deceased promisor's subscrip-
tion could be enforced against her estate on the basis of an implicit
promise by the college to memorialize her name, while at the same
time in his opinion for the court flirting with the notion that promis-
sory estoppel would also have justified enforcement. 9° Building on
this history of judicial sympathy, the Restatement (Second) proposed
in its version of section 90 a rule permitting recovery on promises to
charities without requiring proof of reliance. Despite the public pol-
icy arguments in favor of such a rule, some courts have disagreed. In
Maryland National Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Federation,'9' for in-
stance, the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to adopt the Re-
statement (Second) approach, insisting on either a demonstration of
consideration or a showing of definite and substantial reliance on the
particular promise sought to be enforced.
In this area, the doctrinal innovations suggested by the commen-
tators seem potentially important and useful. As we have seen, the F
& M "economic activity" rule can easily be stretched to accommodate
any donative promise made to a charity by a business enterprise."9'
And the Barnett "intent to be bound" rule could make formal prom-
ises to charities enforceable per se. Thus, both approaches could in
different ways advance the policy goal of the Restatement (Second's)
proposed approach to charitable giving.
As in the Greiner case, the sticking point comes in the situation
where an informal promise is made, apparently with the serious intent
to perform, and the promisee, in reliance on that promise, proceeds to
rely in substantial ways. Should the charity in that event also have to
388. Professor Eisenberg has suggested that if intra-family donative promises were to
be freely enforceable without regard to reliance, they should probably be subject to de-
fenses of improvidence and ingratitude, as they are in civil law countries. See Eisenberg,
supra note 386, at 13-18.
389. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
390. See generally Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Car-
dozo in the Allegheny College Case, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 645 (1987).
391. 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979).
392. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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meet Barnett's requirement that the promisor have intended appar-
ently to be legally bound by her promise? Again, this seems ques-
tionable. Even if not formally expressed, a charitable promise that is
nevertheless really made and substantially and reasonably relied on,
should at least be enforceable under the general promissory estoppel
rule of section 90, without insisting on a further requirement of intent
to be bound.3 93 Even the Maryland court which rejected the Restate-
ment (Second's) suggested special rule for charities would have en-
forced on the basis of the general section 90 rule, had sufficient reli-
ance on the particular promise been shown.3 "4  But worries about
insufficiently deliberate or unduly influenced promises might also af-
fect one's willingness to enforce an informal promise in the charitable
area, even if the promise had been demonstrably relied on.3 95
393. How Barnett himself would view the Allegheny College case today is far from
clear. In his Death of Reliance exposition of an intention-to-be-legally-bound rule of li-
ability (his suggested Restatement section 71B, see supra text accompanying note 216),
Barnett includes an illustration seemingly inspired by Allegheny College:
6. A promises to donate $5,000 to B, a religious college, in a signed writing that
includes the statement that, "I hereby intend to be bound." A's promise is en-
forceable regardless of whether B relies on it.
Barnett, supra note 204, at 533. But this illustration goes beyond the facts of the real Alle-
gheny College case by including an express statement of intention to be bound; here, Bar-
nett has simply shot a fish in his own doctrinal barrel, so to speak. In the real Allegheny
College case, the promisor's pledge (which seems to have been a preprinted form) did not
have such a statement, but it included the language "in consideration of my interest in
Christian education and in consideration of others subscribing, I hereby subscribe .... "
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (1927). Bar-
nett's section 71B includes the possibility of a recital of "nominal consideration" to make
the promise binding, but his only illustration of this point is the phrase "in return for valu-
able consideration of $1.00." Barnett, supra note 204, at 533 (Illustration 3). Barnett's
suggested new rule shares with existing Restatement (Second) section 87(1)(a) (discussing
recital of "purported consideration;" see comment b discussing "nominal consideration")
ambiguity as to whether the recited "consideration" must be something that could satisfy
the traditional consideration requirement, if actually present in the transaction. Presuma-
bly "my interest in Christian education," even though quite probably present in Allegheny
College, would not serve legally as consideration, but "others subscribing" could. In his
reliance-recovery section, section 71C, Barnett fails to give any express indication whether
in his scheme an Allegheny-type promise could be enforceable solely on the basis of reli-
ance (although his discussion in comment c seems to imply that it might).
394. See Maryland Nat'l Bank, 407 A.2d at 1138.
395. In suggesting near-automatic liability for charitable-subscription promises, the
Restatement (Second) follows up its seemingly strong statement of the rule in section
90(2) ("binding ... without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance") with
the following illustration:
17. A orally promises to pay B, a university, $100,000 in five annual installments
for the purposes of its fund-raising campaign then in progress. The promise is
confirmed in writing by A's agent, and two annual installments are paid before
A dies. The continuance of the fund-raising campaign by B is sufficient reliance
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The preceding discussion has addressed the role of promissory
estoppel as a reason for enforcement, distinct from consideration or
formal devices like the seal. 96 But that doctrine also plays a role in
overcoming formal rules, such as the requirement of definiteness3" or
the statute of frauds.3 98 Here again, a change in the law-in this area,
abandonment of the formal rule-could obviate the necessity of in-
yoking reliance as a means of overcoming such a requirement?" Un-
til that happens, estoppel should continue to be available and effec-
tive in cases where the promisee's reliance both corroborates the
making of the promise and makes enforcement appropriate despite
the non-satisfaction of the formal requirement.'
The foregoing is hardly an exhaustive treatment of the role of
reliance in contract law, either now or in the future. I have merely at-
tempted to suggest a variety of ways in which the presence or absence
of reliance could be important in deciding whether promises should
be enforced, even under the liberalized approaches to liability advo-
cated by the various commentators whose work we have discussed. It
to make the promise binding on A and his estate.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 90(2) cmt. f, ilius. 17 (1981). As an illustration of a bare-
bones automatic enforcement rule, this is somewhat short of compelling; given the
written confirmation and partial performance during the promisor's lifetime, there
seems little other than a Ouija-board message from the departed himself that could
have been loaded on to make enforcement look appropriate. (Similar facts were not
enough, however, in Maryland National Bank v. United Jewish Appeal, discussed su-
pra text accompanying note 391; conversely, in Allegheny College, the promisor had
recanted before her death, but to no avail.) The Reporter's Note to Restatement
(Second) section 90 indicates that illustration 17 quoted above was based on In re
Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr. Ct. 1958), a case in which one assumes, reading
between the lines, that everybody involved (including the heirs) wanted the promised
gift upheld, perhaps for tax reasons. A more convincingly adversarial illustration for
section 90(2) would have been Woodmere Academy v. Steinberg, 363 N.E.2d 1169
(N.Y. 1977) (also, like Allegheny College and Field's Estate, from New York), in
which the promisor, still very much alive and strenuously resisting enforcement, was
held to his promise to donate $200,000 to plaintiff prep school; of course, plaintiff
school had named its library for Mrs. Steinberg.
396. A modem example would be the "firm" offer in U.C.C. section 2-205, irrevocable
if in writing and signed. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1995).
397. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 34(3) cmt. d (stating that reliance may make remedy
appropriate despite uncertainty). See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 139,150.
399. At one point in the evolution of the revised Article 2 of the U.C.C., it appeared
that the Code's statute of frauds for the sale of goods, section 2-201, would simply be omit-
ted from the revised Sales Article. As of this writing, it appears that some version of the
writing requirement will survive, probably with some indication either in the section or its
comments that reliance may trump the writing requirement. See infra note 148.
400. One proposed version of the new U.C.C. statute of frauds in Article 2 would have
explicitly incorporated a reliance-based exception to that statutory formality. See the dis-
cussion of July, 1997, draft of § 2-201(c)(3), infra note 148, at 21.
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does not appear to me that reliance would necessarily become irrele-
vant in that world. Indeed, if the combined Farber-Matheson-
Barnett-Yorio-Thel approaches should completely prevail, we might
well feel the need of an additional equitable principle to temper their
sweeping effect, a sort of promissory-estoppel-in-reverse:
If the maker of a potentially enforceable promise can
carry the burden of showing that no reliance had occurred
when that promise was revoked, enforcement may be de-
nied if no injustice will result therefrom.
The further exploration of this suggested application of the reli-
ance principle can well be left to more elaborate discussions of the
pros and cons of expanding our notion of consideration. For our pur-
poses here, it may be enough to suggest that while promissory estop-
pel is presently employed to rationalize some of the results that the
promise theorists applaud, continued attention to the reliance factor
will be appropriate even after a sweeping, promise-theory-based re-
laxation of the consideration requirement has taken place. If, as F &
M have reported, reliance-based promissory estoppel is in the process
of persuading the consideration doctrine to let its hair down and re-
lax, that's probably a happy development. But it looks like the reli-
ance principle should hang around the party for a while anyway, to
serve as the designated driver if needed.
B. Understanding Cases: Reliance v. Reliance
In the introduction to this Part IV, I suggested with perhaps
seeming redundance that focusing on the principle of reliance protec-
tion not only helps us decide cases better, it can help us understand
them better. In the preceding section, I suggested that reliance analy-
sis might continue to be useful in contract decision-making even if the
doctrinal reforms recommended by recent commentators were gener-
ally accepted. In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate how at-
tention to the reliance factor can help us better understand other,
more complex cases.
Most of the examples discussed in the previous section were pro-
totypical promissory estoppel cases-cases in which the defendant
appears to have made a promise on which the plaintiff relied, justify-
ing enforcement despite some doctrinal impediment. In such cases,
the role played by reliance seems simple and obvious, and the only
question is whether the relied-on promise should be enforced despite
the doctrinal obstacle. One party is (or appears to be) the "relying"
party, while the other party is the one whose commitment may be
deemed enforceable by virtue of the first party's reliance. There are
many cases, however, in which both parties are relying, each in its
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own way, on something. Both forms of reliance may appear reason-
able, and both may seem worthy of protection. How might such a
state of affairs come to pass? And when it does, how are we to priori-
tize-to decide whose reliance is more worthy of legal protection?
Consider the following sampling of some of the situations in
which promissory estoppel is commonly thought to have potential
application: (1) Gratuitous promises, not otherwise supported by
consideration-intrafamily gifts, non-exchange business promises,
charitable subscriptions; (2) Unwritten agreements within the statute
of frauds-sale of land, sale of goods, a promise to answer for an-
other's debt, an agreement not to be performed within a year; (3) Re-
voked offers; and (4) Modification agreements. In all these situa-
tions, one party-for the purposes of this discussion, call her the
promisee-may claim to have relied on the other party's promise of
performance. But the other party, the promisor, may assert that he
relied as well-that he relied on a rule of law that would protect him
from liability on his promise."' Is this a credible assertion? And if it
is, is this type of reliance deserving of legal protection-protection
which in this situation would consist of a denial of the promisee's
claim?
It should be noted that many of these non-liability rules are far
from absolute; the armor they provide against liability has many a
gap. Intra-family promises can sometimes fit into the bargain mold,
as can some ostensibly gratuitous business promises; the same is true
of charitable donations, and even in the complete absence of consid-
eration charitable promises are sometimes enforced. Some mixed
goods/services agreements will fall within the more liberal statute of
frauds in U.C.C. section 2-201, and be enforceable. Many contracts
are taken outside the one-year statute of frauds by remote contingen-
cies of termination. An oral promise to answer for the debt of an-
other may be deemed enforceable under the "main purpose" rule.4 2
An offer may appear to be "firm," and for that reason be irrevocable
under either U.C.C. section 2-205 or Restatement (Second) section
87(1)(a). An agreement modifying an existing contract may fall un-
der Article 2, and thus require no consideration under the rule of
U.C.C. section 2-209(1); if not, the "unanticipated difficulties" rule of
Restatement (Second) section 89(a) may yet apply. So, in many
cases, a legally-knowledgeable promisor could not rely with complete
assurance on the protection of a conventional non-liability rule. He
401. Here, as generally throughout this article, assigning genders to the parties is in-
tended only as a convenience, to assist me (and you) in differentiating between them in
the various hypothetical cases set for discussion.
402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 116.
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would be aware of the possibility that the promisee could successfully
invoke one of the exceptions or limitations on the rule in question.
On the other hand, there are surely many cases where the prom-
ise in question could clearly fall within a general rule of non-liability.
Examples could include the promise of a gift from one family mem-
ber to another; an oral agreement to sell land: withdrawal of an unac-
cepted non-goods offer, even if purportedly "firm"; the completely
"one-sided" modification of a service agreement, not generated by
any surprising difficulty of performance. In these situations, a legally-
knowledgeable promisor might with confidence assume that some le-
gal rule protected him against liability on his promise.
So, in many cases, it appears that a promisor seeking to avoid li-
ability for nonperformance of his promise could credibly declare: "I
never would have made that promise if I hadn't honestly and rea-
sonably believed that it was not legally enforceable." He might will-
ingly so testify under oath, and we might well believe him. "And
therefore," his argument would continue, "you shouldn't hold me to
it." Perhaps that argument should not enable the promisor to stave
off liability if the rule he relied on did not in fact provide the protec-
tion he expected it would. (Maybe consideration for his promise was
not required, or could be found in some element of the transaction;
maybe the statute of frauds did not apply to his promise after all;
maybe his offer was "firm," and fell under Article 2.) But suppose
the promisor is right about the non-liability rule: It does apply to the
facts of his case, and-except for the possible effect of the promisee's
reliance-the promisor would indeed have no legal obligation by rea-
son of his nonperformance. When, if ever, should the promisor's reli-
ance on a rule of law trump the promisee's reliance on the expecta-
tion of his performance?
Despite contract law's professed allegiance to the "objective the-
ory" of contract formation and enforcement,4"3 it is clear that in many
cases contract law does care about the actual state of mind of one or
both of the actors in a contractual dispute."" And in order to reach
403. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 230 (stating that standard of interpretation where
there is integration is that of a "reasonably intelligent person"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 200 cmt. b ("[T]he intention of a party that is relevant to formation of a contract is the
intention manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention.").
404. Despite continued reference to the issue of whether one party has "reason to
know" of the other's meaning or intention, the Restatement (Second) rules regarding con-
tract formation and interpretation depend not only upon the appearance of intention but
on the fact of intention as well. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 19, 20, 21, 26, 27,
201. Perhaps because it owes fealty to Karl Llewellyn rather than to Samuel Williston or
Oliver Holmes, the U.C.C. in Article 2 is able to be a little more forthright on the issue of
intent. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3) (1995) (stating that a contract with open terms may be
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this point in our analysis, we have necessarily accepted the possibility
that the promisor will make a claim about his state of mind at the
time the promise was made, a claim which we are willing to accept
both as true and also as potentially significant. So it should be no
great stretch to posit that in order to assess the relative strength of the
parties' positions, we must also consider the state of mind of the
promisee. What did she know about the rule of law by which the
promisor claims to be excused, and about the promisor's reliance on it
when he made his promise to her? A variety of cases may be imag-
ined.
Case 1. At the time the promise was made and relied on by the
promisee, she was unaware of the non-liability rule. This is clearly
the easiest case. Assuming the promisee really didn't know of the
rule, but the promisor did, then the promisor may have been aware of
the promisee's ignorance.' Even if he was not, he apparently did
nothing to bring home to her the existence of a rule he might later in-
voke to avoid liability for nonperformance. Until the promisee has
changed her position in reliance on the promise, the promisor may in-
yoke that rule to explain and justify his nonperformance.6 Once the
promisee has relied, however, it should be too late for that. By first
making and then breaking an apparently genuine commitment to the
promisee, the promisor has induced her to rely to her detriment on
the prospect of his performance. Being unaware of the non-liability
rule, the promisee could not anticipate the promisor's later invocation
of that rule to escape liability for his nonperformance. Her claim for
relief is based on actual injury, which he caused and could have
avoided.' If the promisor is left worse off by enforcement of his
binding if parties have intended to make a contract), 2-305(1) and (4) (stating that parties
if they so intend can conclude contract with open price term; when parties intend not to be
bound unless price is fixed or agreed they are not bound unless it is so fixed or agreed).
405. This suggests the possibility that the promisor's non-disclosure could be wrongful,
in legal effect an assertion that no such rule of law existed. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§§ 161 (defining when nondisclosure is equivalent to an assertion), 170 (explaining reli-
ance on assertions as to matters of law).
406. Even if the promisor's action in making a promise he did not intend to keep could
be treated as fraudulent, if the promise is repudiated before the promisee has relied on it,
the promisor would presumably have incurred no liability. In order for fraud or misrepre-
sentation to have legal effect, it must be relied on by the other party. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) §§ 163, 164 (stating that to prevent formation of contract or make contract
voidable, fraudulent or material misrepresentation must induce manifestation of assent by
the other party), 167 (stating that to be "inducing cause", it must be at least a substantial
factor influencing decision). Of course, in the context of our discussion, the party affected
by fraud or misrepresentation of intent (our "promisee") does not want to avoid a contract
so induced, she wants to prevent the other party from escaping liability on his promise by
invoking a rule of law, the existence of which was withheld from her.
407. Yes, there is at this point an issue of whether relief for the promisee requires pro-
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promise, this is not the fault of the promisee; it is rather the result of
the promisor's own breach of trust. On the other hand, to withhold a
remedy from the promisee would leave her worse off by virtue of her
reliance, even though she has not acted unreasonably. The moral
force of protecting trust reasonably reposed, combined with the social
utility of compensating harm induced by breach of trust, surely ex-
ceed in this case whatever utility might come from adherence to a
general principle leaving promisors free to make and then break
promises with impunity.
Suppose, however, that the promisee is aware of the non-liability
rule that might protect the promisor, but relies on his promise any-
way. Here things get more complicated. Professor Barnett and oth-
ers have questioned whether a promisee can ever reasonably rely on a
promise which she knows to be unenforceable under some rule of
law. °8 The answer seems to depend on more factors than just the
promisee's knowledge, however. Consider some of the possible
variations:
Case 2. Although the promisee knows of the non-liability rule,
she is assured by the promisor that he will provide her with a writing,
ensuring legal enforceability. (This case of course assumes that the
non-liability rule is a "statute of frauds," some rule that requires a
writing for enforcement.) Even the Restatement (First) was willing to
accept this ancillary promise as a sufficient predicate for protection of
the promisee's reliance, placing this situation alongside the case
where a promisor falsely (and probably fraudulently) represents that
a writing does in fact exist." The promise to create a writing could
also be fraudulent, if made with no intention of performance, but it
need not be; it may have been sincere when made, and still give rise
to a "promissory estoppel" on the promisee's behalf.1 ° If the promi-
tection of her expectation interest, or merely compensation for her reliance injury. I am
not addressing that question in this discussion.
408. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 452. See also Goldstick v. ICM Realty.
788 F.2d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J. discussing the erosion of the statute of frauds
by promissory estoppel).
409. Restatement (First) section 178, comment f, asserts that an "estoppel" may pre-
clude use of the statute of frauds defense where substantial action has been taken in reli-
ance on either a representation that the statute has been satisfied (i.e., that a sufficient
memorandum has been created) or a promise to create such a memorandum. The com-
ment refers to the latter possibility as "an effective promissory estoppel," the only use of
that terminology in the Restatement (First).
410. Even courts not generally hospitable to promissory estoppel as a counter to the
statute of frauds defense may accept the notion that an express promise to provide a writ-
ing can effectively overcome the statute if relied on. See, e.g.. Klinke v. Famous Recipe
Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 647 (Wash. 1980) (en banc). Although Restatement
(First) section 178 comment f does say that the promissory estoppel may operate "if the
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sor does not perform as promised, he is guilty of a double breach of
trust, having broken not one promise but two; for her part, the prom-
isee by perhaps soliciting the promise of a writing may have taken at
least some precaution against the operation of the non-liability rule.
These factors taken together make the case for the promisee still an
appealing one, despite perhaps a greater awareness on her part of the
riskiness of reliance.
Case 3. The promisee is aware of the rule of non-liability, but the
promisor assures the promisee that he can be counted on to perform
despite the legal barrier to enforceability. In this case, that barrier
might be lack of compliance with a formality (as in Case 2), or it
might be lack of consideration.411 Here again, if the promisor reneges
he is guilty of a double breach of trust. The Restatement (Second)
section 139 goes beyond the earlier rule, providing that a promissory
estoppel to override the statute of frauds may arise on the basis of
reasonable and foreseeable reliance, not necessarily dependent on an
express promise to create a writing.1 But that does not answer our
question as to the effect of the plaintiff's awareness of the non-
liability rule.413  Should that factor tip the balance away from the
promisee?
In our earlier discussion of Greiner v. Greiner,4 4 I asserted that
Statute [of Frauds] would otherwise operate to defraud," cases like Klinke do not appear
to insist that the promise have been technically fraudulent to trigger the estoppel.
411. If the barrier to enforcement is the statute of frauds, Case 2 and Case 3 may well
occur in combination: The maker of an oral promise who commits himself to create a
writing formally memorializing that promise may also give assurances that in the mean-
time (pending the creation of the writing) he can be trusted to render the promised per-
formance.
412. Restatement (Second) section 139 has only two illustrations in which liability is
imposed despite the statutory bar. (One is based on Vogel v. Shaw, 294 P. 687 (Wyo.
1930), the other on Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).) The
facts of each include a promise by the defendant to provide a written contract. Neither the
text of section 139 or its comments indicate that this factor is a requirement for its opera-
tion, however, and cases have applied the rule of section 139 where no such promise was
shown. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181-82 (Haw. 1970) (holding that an
oral one year employment contract was enforceable based on promisee's reliance despite
apparent violation of the statute of frauds).
413. Restatement (Second) section 139(2) lists a number of factors the courts should
consider in deciding whether an estoppel sufficient to overcome the statute arises from the
plaintiff's reliance. In addition to the definite and substantial character of that reliance,
and the availability of other remedies, the section stresses the possibility that the reliance
may itself help to corroborate the plaintiff's claim, thus furthering the statute's goal. Sec-
tion 139(2)(d) also directs the court to consider the reasonableness of the reliance, but
nothing in the text, comments or illustrations of section 139 speaks to the question
whether the promisee must have been ignorant of the statute in order to assert that her
reliance was reasonable.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 378-383.
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promisee Frank Greiner in relying on his mother's promises to con-
vey land to him may well have been simply oblivious to the question
whether her promises were legally enforceable. When you confi-
dently expect a promise to be performed, there may be little occasion
to consider what you will do if it is not. This is the proposition which,
if accepted, can provide a solution to Case 3. Where the promisee
trusts the promisor to do what he promised, her knowledge of a non-
liability rule does not make her reliance per se unreasonable, because
it is not the rule of law she is relying on-it is her trust in the sincerity
and commitment of the promisor. In Greiner, promisee Frank may
have trusted his mother simply because she was his mother. In non-
family cases, trust may not be so easily reposed. But if the promisor
actively encourages the promisee to expect him to perform despite
the acknowledged existence of a rule of law that would protect him
from liability, and she acts in substantial and foreseeable reliance on
that assurance, this seems to me a valid basis for an estoppel.
The promisee's knowledge of the non-liability rule may be more
problematic, however, in cases where the promisor's conduct is more
equivocal.
Case 4. Both the promisor and the promisee are aware of the
non-liability rule, and although the promisor assures the promisee he
can be counted on to perform, he staves off requests to put his prom-
ise in a legally enforceable form. (This might be compounded by the
promisor's delay in commencing performance itself, when the time
for performance has seemingly arrived.) Here the promisee is on
shakier ground. If the relationship between them or other circum-
stances are such as to induce trust on her part, her initial reliance may
still be regarded as justifiable. At some point, however, the promi-
sor's inactions may speak louder than his words, and further reliance
by the promisee may appear unreasonable in light of the promisor's
persistent refusal to commit himself formally.41 If the remedy for the
promisee's reliance is to be computed in terms of her reliance, this
shift may be significant as regards later actions on her part. However,
substantial reliance already incurred might form a sufficient basis for
her protection.416
415. At this point I'm irresistibly reminded of the Fred Astaire/Jane Powell number in
ROYAL WEDDING: How Could You Believe Me When I Said I Love You When You
Know I've Been a Liar All My Life? See ROYAL WEDDING (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1951).
416. The facts as stated actually raise two different but related issues: 1) If promissory
estoppel is the only basis on which liability can be imposed, has enough reasonable reli-
ance occurred to give rise to the estoppel, even if the later reliance might not be viewed as
reasonable? 2) Particularly if the remedy for recovery under a promissory estoppel theory
is viewed as necessarily reliance-based, there may be a question whether some of the
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Case 5. The promisee knows of the non-liability rule (as does the
promisor),417 but her decision to rely is made with little or no con-
scious attention to that rule because she reasonably believes the
promisor's commitment to performance is genuine and will be kept.418
Additional facts could be useful. Did the promisor actively encour-
age her reliance? Did the promisor stand to gain anything from that
reliance? Were there "barriers to bargaining" that could have im-
peded what otherwise might have been an insistence by the promisee
that the promise be somehow put in an enforceable mode? Such
elements could strengthen the promisee's case for enforcement. But
suppose none appear. The two parties stand on a relatively equal
footing; both know of a legal rule that could protect the promisor
from liability; she trusts him to do what he promises; she changes her
position in reliance on his promise; he claims later that he purposely
made that promise in an unenforceable way, so as to avoid any legal
obligation to perform his promise. Which claim is stronger?
At this point the battle lines are drawn, and one must choose
sides. Allegiance here could depend on the strength of the policy re-
flected by the non-liability rule. If the policy concern is merely the
absence of consideration, the choice may be easier. The considera-
tion doctrine in its classical form is so widely regarded as irreparably
incoherent and undependable4 9 that it hardly can expect diehard sup-
plaintiff's reliance should be noncompensable, under the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences. The case exemplifies the dilemma of prospective nonperformance unaccompa-
nied by an express repudiation: At what point is it no longer reasonable to throw good
money after bad? On a purely rational basis, this may be a hard decision to make; it may
be even harder to cut your losses when this requires an implicit admission of misplaced
trust.
417. I am using "knows" here in the sense it is used in the U.C.C., actual knowledge.
U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1995). This is more than just "reason to know," but in the case stated
could be less than "awareness."
418. Cases 2 through 5 discussed in the text above are obviously very similar, but
hopefully not indistinguishable. In Case 2, the promisor promises that a writing will be
created. In Case 3, he assures the promisee that he can be counted on to perform even if
his promise is not legally enforceable for some reason. Case 4 is like Case 3, but the
promisor resists requests that he provide a basis for legal enforcement, such as a writing.
Cases 2 through 4 all assume some degree of attention by the promisee to the possibility
that the promise will be legally unenforceable, at the point when she makes her decision to
rely. In Case 5, however, the promisee is assumed to have knowledge of the non-liability
rule, but not "awareness" of it; her decision to rely is not based on the assumed presence
or absence of legal enforceability, but is based on other factors.
419. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CoNTRACr AS PROMISE 35, 38 (1981) (characterizing
the doctrine of consideration as incoherent and internally inconsistent). Professor Farns-
worth offers this less-than-ringing endorsement:
As a cornerstone for the law of contract, the doctrine of consideration has been
widely criticized. It would be foolhardy to attempt to defend it by an exercise in
logic, for it must be viewed in the light of its history and of the society that pro-
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port here or anywhere else. Few will rush to the defense of interna-
tional communism as the Berlin Wall is crumbling. Breach of a trust
reasonably reposed should be regarded as worthy of protection, even
if the relying party should have known, indeed did know, that the
consideration requirement might prevent legal enforcement of the
promise.2
But suppose the non-liability rule is one of form-one of the
various statutes of frauds. Can the promisee's reliance be protected if
she knew of that rule? One is tempted here to invoke again the Ber-
lin Wall, but a better analogy might be NATO. True, the revisers of
Article 2 have had difficulty deciding whether to retain the sale-of-
goods statute of frauds in some form, but the other conventional stat-
utes of frauds are generally still in place, and even occasionally get
beefed up by legislatures sensing the danger of successful fraud in
particular transactions.42' Unlike the consideration doctrine, with its
variety of counter-intuitive applications, the possibility that a legal
rule may require a signed writing for enforceability of a promise is
duced it. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty that other societies have had in
developing a general basis for enforcing promises, it is perhaps less remarkable
that the basis developed by the common law is logically flawed than that the
common law succeeded in developing any basis at all.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 16, at § 1.6. At one point in The Paper Chase,
Professor Kingsfield is said to have written an article entitled "The Blessings of Considera-
tion." JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE 80 (1973). We are left to guess
whether the title was ironically intended.
420. This seems as good a place as any to point out that the promisee might also be
relying on her knowledge of a rule of law, in this case the rule of promissory estoppel.
This is a difficult factor to assess. On the one hand, section 90 has been around at least
since 1932, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 90, and its Restatement (Second) offspring since
1979. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). One might with justifi-
cation take the position that reliance on these rules is no less reasonable or significant than
reliance on the rules of non-liability, such as the consideration requirement or the rules of
form. But there is a problem here, nonetheless. It is one thing to counsel a client, "If you
can get the other party to sign a formal 'contract,' you will probably be protected." It is-
at least it seems to me to be-a different thing to counsel the client, "You should go ahead
and rely on the promise that was made to you, because then you will be protected." I have
never advised a client in these circumstances, but given the risks involved, it has always
seemed to me that I would counsel the promisee to change position only if she would do so
anyway, because of her trust in the promisor-not just for the sake of binding someone to
a promise that she fears may not be performed, and could not otherwise be enforced. I
have refrained from putting forth the promisee's conscious reliance on section 90 (or some
other similar rule) as an independent argument for enforcement in this discussion, because
a main thrust of my argument is that individuals rely on promises not primarily (if at all)
because of their expectations of legal enforceability, but because of their expectations of
performance.
421. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 5-701(a)(10) (McKinney 1989) (revised in
1964 to exclude possibility of contractual or quantum meruit recovery on alleged oral
agreement for "finder's fee").
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well within a layperson's area of foreseeability, so for a promisee to
have at least a hazy knowledge of the rule would be neither unusual
nor implausible. And the policy of requiring a writing does have a
potential utility in deterring fraudulent claims, and encouraging or-
derly memorialization of business transactions.
For many courts and commentators, the policy choice presented
by the statute of frauds has appeared to be of truly Hobsonian pro-
portions: Enforce the statute, and thereby risk undercompensating
truly deserving plaintiffs for the sake of deterring undeserving ones;
override the statute in order to compensate apparently deserving
plaintiffs, and thereby risk encouraging possibly successful fraud. But
the choice presented by the case we are discussing is not so agonizing
as that. In the statute of frauds area, reliance-protection actually rep-
resents not Hobson's choice but an eminently reasonable compro-
mise. To protect only relying parties is to preserve the statute of
frauds, but only up to the place where innocent people start to get
hurt. The unrelied-on agreement can be repudiated by either party
with impunity, thanks to the statute of frauds, even if the other party's
expectation interest thereby suffers a grievous blow. But the repudia-
tion of a reasonably, foreseeably, substantially relied-upon oral
agreement will occasion more than a theoretical injury, and deserves
a more than theoretical remedy.4'
Of course an ironclad, across-the-board enforcement of the stat-
ute of frauds could be "efficient," in the sense of avoiding litigation,
both by deterring the allegation of spurious agreements and by
stimulating the written memorialization of genuine ones. But we
have by now over three centuries of experience to suggest the vision-
ary nature of that solution. Nor does the recognition by many courts
of a reliance-based exception appear to have opened a floodgate of
litigation. Here, as in many other areas, lowering the doctrinal bar-
rier to a potentially successful cause of action may mean additional
"transaction costs" (read, lawyers' fees), but ordinarily it will result in
a settlement rather than a trial. And the promisor who repudiates
promptly, before reliance can occur, should be able to avoid even
that.
It thus appears that even in Case 5, a court can and ordinarily
should favor the rule-knowing, position-changing promisee over the
rule-invoking, promise-breaking promisor. Does this result give too
little weight to the promisor's claim to be protected by the rule of law,
disappointing a legitimate expectation of insulation from liability? If
the promisor truly intends when making his promise to invoke at
422. I realize that even a loss of mere expectation is an "injury," but it seems to me not
a "hurt" in the sense that a reliance-based change of position may be.
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some point a rule of non-liability (or at least wants to reserve his un-
fettered ability to do so), he can avoid this problem by making that
plain up front. The promisee's reliance then will involve a conscious
degree of risk, and may appropriately go uncompensated when the
promisor repudiates liability, as he warned her he might. If he is not
willing to expressly assert his unwillingness to be bound in this fash-
ion, the promisor is truly trying to have it both ways, and has forfeited
his claim to the law's protection.
Let us pause momentarily to sum up. The above discussion has
considered the possible opposition of two types of reliance. On the
one hand, a promisee may rely on a promise of performance by
making a prejudicial change of position; that reliance could consist of
rendering some performance of her own in exchange, or taking some
other action on the strength of the promisor's apparent commitment
to perform. On the other hand, the maker of the promise may have
been relying on a rule of law to protect him from liability on his
promise. Such reliance could consist of making an ostensibly firm and
trustworthy commitment where otherwise no commitment at all (or at
most a highly qualified one) would have been made. As we have
seen, where these two types of reliance collide, the promisee's reli-
ance appears almost always to have the stronger claim to protection.
Only where the promisor's intention to rely on the nonliability rule as
a shield from obligation is so unmistakable as to undercut his appar-
ent commitment to performance is the promisee's reliance claim
likely to appear weaker by comparison.
The above conclusions can be extended to other situations as
well. Take for example an agreement modifying an already existing
contract. The classical pre-existing duty corollary to the considera-
tion doctrine forbids enforcement of a "one-sided" modification of an
existing agreement, where one party receives a benefit but gives
nothing in return. This result is customarily justified as an attempt to
protect the original bargain against a later attempt by one party to ex-
tort a better deal when circumstances are more favorable to her, cir-
cumstances which typically include the difficulty or impossibility of
finding a timely replacement for the performance promised by the
party threatening default. The consideration requirement has proved
an unwieldy tool for this purpose, and over the years the common law
has developed a number of exceptions designed to allow the court to
enforce modifications which, although one-sided, do not appear to
have been the product of such opportunistic behavior. The U.C.C. in
Article 2 takes the opposite tack, in section 2-209(1) simply negating
any requirement of additional consideration for a modification, while
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at the same time subjecting modification agreements to the general
good faith requirement that permeates the Code.423 Against that
background, consider the following:
Case 6. Suppose an existing bilateral contract, only partly per-
formed. One party proposes a modification agreement favorable to
her-perhaps a price increase for the services she was to perform,
perhaps an extension of the time by which her performance was to be
due, perhaps a variation in the mode of performance that would per-
mit her to perform in a easier or less expensive manner. (She is the
party we have called "the promisee," but may also in these examples
be thought of as the "performing party.") Despite the fact that the
modification benefits only the party proposing it, the other party
freely agrees. (Following our pattern established above, he is the
"promisor," as well as the "paying party.") In effect, this modifica-
tion agreement amounts to a gift to the promisee. Why would the
promisor agree to it? A whole host of possible reasons present them-
selves. Perhaps the promisee for her part has earlier agreed to some
similar modification that benefited him. Perhaps the promisor thinks
he might at some future time want the promisee's assent to some
other agreement that would benefit him and not her. Perhaps he re-
gards this modification as not substantially inimical to his interests.
Perhaps for some other reason he thinks it generally advantageous for
him to have the good will of the promisee. Maybe he's just a nice
guy.
But maybe he's not. In manifesting his agreement to this modifi-
cation, the promisor might have believed that the agreement would
be legally unenforceable, and thus could be freely repudiated by him
later, if he chose to do so. This apparent agreement would probably
be followed by acts of reliance by the promisee, which would likely
include her continued performance under the original contract as
modified. If at some later point the promisor should indeed renege
on his promise to render and receive performance as modified by that
agreement, the stage would be set once again for a contest for pri-
macy of protection between two types of reliance: Reliance by the
promisee on the promisor's apparent agreement to the modification;
reliance by the promisor on the rule of non-liability.
On the facts of Case 6 as described above, the modification
agreement was not the result of opportunistic coercion by the prom-
isee. In these circumstances, the only rule protecting the promisor
from obligation would be lack of consideration, and the situation is
423. Comment 2 to section 2-209 asserts that a modification must meet the good faith
requirement generally applicable throughout the U.C.C., and gives some guidance toward
its application. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1995).
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very like Case 5, discussed above. The consideration barrier against
one-sided modifications is a highly porous one, even more so than the
underlying general requirement of consideration. If Article 2 of the
U.C.C. applies, there is simply no requirement of consideration for a
modification under section 2-209(1). Even under the common law, if
a modification agreement is fair in the light of unanticipated difficul-
ties of performance, it may be enforceable under the rule of Restate-
ment (Second) section 89(a) without fresh consideration.424 So reli-
ance on lack of consideration as a protection against liability could be
reliance on a slender reed indeed. But in order to test the strength of
the promisor's reliance on the protection of the rule in Case 6, we
must assume that it would indeed protect him-that except for the
possible counterweight of the promisee's reliance, the promisor
would not be bound by his apparent assent to the modification
agreement, and could freely repudiate it.
411
At this point we must assess the form which the promisee's reli-
ance has taken. Unlike the cases considered earlier, this situation
does not present the promisee with a completely free choice, to rely
or not to rely. The promisee is already bound by a contract to the
promisor, which obligates her to perform in a certain way. Her con-
tinued performance as originally promised would not under estab-
lished rules constitute consideration for a modification. Conceivably
it might not be viewed as "detrimental" reliance, either. But since at
this point we are assuming that the consideration requirement is the
only legal rule that would protect the promisor from obligation on the
modification agreement, we are necessarily assuming in this example
that the promisee is acting in good faith throughout, and not exercis-
ing any duress against the promisor. Even if the modification agree-
ment does not call for any change at all in her performance (if the
only change was a higher price to be paid for her services, for in-
stance), still her rendering of that performance will now be based on
424. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 89(a) ("A promise modifying a duty under a con-
tract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair and equitable
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.").
425. The assumptions here might appear inconsistent. On the one hand, the promisee
is assumed to have acted in good faith, and not opportunistically to coerce a modification.
On the other hand, the modification agreement is apparently assumed not to qualify for
enforcement under the rule of Restatement (Second) section 89(a) as a modification
which is "fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when
the agreement was made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 89(a). One can, however, imag-
ine a case in which it becomes apparent as the parties proceed with performance of their
original agreement that the promisee has simply made a bad deal, and both parties realize
and acknowledge that fact. The ensuing modification agreement could then be "fair and




an expectation that the promisor's performance will be modified as he
agreed, and her behavior may be affected in various subtle and per-
haps unproveable ways by that factor. Even if the modification
agreement were not regarded as immediately binding when made,
the case seems an excellent one for binding the promisor as soon as
any appreciable amount of performance, preparation for performance
or other change of position' has taken place in reliance on the newly
modified agreement.*
Case 7. Let us now assume the polar opposite case to Case 6.
There are no circumstances justifying modification, and the proposed
modification is definitely not "fair and equitable." Nevertheless, the
performing party threatens to breach unless the price for her per-
formance is increased, and no timely equivalent substitute for her
performance can be procured (except, perhaps, at grossly exorbitant
cost). If breach occurs, it will cause substantial injury to the paying
party, much of which would go uncompensated even in a successful
breach of contract suit because of difficulties of proof, the foresee-
ability requirement for consequential damages, the undercompensa-
tion of non-monetary harm, and the inability to recover attorneys'
fees. While making plain his unhappiness at having been strong-
armed in this fashion, the paying party agrees to the modification.
Privately, however, he intends to renege on his promise once the dan-
ger of injurious breach is past. The promisee completes her perform-
ance, but the promisor only pays what was originally promised.
Here the equities are completely reversed, obviously. Can the
promisor successfully maintain his position? Several legal rules ap-
pear potentially to protect him from enforcement of the modification:
The consideration requirement (under common law contract princi-
ples); the requirement of good faith (under the U.C.C.); and the no-
tion of duress as a defense to the existence of a contract.' The re-
426. The promisee might, for instance, decide to decline a third party's offer of some
other transaction that she could not otherwise have afforded to forgo. Or, she might feel
able to invest more resources in this performance than she otherwise would have, and
thereby render a better-than-minimal performance, even though not contractually re-
quired to do so.
427. There is of course a paradox here. Continued performance by the promisee as
originally promised would not under conventional doctrine be consideration for the
promisor's agreement to some increased obligation on his part. It might, however, be suf-
ficient detrimental reliance on her part to make the modification binding on a reliance ba-
sis. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 89(c) (stating that a modification of a contract not
fully performed is "binding to the extent justice requires" based on a party's detrimental
reliance). The point is discussed at greater length in Proliferation, supra note 3, at 74-76.
428. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
429. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 175 (explaining when duress by threat makes a
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quirements of these doctrines may differ slightly, and the promisor
might have an easier time showing one than another, but they all po-
tentially protect him here, as he hoped and intended they would when
he ostensibly agreed to the modification.
Will the promisee's reliance on the modification agreement be
sufficient to overcome this panoply of defenses? On the facts as
stated so far, probably not. The promisee may argue that she has
trusted the promisor to do what he promised, and her trust has been
violated. But the promisor can respond that not only was the prom-
isee herself guilty of such a breach of trust, but that hers came first,
and was not-unlike the promisor's-a reasonable response to the
bad faith conduct of the other party. Wrested from him by duress,
the promisor's apparent agreement should be no more binding-
morally or legally-than the promise of a ransom payment, made to
obtain the release of a kidnap victim and then repudiated once the vic-
tim has been released. No amount of reliance, the promisor will ar-
gue, can legitimate a promise procured-metaphorically at least-at
gunpoint.
But Cases 6 and 7 both assume a kind of factual purity that in
real life might be hard to come by. Suppose instead a modifying
agreement made in circumstances of some ambiguity:
Case 8. The promisee has requested a price increase for her
services to be performed pursuant to an already existing contract be-
cause she has received an offer of a higher price for those services
from another source. She does not overtly threaten a breach (al-
though accepting the other offer would be inconsistent with her per-
formance of the existing contract, and such a threat might therefore
be seen as implicit). She does, however, clearly communicate her be-
lief that a price increase would be appropriate, in the circumstances,
and strongly urges the promisor to agree. " ' If he does so, can he later
renege on that promise with impunity? Or should it be enforced?
In this case, lack of fresh consideration might make the modifica-
tion unenforceable. The promisee might also appear to have acted in
bad faith. For one or both of those reasons, the modification agree-
ment might be unenforceable. And the promisor might have agreed
to it in the belief-or at least the hope-that such would be the case.
On the other hand, the promisee will have relied on the promised
modification, at least by forbearing to breach (in a situation where
contract voidable), 176 (explaining when a threat is improper). See, e.g., Austin Instru-
ment, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Galtaco
Redlaw Castings Corp., 749 F. Supp. 794,797 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
430. The facts of Case 8 are intended to mimic those of Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 131 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1921).
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breach might have been "efficient"),43' and possibly in other ways as
well. And the promisee's conduct is not so clearly coercive as it was
in Case 7. Can the promisor in Case 8 justifiably claim that his reli-
ance on the non-liability rule trumps the promisee's reliance on his
promise of a modification?
In its determined straddling of the fence, Case 8 may sound like a
typical law-school exam question, designed to elicit an "on the one
hand this, on the other hand that" response. And indeed it is. But it
probably also mirrors a lot of real-life transactions, where the iron
hand of potential coercion may or may not be awaiting within the vel-
vet glove of persuasion.432 One is tempted to call Case 8 a draw, but
even if a law student (or teacher) could have that luxury, a court
would not. How should this seeming stalemate be broken?
In order to test the relative weight of the two forms of reliance, it
may help first to imagine the case without any reliance by the prom-
isee. Suppose for the moment, then, that the promisor does indeed
manifest apparent assent to the modification agreement, and does so
formally (in a signed writing, let us assume) so the fact is not at all in
doubt. But he very quickly repents, and retracts that assent, before
the promisee can have relied on that agreement in any substantial
way. Would the modification agreement be binding?
If the modification is subject to a consideration requirement,
then on the facts as stated it fails, and for that reason alone would be
unenforceable. 3 Even apart from lack of consideration, the modifi-
cation might be seen as having been coerced, and tainted by bad faith
or duress on the promisee's part. If the promisor argues that he ini-
tially relied on the protection of the legal rule, this seems (in light of
his prompt retraction) to add little to his claim not to be bound; that
claim basically stands or falls on the strength of his underlying doc-
trinal defense: lack of consideration, bad faith or duress protect him
from liability on the modification.
But now suppose that the promisor does not retract promptly,
431. If the gain from the alternative offer were high enough to leave the promisee with
some excess after the promisor had been compensated for her breach, the breach would
have been "efficient" under standard economic analysis. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 119 (4th ed. 1992).
432. This seems to have been the situation in Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Busch, Inc.,
131 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1921). The court recounts both versions of the crucial conversation,
plaintiff employee's and defendant employer's. The employee sounds a little more coer-
cive in the employer's version, but in neither account does the employee in so many words
threaten to breach and accept the competitor's offer if he is not given the requested raise.
433. We are continuing to assume, as with Case 6, that the agreement as modified does
not fall within the unanticipated circumstances rule of Restatement (Second) section
89(a). See supra note 425.
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but waits until the promisee has finished her performance (or at least
until the promisor is less vulnerable to the harm that might result
from her breach). The promisor once again can assert a reliance
claim, that he entered into the modification only to avoid substantial
injury, and did so in reliance on the law's protection. He appeared to
submit to the promisee's demand out of necessity, in order to obtain
what he was entitled to under the original agreement. He did so in
reliance on the law's protecting him against liability at the point when
repudiation of the modification became a practical possibility. When
the kidnap victim has been released, the promisor will argue, the
promised ransom no longer has to be paid.
The problem with that argument is, of course, that the promisee
now has a reliance claim of her own. She continued to perform as
originally promised in a situation where breach for her might have
been, if not the "right" thing to do, at least the more "efficient"
course of action. And on the facts of Case 8, the promisor never sig-
naled to the promisee that his agreement to the modification was any-
thing other than voluntary and genuine, so her reliance on his appar-
ent commitment may have been both substantial and reasonable. If
he had resisted initially, maybe she would have applied more pressure
by overtly threatening breach, but maybe she would have just backed
off. Since he didn't put her to that test, we don't know. And if the
promisor intended from the beginning to renege on the modification
as soon as it was tactically safe to do so, then he was himself guilty not
merely of bad faith, but of fraud.
In the Case 8 situation, it is probably not surprising that courts
have gone different ways. The more the promisee appears to have
threatened breach in a situation where the promisor had little practi-
cal choice but to submit, the more likely we are to favor the promisor,
who may have relied on a rule of law to protect him when he pre-
tended to assent.43" The more the promisor appears freely to have
gone along with a modification that from the promisee's perspective
seemed to be fair, the more apt we are to favor the promisee, who
may have forgone other courses of action in reliance on the promi-
sor's apparently genuine consent.435 Either way, the choice is ulti-
mately between two forms of reliance, each with a potentially legiti-
mate claim to protection, in a situation where one must yield to the
434. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc., v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E. 2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
435. See, e.g.. United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive Enter., 418 F. Supp. 662,
664-65 (E.D. Va. 1976); but cf. T&S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790
F.2d 1098, 1106 (4th Cir. 1986) (buyer's failure to make formal protest did not bar its later




The preceding cases have all involved two types of reliance that
might be regarded as different, and for that reason distinguishable:
Reliance by one party on a rule of law as compared with reliance by
the other on an expressed manifestation of intention. Whichever way
that cuts, it might conceivably be seen as presenting an ap-
ples/oranges problem. Let us now address a few situations where the
competing forms of reliance are more directly comparable-apples
vs. apples, as it were.
Case 9. Suppose that two parties have initially made a written
agreement to exchange performances in the future. Among its vari-
ous provisions, that agreement declares that any modification of its
terms must be in writing and signed by both parties. Despite the
presence of this "no-oral modifications" (hereinafter "NOM") clause,
the two parties do later agree, orally, to modify their agreement in
some way. This might be a "one-sided" modification, favoring one
party, in which case the legal issues raised by that aspect of the
agreement would be those discussed above. But assume for the sake
of discussion at this point that the modification does not lack consid-
eration. Each party gets something new out of it-an additional seg-
ment of performance, say, in return for an additional amount of pay-
ment. The modification might also appear to be subject to some
statute of frauds, U.C.C. or otherwise; again, this would raise legal is-
sues similar to those we have already encountered. But here there is
an additional factor we have not addressed until now. What legal
problems will flow from the presence of the NOM clause in the origi-
nal written agreement?
Here again, we have potentially different applicable rules, de-
pending on the situation. If the transaction falls outside of Article 2,
and general contract common law applies, the NOM clause will
probably be ineffective. The parties who had the power to make an
agreement originally also have the inherent power to change it, even
if that entails in effect overriding their own earlier agreement. On the
other hand, if Article 2 applies, then under section 209(2) the NOM
term will be at least initially effective."
Suppose, then, that after such an oral modification is made, one
of the parties who apparently agreed to it-call him the "promisor,"
to follow the pattern we have been using-claims later not to be
bound by that agreement, and in support of that claim argues that he
relied on the NOM clause to insulate him from obligation. The
436. The section does require that the provision be separately signed if the parties are
not both merchants; we will assume here that this formality, if applicable, has been com-
plied with.
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promisee has expressly agreed that such an agreement should not be
binding unless it is in writing and signed, which this one is not. Here
the promisor in attempting to escape liability is relying, not on some
underlying rule of law, but on the express agreement of the other
party that oral agreements shall not be binding between them. Is this
a reliance claim that should prevail?
If Case 9 arises under the common law regime, then the promisor
is attempting to use his reliance to achieve a result that (as indicated
above) the law probably would not otherwise give him. This is not by
itself conclusive, obviously, since much of the thrust of our discussion
so far is that reliance may trigger different results than would obtain
under otherwise applicable rules. What probably is conclusive is that
the promisor is claiming that he relied on the promisee's express
agreement in the NOM clause that writing would be a sine qua non
for modification. However, that earlier agreement is one which both
the promisee and the promisor were apparently later willing to ignore.
Once the promisor knows that the promisee has changed her mind
about the importance of a writing, he cannot then be relying on that
earlier expression of intention-particularly when he is simultane-
ously manifesting the same change of heart himself. Thus, the reli-
ance claim not only fails to trump the later agreement, on closer ex-
amination it evaporates.
But suppose that Case 9 occurs in a sale of goods situation, so
that Article 2 applies. Now the legal tables are turned, to some ex-
tent. In section 2-209(2), the U.C.C. declares that when an agreement
contains a NOM clause, that clause is effective. The agreement "can-
not otherwise be modified or rescinded.,"137 However, in section 2-
209(4), the U.C.C. provides that an attempted modification which
violates the NOM clause can still "operate as a waiver., 43 Further-
more, such a waiver will under section 2-209(5) be non-retractable, if
its retraction would be unjust in light of "a material change of posi-
tion in reliance on the waiver.,
439
In the Article 2 version of Case 9, we have thus come to a situa-
tion very similar to our earlier Case 6. In agreeing to an oral modifi-
cation, the promisor may assert, he was relying on both the NOM
clause itself (as an expression of the other party's intention to disre-
gard oral modifications) and on the rule of law that upholds NOM
clauses (section 2-209(2)). But the promisee, seeking to uphold the
oral modification, has her own pair of reliance claims, each of which
trumps its counterpart. Where the promisor was relying on the origi-
437. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995).
438. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1995).
439. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1995).
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nal NOM clause as an expression of the promisee's intention (as well
as his own), the promisee relied on the later oral modification agree-
ment as an expression of the promisor's willingness (and her own as
well) to disregard the NOM clause. And where the promisor was re-
lying on the rule of section 2-209(2), the promisee-once she has
changed her position in reliance on the later agreement-can claim
that she relied on the explicit rule of sections 2-209(4) and (5).'
Case 10. Our discussion of Case 9-like the earlier discussion of
cases involving the statute of frauds-tacitly assumed -the reality of
the agreement at issue. Suppose, however, that this fact is contra-
vened. Case 10 is like Case 9, except that the existence of the oral
agreement is in dispute. The "promisor" does not admit making the
later oral agreement; he denies it. (If he is telling the truth, then the
terms "promisor" and "promisee" no longer accurately describe the
parties, but we will retain those appellations to avoid confusion.) The
promisor argues that to save the trouble and expense of having to liti-
gate on the merits (and also to avoid the risk of losing that litigation),
he ought to be relieved of even the obligation of responding to the
promisee's claim. In the absence of a writing, he asserts, the modifi-
cation-whether or not it was actually made-should simply be inef-
fective.
Here we have a different kind of reliance claim than any we have
yet discussed. The promisor claims that in making the original
agreement, he relied on the NOM clause to insulate him from any
later claim that an oral modification was agreed to. Having induced
him to contract originally on the basis of that clause, he argues, the
promisee should not now be free to disregard it, and force him to re-
spond to such a claim. His reliance claim now has nothing at all to do
with his agreeing to the modification; he denies having ever done so.
His reliance claim relates rather to the original contract, to which-he
now asserts-he would not have agreed if it had not appeared to pro-
440. In Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1995), a
seller of basil leaves attempted to enforce an oral modification agreement providing for a
higher price to be paid by the buyer in return for additional processing of the leaves by the
seller before delivery. Buyer moved for summary judgment based on the NOM clause and
the statute of frauds, U.C.C. section 2-201. The buyer had assertedly agreed to memorial-
ize the modification in writing, but had not done so; both parties nevertheless had pro-
ceeded to perform under the agreement as revised. The court invoked principles of
waiver, estoppel and part performance to deny the buyer's motion for summary judgment,
and instead granted the seller's motion for partial summary judgment on its claim for in-
creased compensation. In a comment to the proposed revision of U.C.C. section 2-209,
the Brookside case is cited for the proposition that under the revised Article 2, a NOM
clause will continue to be subject to waiver based on language or conduct inconsistent with
the clause, where reasonable, good faith reliance is thereby induced. U.C.C. Revised Ar-
ticle 2, supra note 148, at 34-35.
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tect him against just this eventuality.
As we have seen, the common law was not generally hospitable
to NOM clauses, perhaps for reasons having to do more with logic or
views about contractual autonomy than with concern with protection
of reasonable detrimental reliance. The U.C.C., however, as part of
its friendliness to commercially reasonable agreement-making, en-
dorses the NOM clause in general terms, while at the same limiting
effectiveness of the clause to situations where the modifying agree-
ment has yet to be substantially relied on by the party attempting to
enforce it. But what of the promisor's claim in Case 10 that he sub-
stantially and reasonably relied on the NOM clause to avoid just what
he now faces-a factual dispute as to the existence of an oral modifi-
cation agreement? But for the NOM clause, the promisor may argue,
he either would not have entered into the original agreement at all, or
else would have imposed other kinds of controls on this risk, such as
broader powers of termination, internal safeguards, etc. For her part,
the promisee asserts that the modification agreement was really
agreed to by the promisor, and that she has substantially and rea-
sonably relied on it. Compared to that reliance claim of the promisee,
how strong is the promisor's claim to be entirely exempted from this
dispute?
God only knows. No, really. Because with divine omniscience,
we could be absolutely certain whether the promisor is telling the
truth. If we were sure that he was, we would happily relieve him of
the burden of a trial (as well as the risk of being wrongly disbelieved).
On the other hand, if we knew for sure that the promisee was telling
the truth, we should be reluctant to insulate the promisor against her
claim merely because of her earlier adherence to a clause which the
parties may well not have discussed, and to which the promisor later
appeared indifferent."1
In the final analysis, there may be no satisfactory lasting resolu-
tion of this tension between the promisor's desire for stability and
441. There are two additional factors which might figure in a case like this. One is the
possibility that the parties have established a course of performance by which modifying
agreements are made orally and promptly relied on, but consistently reduced to writing at
some future point. Such a course of performance balances the legal and practical tensions
created by the NOM clause, and could appear to increase the credibility of the promisee's
story that an oral agreement was made despite the NOM clause in the original contract.
The second factor is the agency issue. A NOM clause-along with other devices,
such as a strong merger clause or specific limitations on agents' authority to vary the writ-
ten agreement-is often used as a device to avoid liability for unauthorized changes
agreed to by agents. This is a rational goal, given the business enterprise's need to rely on
all kinds of agents to get its work done. On the other hand, one might resist having the
other party pay the price in the form of a forfeiture, where oral "change orders" have been
relied on by her.
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predictability, and the promisee's claim to be protected in her reason-
able reliance on the promisor's commitment to a modifying agree-
ment. Depending on the relative strength of the equities, courts will
differ with each other, and even with themselves from case to case.
Thus, in ruling that an NOM clause stood as a "stone wall" in the
path of one party's attempt to prove a modification agreement, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1965 declared that this must be the
rule. "Otherwise," it lamented,
written documents would have no more permanence than writings
penned in disappearing ink.... [C]ontractual obligations would
become phantoms, solemn obligations would run like pressed
quicksilver, and the whole edifice of business would rest on sand
dunes supporting pillars of rubber and floors of turf. Chaos would
envelop the commercial world.
442
The same language was quoted approvingly (by its author) just
three years later in another Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision,
but this time in a dissent. In permitting enforcement of an oral modi-
fication agreement, the majority opinion in that later case pointed out
that under the U.C.C. a NOM clause can be waived, and that it will be
considered waived "when its enforcement would result in something
approaching fraud."'443 When an oral modification agreement collides
with a NOM clause, the court continued, "the effectiveness of a non-
written modification... depends upon whether enforcement of the
condition is or is not barred by equitable considerations, not upon the
technicality of whether the condition was or was not expressly and
separately waived before the non-written modification."
4
The point of Case 10 seems to me to be not that either form of
reliance must necessarily prevail.44 It is rather that each party in such
a case might justifiably claim to have relied on the words and conduct
of the other, so that resolution of their dispute must involve a com-
parison of both their respective actions in reliance. This lesson, if ac-
cepted even arguendo, will permit us to confront head-on the mino-
taur that has all along been waiting at the end of this labyrinth:
the parol evidence rule.
442. C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 214 A.2d 620, 622 (Pa. 1965) (Musmanno, J.). The court
held that the NOM clause would prevent proof of the modification unless its proponent
could show an express agreement to waive that clause (rather than simply an oral modifi-
cation agreement).
443. Universal Builders v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 16 (Pa. 1968) (citing
5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACrS § 689, at 306-07 (3d ed. 1961)).
444. 1&
445. Although the U.C.C. by referring specifically to the promisee's actions in reliance
on the modification/waiver seems at least by implication to be stating that such reliance
deserves priority in protection as a matter of law.
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C. Understanding Ourselves: Liars and Reliers
Picking up the thread of the discussion immediately above, I
shall proceed in this section to examine the intersection of the parol
evidence rule and the reliance-protection principle. At the beginning
of this Part IV, I proposed that attention to this principle might help
us understand ourselves better. In this section I will try to explain
how that might be so. Like most of the commentators whose work is
cited and discussed in these pages, I am a full-time law teacher, a for-
mer law student, and a one-time practicing lawyer. The mere fact
that you are reading this article at all strongly suggests that you are
one or more of those things yourself."6 You and I are therefore part
of the American legal establishment-the creators and custodians of
the legal system, including its body of contract law. And you and I
and the other members of that establishment are, I believe, deeply
and perhaps irredeemably divided not only among ourselves but of-
ten within ourselves about the dilemma presented by a head-on con-
frontation between the policies served by the parol evidence rule and
the principle of promissory estoppel.
In choosing the parol evidence rule for discussion at this point, I
am well aware that it hardly represents one of promissory estoppel's
triumphs. In the various cases analyzed above-involving lack of
consideration, statute of frauds, modification, etc.-reliance protec-
tion (usually under the rubric of "promissory estoppel") has carved
out for itself a well-developed and significant role in the contract rule
system. Even a NOM clause under the U.C.C. will be trumped by re-
liance.447 When we come to the parol evidence rule, however, a very
different situation obtains.
The parol evidence rule has taken different forms and been vari-
ously explained over the years."8 It is generally understood to bar
admission and consideration of evidence of extrinsic agreements
made prior to or contemporaneously with a formal written agree-
ment, when the parties to that written agreement have intended it to
be the complete and exclusive statement of their contract. 9 Based on
446. You might even be a judge, in which case I modestly but strongly urge you to
keep reading.
447. While the common law rule denying effect to such clauses doesn't expressly de-
pend on the presence of reliance, the cases reaching that result generally do involve reli-
ance by the party seeking to enforce the modification. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS,
supra note 16, at § 7.6.
448. An excellent discussion of the parol evidence rule, along with citations to the
various standard commentaries, can be found in Farnsworth, Contracts. See id. at §§ 7.2-
7.5.
449. The Restatement (Second) version of the parol evidence rule can be found in sec-
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the assumption that such a writing necessarily supersedes or excludes
all such other agreements, the parol evidence rule in effect requires
the court as a matter of law to disregard all evidence ("parol" evi-
dence, because usually oral rather than written) of their existence.45 °
A possible occasion for the application of promissory estoppel
may arise if one of the two parties to a formal written agreement as-
serts that both parties mutually agreed to something not expressed in
that writing (even, perhaps, in conflict with its express provisions),
and that she relied on the other party's assent to that extrinsic agree-
ment when entering into the contract and commencing to render her
performance. Of course, the other party may well deny that any such
extrinsic agreement existed. Whether he does or not, he may argue
that its existence is legally irrelevant, because the parol evidence rule
requires the writing and only the writing to be taken as expressive of
the parties' agreement. In its apparent exaltation of writing over
other means of expressing agreement, the parol evidence rule bears
an obvious family resemblance to the statute of frauds, which requires
a written, signed agreement for some types of contracts to be en-
forceable.451 In an attempt to insure that a written agreement will be
regarded as "fully integrated" and thus protected by the parol evi-
dence rule, drafters often employ a "merger clause." 52 Such a clause
tions 209-218. Article 2 of the U.C.C. has another version in section 2-202. See
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrs, supra note 16, § 7.2 at 466.
450. As Professor Farnsworth observes, the parol evidence rule may be seen as having
an "evidentiary" or a "substantive" function. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note
16, § 7.2 at 468. For procedural purposes (eg., choice of law), the rule is commonly
treated as "substantive." See id. The evidentiary view of the rule-that written evidence
is inherently more trustworthy than oral--"once had currency," Farnsworth notes, but is
now out of fashion. Id. at 467. Since Professor Arthur Corbin's full-scale reexamination
of the rule in his treatise, it is more conventional to explain the rule, as Farnsworth does,
in terms of the parties' shared intention "to simplify the administration of the resulting
contract and to facilitate the resolution of possible disputes by excluding from the scope of
their agreement those matters that were raised and dropped or even agreed upon and su-
perseded during the negotiations." lId at 469. Of course, the problem with Corbin's ap-
proach is that it simply redefines the court's dilemma: How can we surely know the par-
ties' true intent, if we must look only at the writing? Conversely, if permitted to look
elsewhere, have we necessarily deprived the writing of what may have been its intended
result?
451. There are equally obvious differences, of course. The statute of frauds, particu-
larly in its more modern form does not require the entire agreement to be expressed in the
writing, nor preclude recourse to extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1995).
On the other hand, the parol evidence rule imposes no requirement that the parties in fact
adopt a written version of their agreement; it only applies to the extent that they have cho-
sen to do so.
452. One version of such a clause, from long-ago memory: This Contract represents
the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter thereof, and all prior
negotiations and agreements with respect thereto, written or oral, are merged herewith
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is functionally related to the NOM clause, and indeed the two clauses
are likely to both be employed by a drafter intent on insuring-to the
extent legally possible-that the written agreement alone will be
taken as expressing the contract of the parties . 4 " As we have dis-
cussed above, both the statute of frauds and the NOM clause are
likely to bow to substantial, foreseeable, detrimental reliance. In light
of their obvious similarities, it might be thought likely that the parol
evidence rule would follow suit.
And so it appeared at the beginning of the last decade."' Despite
the predictions of some commentators, however, "5 the projected vic-
tory of promissory estoppel over the parol evidence rule has for the
most part been, as Professor Farnsworth observed a few years ago, a
non-event. 6 The parol evidence rule is a rule so riddled with excep-
tions and so hemmed in by qualifications that its complexity is legen-
dary. 7  Nevertheless, it seldom yields to the direct application of
promissory estoppel."8 What does this state of affairs tell us about the
and superseded hereby.
453. Like any "boilerplate" clause, the merger clause may or may not achieve its in-
tended purpose. The more "modern" parol evidence rule regards such clauses as evidence
on the issue of intent-to-fully-integrate, but not necessarily conclusive on the point.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 209 cmt. b; 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 578 (1960). Many courts will, however, give them binding effect. See
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 16, § 7.3 n.35. In the course of the ongoing revi-
sion of Article 2, after the parol evidence rule was tentatively revised to exclude consumer
contracts from its operation, an effort was made to revise the Code's parol evidence rule
to provide that merger clauses must be given conclusive effect in non-consumer contracts;
as of this writing that effort apparently has failed. See U.C.C. Revised Article 2. Sales,
xxiv, 19 (Discussion Draft April 14, 1997); U.C.C. Revised Article 2, supra note 148, at 22-
23 (presumptive but not conclusive effect of merger clause on issue of integration will be
treated in comment to revised section 2-202).
454. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 51, at 1454-55.
455. In a 1981 article, I declared that we could "confidently expect" that just as the
statute of frauds had proven vulnerable to promissory estoppel, so would "another bastion
of form-over-substance, the parol evidence rule.., fall under similar attack." Prolifera-
tion, supra note 3, at 77-78. I have been occasionally flattered to see this statement
quoted, much as the editors of the Chicago Tribune must periodically be flattered by yet
another reproduction of the 1948 photo of a grinning Harry Truman holding aloft their
famous headline, "DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN."
456. Farnsworth, supra note 59, at 219-20.
457. In this area, the obligatory quotation is from JAMES B. THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898): "Few things
are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, The Parol
Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. L. REV. 93 (1994).
458. While clearly of the view that promissory estoppel should be stronger than the
parol evidence rule where the elements of the former are present, Professor Eric Holmes
in his comprehensive review of the case law is unable to muster many even arguable ex-
amples of that principle. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19, at 279-82, 303-04, 309, 361-64.
In Starr v. 0-I Brockway Glass, Inc., 637 A.2d 1371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), plaintiffs, a mar-
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parol evidence rule, about promissory estoppel, and about our vision
of contract law?
At the outset, it has been suggested that the very complexity of
the present-day parol evidence rule offers at least a partial explana-
tion for its apparent indifference to reliance.4 9 When one of the par-
ties to a written contract offers evidence of a prior or contemporane-
ous extrinsic agreement on which he appears to have strongly and
detrimentally relied, there is often some established doctrinal basis on
which that evidence might be admitted, despite the parol evidence
rule. The evidence merely explains an otherwise ambiguous agree-
ment;4 it reflects an applicable trade usage, or a relevant course of
dealing between the parties;461 it reveals a condition precedent to the
ried couple, had contracted to sell land to the defendant, which intended to build a ware-
house there. The written contract of sale was expressly conditioned on the buyer's ability
to close on other adjacent property and proceed with the contemplated development. The
buyer ultimately abandoned its plans and refused to complete the purchase. The sellers
sued for damages alleged to have resulted from their yielding possession to the buyer in
response to a request to that effect made on the date the contract was signed, an act which
they asserted had caused losses in the operation of their business; they also sought specific
performance of the contract to purchase. The trial court granted buyer's motion for sum-
mary judgment, on the ground that performance of the purchase agreement was com-
pletely discretionary with the buyer, and that proof of the buyer's request that the prop-
erty be vacated was barred by the parol evidence rule. On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that summary judgment was improper. Performance of the contract
was not completely discretionary with the buyer; the implied obligation of good faith im-
posed on it a duty to use reasonable efforts to bring about the conditions to performance,
making the claim for specific enforcement a triable one. As to the buyer's request that the
sellers vacate the property, this also presented a triable issue of material fact, because the
sellers' justifiable reliance on such a request could be the basis for an "equitable estoppel"
to assert the parol evidence rule. From the court's statement of the case, it seems that the
buyer's request might have been made after the signing of the written contract (even if
made on the same date), in which case the court could have invoked the traditional view
that the parol evidence rule only applies to extrinsic agreements or statements made be-
fore or simultaneously with the signing of the integrated writing. Instead of attempting to
invoke such a "technical" counter to the parol evidence rule, however, the court simply
and clearly stated that in this case the parol evidence rule should bend to a reliance-based
estoppel.
459. See, e.g. Metzger, supra note 51, at 1461-62; Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at
474.
460. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 214(c). See, for example, DeJong v. City of
Sioux Center, 980 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (N.D. Iowa 1997), in which a federal court first de-
termines that Iowa would not apply promissory estoppel to permit plaintiff shopping cen-
ter tenant to show an oral promise to complete mall construction in time for opening by
specified date where agreement between parties was fully integrated writing, then goes on
to hold plaintiff's evidence on the point was admissible anyway because the writing itself
was ambiguous as to the center's agreed-on opening date.
461. See U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1995).
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operation of the contract at issue;" it shows that fraudulent misrepre-
sentations were made;463 it indicates that what appeared to be an inte-
grated written agreement was not an integration at all, or at least not
a complete one." The presence of detrimental reliance may influ-
ence the court's decision to accept one of these doctrinal justifications
for the admission of parol evidence. But nothing in the rules requires
that such reliance be identified by the court as a contributing cause of
that decision, so if reliance is indeed protected, it is tacitly and per-
haps incidentally.
It also may be protected by the Lord Nelson, turn-a-blind-eye
method.465 Some commentators have noted that often a relied-on oral
understanding appears to have been enforced without any discussion
of the parol evidence rule, even though the parties had apparently
adopted a written agreement which might well have qualified for pro-
tection under that rule." This seeming tendency to overlook the pos-
sible application of the parol evidence rule67 suggests that it may be
weaker in practice than it appears to be in the hornbooks.4"
But those are only partial explanations at best, and they may also
be partially rationalizations. The fact remains that although promis-
sory estoppel has been seen by many as potentially strong enough to
overcome the parol evidence rule, the decisions generally do not bear
that out, at least not yet. Why not? As various attempts to explain
the rise of promissory estoppel have demonstrated, it is very hard to
identify with certainty the causes of such a legal event.469 And just as
"proving a negative" is usually thought to be a more onerous burden
of proof, identifying the causes of a non-event seems a particularly
daunting task. All I can do is offer some suggestions of the factors
462. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 217.
463. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 7.4, at 483 (arguing for broad rather than nar-
row view of fraud exception to parol evidence rule).
464. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 214(a), (b).
465. The reference is to Lord Nelson's action at the Battle of Copenhagen, ignoring a
signal to disengage (with victory as the ultimate result) on the excuse that, having only one
good eye, he had not seen it. As Professor Scott Burnham has reminded me, Professor
Corbin used this analogy in discussing various judicial responses to standardized forms.
See 1 CORBIN, supra note 453, at § 128.
466. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 104, at 475 n.158.
467. This phenomenon is observable in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Gibson, supra
note 140, at 704-06, describing courts' indifference to Article 2 when deciding Drennan-
type cases on promissory estoppel basis.
468. Of course, in some of those cases the issue may have been raised and dealt with
below; in others, there may simply have been a failure of lawyering-nice for the other
side in that case, but not something later litigants can count on.
469. Feinman, supra note 178, at 1374; Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and
the Evolution of Contract Law, supra note 139.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
that seem to me most probably at work here.
One of those is simply the spirit of the times. When we survivors
of the last decade think back over "the Eighties," we are apt to re-
member boom times on Wall Street, corporate mergers and hostile
takeovers, the resurgence of political and religious conservatism, the
collapse of international communism and the corresponding turn to-
ward free-market capitalism, and the decline of welfare-state liberal-
ism. Without wishing in the slightest to caricature either proponents
or opponents of one legal doctrine or another, it seems fair to suggest
that the tenor of those recent times was much more hospitable to rug-
ged individualism and pursuit of economic self-interest than to visions
of communitarian interdependence and mutual trust. In the commer-
cial law area, many courts in the Eighties and early Nineties have
seemed disposed to revert to a highly formalistic vision of contract
law, more typical of the classical, early twentieth century era than of
the more recent, modern period.47 As one of the "formalist" contract
doctrines, the parol evidence rule would naturally be a beneficiary of
this judicial trend. Conversely, with the tide of modern contract law
apparently ebbing, it seems no particular reflection on promissory es-
toppel to suggest that its boat may have been lowered along with
many others.
As the preceding comment suggests, it is possible to view promis-
sory estoppel and the parol evidence rule-and probably many other
contract doctrines as well-in political terms. Not just political in the
Republicans-versus-Democrats sense,47' but political in terms of the
values those rules may serve. Despite the apparent neutrality with
which contract rules are stated and ostensibly applied, study of court
opinions over time strongly suggests that contract decision-making
frequently involves a tug-of-war between conflicting values or goals-
between abstract law and particularized equity, between an elitist and
a populist view of law and the legal system, between at least a pro-
fessed neutrality and a more-or-less conscious balancing of interests,
between individualism and communitarianism, between amorality
and morality.'=
470. See generally Mooney, supra note 58, at 1133.
471. Although maybe in that sense, too. See infra note 497.
472. For many commentators of the present day, the dominant goal of contract law
seems to be efficiency. Because efficiency appears to mean (or to symbolize) so many dif-
ferent things to different people, it's hard to know how its counter-value should be de-
nominated. Obviously efficiency could be seen as opposed by inefficiency, but presumably
few would regard that as an end in itself. (Maybe I underestimate the size of what would
presumably be the Luddite constituency?) The text suggests that individualism can be
seen as opposed to communitarianism (or perhaps altruism); most economic analysis ap-
pears to assume a free market of rational actors motivated by their individual self-interest,
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These various values do not always sort themselves out in the
same pattern, and in differing cases may pull in different ways. Like
other commentators before me, however, I see a tendency for them to
coalesce in two opposing clusters. One of those clusters is highly con-
gruent with what we have called "classical" contract law; the other is
more likely to be reflected in contract law of the "modern" period.
And while the parol evidence rule has survived in one form or an-
other through both of these periods and up to the present day, it ex-
hibits strongly the characteristic features of classical contract law,
stressing as it does the dominance of writing over all other forms of
expression, of the drafter over all other actors, and thus-inferentially
at least-of the lawyer over the non-lawyer, and of the counseled
over the non-counseled.
In light of the parol evidence rule's position at the extreme clas-
sical end of the contract law spectrum, it is not surprising that many
commentators have had extreme views of its merits and demerits.
Some have been strongly dismissive, professing to see no demon-
strated efficacy in the rule. 3 Others have been equally vehement in
their support. Professor Scott J. Burnham has recently described
the chasm between these two world-views:
In one view of the world, things should function tidily. People
should think before they act, seek advice when out of their depth,
know what they are getting into, read all documents, and write down
all their agreements. If they do not, the law will see that they suffer
the consequences. People may be hurt, but they-and others who
learn of their misfortune-will profit from the experience, and the
world will become tidier. The drawback of this approach is that it
so maybe that dichotomy addresses the law-and-economics orientation. Cf. Duncan Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1722-24
(1976), describing and contrasting individualism and altruism. As the text above may sug-
gest, Professor Kennedy's article has had a strong, if gradual, influence on my thinking
about contract law and the role of law in society.
473. See, e.g., the "well-known judicial tirade" (the phrase is Professor Farnsworth's)
against the parol evidence rule, delivered by Judge Jerome Frank in Zell v. American
Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 647-50 (2d Cir. 1943). Writing again in 1949, Judge Frank stuck
to his guns, despite efforts by "[m]y good friend Professor Karl Llewellyn," to persuade
him of the social utility to be found in the fact that "carefully prepared, lawyer-made
documents" will frequently "forestall litigation." JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 30-
31 (Atheneum ed. 1963) (1949). Perhaps "skilled legal paper-work" does have that effect,
Judge Frank responded, but it "should be kept in mind" that "economically powerful cor-
porations" that employ "exceptionally competent trial lawyers" will often prevail because
less powerful adversaries are "unable to finance litigation with those giants," or are fearful
of retaliation in various forms. Id.
474. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (1988)
(opinion by Judge Kozinski excoriating California courts for apparently loosening parol
evidence rule); Olivia W. Karlin & Louis W. Karlin, The California Parol Evidence Rule.
21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1361 (1992).
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fails to recognize the human side of the law, the need for fairness. If
we expect formality every time, there is no humanity.
In the other view of the world, people screw up. They grope their
way through a complex and demanding world, doing the best they
can, which is often not good enough, and they fall into traps. When
they do so, the law will examine the route they followed and the na-
ture of the particular trap. If the particular story is compelling
enough, they will be rescued. Whether others will also be rescued
cannot be predicted-it is a function of how compelling their story is.
The drawback of this approach is that it fails to recognize the stable
side of the law, the need for predictability. If we look to context
every time, there is no rule of law.475
One way to bridge the chasm, or at least live more comfortably
next to it, is to bifurcate the contracting universe by splitting off "con-
sumer contracts." 'Since the typical merger clause will be a "boiler-
plate" provision that no consumer is going to even look at, much less
comprehend, it has been suggested that the parol evidence rule
should apply only weakly if at all where consumers are concerned.476
As regards contracts between consumers and merchants, we have
been aware at least since the days of Llewellyn, Kessler and many
others that standardized forms are likely to be employed. Those
forms are not likely to be either read or understood by consumers,
and a merchant should not as a matter of policy be allowed to impose
completely its untrammeled will on the consumer, merely because the
writing reflects the merchant's version of what it wants their contract
to provide.47 Various doctrines have been employed to protect con-
sumers in this situation, such as the notion of unconscionability47s and
the "reasonable expectations" doctrine." In light of these other de-
475. Burnham, supra note 457, at 141-42. Gilbert & Sullivan mavens will understand
why Professor Burnham prefaces this passage with a quotation from Private Willis's song
from Act 2 of "Iolanthe," declaring from the perspective of Victorian England
- that every boy and every gal,
That's born into this world alive,
Is either a little Liberal,
Or else a little Conservative!
Id. at 141. Or, as someone else has observed, the whole world is divided into two groups:
Those who think the world is divided into two groups, and those who think it isn't.
476. See supra note 453 (regarding the prospective revision of U.C.C. section 2-202 to
except consumer contracts from the application of the Code's parol evidence rule).
477. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about
Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971);
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174 (1983).
478. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 208. The seminal
consumer-unconscionability discussion is of course Judge J. Skelly Wright's opinion in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
479. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986) (en banc).
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velopments, it may indeed resolve part of the tension in this area if
the parol evidence rule is seen as having little force where consumer
contracts are at issue.
But here as elsewhere choices can have consequences that may
not have been intended. If contract law moves toward a parol evi-
dence rule not applicable to consumer contracts, "8 this will relieve the
pressure of formalism in such cases, but perhaps increase it else-
where.4 8 1 The world of commercial contracts is vast indeed, and con-
tractors range from the vastest and most powerful of international
conglomerates to the humblest of enterprises-and indeed to the
least powerful of individuals, since employees when contracting with
their employers are not typically considered to be "consumers."
Once a transaction is characterized as falling outside the consumer
area, should the parol evidence rule permit-indeed, require-that a
formal written agreement (particularly one with a strong merger
clause) be absolutely enforced, no matter what?
Like most legal rules, the parol evidence rule, as it has developed
until now, can be explained and justified in a variety of ways. If the
parol evidence rule and the principle of promissory estoppel are
viewed respectively as the embodiment of "classical" and "modern"
contract law, the two doctrines can be seen as another Gilmorean
"matter/anti-matter" pair. In the end, one must swallow up the
other.82 I suggest, however, that the parol evidence rule can also be
usefully understood as being, like promissory estoppel, one of the
methods that contract law has developed for the protection of rea-
sonable reliance. So viewed, the two are not necessarily antithetical
in their goals; they may be complementary. They will sometimes con-
flict, however, making it necessary in such cases to determine which
form of reliance protection should have priority.
In the ideal case for application of the parol evidence rule, two
contracting parties jointly negotiate an agreement for the future ex-
change of performances. They then-possibly, although not neces-
sarily, with the assistance of attorneys on each side-reduce that
480. The phrase "consumer contract" is used here with its conventional meaning of a
contract between a merchant and consumer, with all that implies in the way of imbalance
of expertise and bargaining power, the use of standardized forms, and the absence of real
bargaining over terms. On the other hand, two non-merchants acting in their individual
capacities could easily enter into a written agreement apparently intended as an integra-
tion; the parol evidence rule might appear to be as relevant there as it is to the ordinary
commercial contract between merchants.
481. See supra note 453 (discussing a recent attempt to revise the parol evidence rule
in U.C.C. Article 2 to make merger clauses in non-consumer contracts conclusive on the
issue of complete integration).
482. See the quotation from Gilmore, supra text accompanying note 34.
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agreement to writing, a writing that describes in detail the perform-
ance each is to render, including a specification of any conditions or
excusing events, and perhaps also describing some of the conse-
quences of nonperformance or defective performance on either side.
Both of the parties adopt that writing (by "signing" it in some fash-
ion) as the definitive expression of their agreement. Among its
provisions, the writing expressly states, in language that both parties
have read, understood and knowingly agreed to, that the writing is in-
tended by both of them to be the complete and final statement of
their agreement.
But suppose now that one party thereafter claims, falsely, that
she is entitled to some greater or different performance than the
writing calls for, because there was an additional agreement to that
effect, an agreement not reflected in the writing. Her assertion of this
claim is a double breach of trust on her part. It deprives the other
party of a primary benefit he expected to receive, her performance as
originally promised in their agreement; it also deprives him of a sub-
sidiary benefit, on the expectation of which he had also relied-his
expectation that she would not challenge the writing as the authorita-
tive source and definition of both parties' obligations. If the resulting
dispute were to end up in court, we would not be surprised to hear
the judge in stern, even indignant, language embrace the proposition
that the parol evidence rule exists to protect contracting parties from
precisely this form of breach of trust. Having so analyzed the case,
the judge might then summarily apply the parol evidence rule to re-
lieve the proponent of the writing from having to respond to the
other's allegations in a trial on the merits.
The preceding case appears to be a strong one for application of
the parol evidence rule, although with more facts it might appear that
one of that rule's many exceptions could apply.s But it also presents
a strong case for the application of the principle of reliance protec-
tion: The opponent of the extrinsic evidence can justifiably argue that
by entering into the contract and commencing his performance on the
strength of the other party's professed adherence to the written
agreement, he has reasonably, foreseeably, and detrimentally relied
483. If the parties are literate individuals, they will just hand-sign or initial the writing;
a party that is a corporation or other legal entity can of course only "sign" through the acts
of its authorized agents.
484. Thus, the asserted extrinsic agreement might fit within the "oral condition prece-
dent" exception; it might be alleged in such a manner as to come under the heading of
"fraud;" it might assert an agreement on matters sufficiently distinct from the primary
thrust of the agreement-as-written to qualify as a "collateral agreement" that would not
necessarily have been included in the writing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 214(d),
216(2), 217.
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on her manifested intention to abide by the terms of that writing, and
only those terms. The strength of the reliance case will of course vary
with the degree of performance or other reliance that has in fact
taken place. Frequently, however, the assertion of an extrinsic
agreement does not occur until performance on both sides is well un-
derway.
If the preceding represents a strong case for the application of
the parol evidence rule, what might a weak case look like? Address-
ing one by one the factors that make the preceding case so compel-
ling, we might fashion a worse-case scenario out of the following ma-
terials: 1) the asserted oral agreement is not a fabrication, but was
actually made; 2) the written agreement-including a strong, "legal-
ese"-style merger clause-was not specifically created for the par-
ticular transaction, but is largely "boilerplate" language used repeat-
edly by its proponent; 3) the proponent of the writing was
represented by an attorney, at least in its drafting, and the other party
was not; 4) the party attempting to assert the oral agreement possibly
did not read all of the writing, and in any event would not have un-
derstood the import of the merger clause if she had read it; 5) the
writing does not reflect the oral agreement, but does not specifically
negate it either; 6) the party denying the existence of the oral agree-
ment may or may not from the start have intended to repudiate it, but
in any event he was well aware that the other party honestly and rea-
sonably believed him to be committed to that oral agreement, not-
withstanding the parties' signing of the written agreement.
I have declared this to be a weak case for the application of the
parol evidence rule. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the
parol evidence rule would not also apply here. Of course, this case
might fall within one of the exceptions to the rule; however, that was
equally true of the case previously discussed, the supposedly "strong"
case.411 In terms of the parol evidence rule and its customary limita-
tions and exceptions, if this is indeed a weaker case for the parol evi-
dence rule, that weakness lies in the area of "intention to integrate."
The parties in the previous case were said to have truly intended the
writing to be the only source of their obligations to each other; in the
instant case, the non-drafting party did not have that intention. But
how can we-how could a court-know that? Not from the language
of the agreement itself, which speaks as strongly in favor of integra-
tion as did the previous example. Only from knowing the surround-
ing circumstances can we know whether the writing was truly in-
tended by both parties to exclude this oral agreement.
This is the paradox of the intention-based parol evidence rule,
485. See id.
1318 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
and of course it is also the end run around the rule that Professor
Corbin saw and systematized in his treatise." You can't justify ap-
plying the parol evidence rule, he asserted, unless you know the
writing was intended by both parties to have such legal insulation
from challenge or even supplementation. You can't know whether
they had such an intent unless you hear the parties' stories and decide
which one you believe. And, of course, he was right. Even the use of
a merger clause cannot by itself compel the application of a strong ex-
clusionary parol evidence rule; it is one of many factors, including the
nature of the parties, the presence or absence of counsel, and their
bargaining situation. To accept Corbin's view of the parol evidence
rule is necessarily to sacrifice at least to some extent the complete in-
sulation from dispute that the strongest proponents of the-contract-
as-written would favor.8 If the evidence on the issue of intention in-
cludes credible proof that the oral agreement was actually made
(which might include a showing of the proponent's reliance on that
agreement, as corroborative of its genuineness)', then the court may
find that the writing is not a complete and final integration of the par-
ties' agreement after all, and permit the oral agreement to be proven
and enforced.
A variety of case-types can be imagined in which the parol evi-
dence rule might be invoked by one of the parties to a written agree-
ment. Some of these are like the case just proposed, in which one
party has agreed to the other's writing, not foreseeing that an explicit
oral agreement between them could be negated by its omission from
that writing. As we have suggested, the issue of integration might be
resolved against the proponent of the writing, permitting receipt of
the extrinsic evidence. Other cases involve genuine misunderstand-
ings over the meaning of an agreement. In such cases, the extrinsic
evidence has a good chance of being admitted as merely explanatory
486. In 3 CORBIN, supra note 453, at § 582, Corbin argues that the issue of intent to
integrate must be resolved before the parol evidence rule can be applied to exclude evi-
dence, and that extrinsic evidence on the issue of integration is always relevant and admis-
sible for the purpose of resolving that issue. Although Professor Corbin attempts to be
judiciously even-handed in his discussion, his feelings about the rule (or at least the way it
is often applied) would be obvious even if he did not at one point flatly assert, "It would
have been far better had no such rule ever been stated." Id. at 455.
487. The rule in this weaker form is far from a non-rule, however. It may still prevent
any such evidence from getting to a jury, and in many cases may thus preclude a jury trial
at all, if no other triable claims remain. But it will not obviate the need for presentation of
at least pleadings and possibly deposition testimony, supplementary affidavits and sup-
porting papers to a judge.
488. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 139(c), declaring that in considering whether to
allow reliance to trump the statute of frauds, a court may consider among other things
whether the asserted reliance corroborates the making of the asserted promise.
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of the writing, particularly if the writing itself appears unclear or am-
biguous regarding the matters dealt with in that oral agreement.489
But the hardest cases of all involve a head-on collision between
two strong but ultimately irreconcilable claims of reliance. Like most
head-on collisions, these cases often involve serious injury-even
death, of a sort. Many such cases can be found in the reports; I will
use as my example one that has recently been the subject of some
comment from others, in order to supplement their observations with
some of my own. In Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., con-
tractor Sherrodd (a family-owned construction firm) sought recovery
for work done at the request of defendant COP Construction (which
was in turn a subcontractor to defendant Morrison-Knudsen).4"
Plaintiff alleged that it had originally bid to perform excavation work
for COP for a lump sum of $97,500, based on a representation from
an M-K agent that the job involved 25,000 cubic yards of removal.
Plaintiff's bid to COP on that basis was accepted, as was COP's bid to
M-K (which included plaintiff's bid to it). Plaintiff began work before
written contracts were signed, and in the course of performance dis-
covered that the amount of earth to be removed was far more than it
had been told. After that discovery, plaintiff was asked by COP to
sign a written contract providing that it would be paid the originally
bid lump sum of $97,500 for all its work. Plaintiff did so, despite the
disparity between that figure and the amount to which it believed it-
self entitled, allegedly because a COP officer threatened to withhold
payment for work already done, and in reliance on his promise that a
deal would be worked out for payment based on the amount of work
actually done, rather than the originally estimated amount. After the
agreement had been signed and the work performed, plaintiff further
alleged, the defendant refused to honor its agreement, invoking the
written agreement as a bar. Far underpaid for the work it had done,
plaintiff ultimately lost its bonding capacity and its ability to bid, and
had to discontinue business-essentially, it died. Defendants denied
plaintiff's allegations, but also moved for summary judgment, which
was granted by the court on the basis of the parol evidence rule. On
489. Problems here may arise if the court insists that an ambiguity be apparent from
the face of the writing itself, rather than manifesting itself only in the light of extrinsic evi-
dence. See, e.g., Hershon v. Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 864 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Here, of course, the U.C.C./Restatement view favors consideration of all types of evidence
for the purpose of interpretation, evidence of express terms as well as of course of per-
formance, course of dealing or usage of trade. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 214.
490. 815 P.2d 1135 (Mont. 1991). Commentary on this case includes extended exami-
nation in Burnham, supra note 457 and a shorter discussion in Mooney, supra note 58, at
1156-57.
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appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, by a
five-two vote.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Turnage held that sum-
mary judgment was proper because even though a defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment ordinarily admits the facts pleaded by the
plaintiff, the parol evidence rule in this case would not permit a
showing of any of the oral misrepresentations or promises allegedly
made to the plaintiff before the signing of the written contract. Plain-
tiff had attempted to invoke the fraud exception to the parol evidence
rule, but this argument was rejected as not applicable where the al-
leged fraud relates directly to, and contradicts, the terms of the writ-
ten agreement.49' Ultimately, the Chief Justice concluded, the con-
trolling principle is commercial stability:
The parol evidence rule is the public policy of Montana .... If this
public policy and rule is not upheld, contracting parties that include
lawful provisions in written contracts would be under a cloud of un-
certainty as to whether or not their written contracts may be relied
upon. The public policy and law does not permit such uncertainty
to occur.492
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Trieweiler began by assert-
ing that a motion for summary judgment requires the court to assume
the truth of facts pleaded. And those facts, he declared, "offend any
reasonable sense of fairness. ', 41 If plaintiff's officer William Sherrodd
is telling the truth, he was repeatedly assured that plaintiff would be
paid on the actual amount of work done, and was told that if Sher-
rodd did not sign the agreement as presented it would be denied the
progress payment to which it was then entitled. Bending to that pres-
sure, Sherrodd did sign, only to be met later by defendant's refusal to
honor that promise, with the end result being financial catastrophe
for Sherrodd's business. Castigating the majority for its reliance on
stale precedents and its indifference to "terrible injustice," 4 4 Justice
Trieweiler responded directly to the majority's invocation of com-
mercial stability and contractor reliance as justification for its action:
The majority expresses concern that but for this decision general
contractors would not be able to rely on written agreements with
their subcontractors. However, general contractors who induce
subcontractors to enter into a written agreement by fraudulent rep-
resentations should find no security in the piece of paper which re-
491. Plaintiff's attempts to invoke the covenant of good faith and fair dealing met a
similar fate; such a claim could only be based, the court held, on a violation of the express
terms of the written contract. See Sherrod, 815 P.2d at 1137.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 1138.
494. Id at 1139.
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suited from their culpable conduct. Furthermore, a justice system
worth its salt should have equal compassion for Montana's many
subcontractors who, while operating without the benefit of legal
advice, sign whatever is necessary in order to keep their operations
afloat and their crews at work.*
5
A jury trial to determine the merits of the plaintiff's claim, Jus-
tice Trieweiler concluded, "is really all the protection that Montana's
general contractors need.,
496
As suggested above, Sherrodd seems to me a hard case, perhaps
the hardest kind of case that could be imagined for testing the
strength of the parol evidence rule. Maybe hard cases do make bad
law, as frequently suggested. In any event, they clearly make good
Rorschach tests. Just as with those suggestive inkblots, what you see
in Sherrodd depends not only on what's there, but on what you bring
to it. Chief Justice Turnage, one surmises, sees a business community
beset with far-fetched and phony claims, brought by shyster lawyers
with the hope of getting to gullible jurors easily persuaded to dip into
someone else's pocket by a hard-luck story based more on emotion
than on fact. Justice Trieweiler, on the other hand, may see a busi-
ness community in which honest but vulnerable individuals are lied
to, bullied and ultimately cheated by powerful companies, aided by a
court system that abdicates its role as the compassionate protector of
its citizenry to become the tool of the well-heeled and well-
counseled.4, Professor Scott J. Burnham sees a situation calling out
for both intelligence and empathy on the part of the courts, and for
the creative practice of preventive law by attorneys.498 Professor
Ralph James Mooney sees another example of what he calls a "new
conceptualism" in contract law, a development which he regards as
having "apparent... class-justice implications. ',4 99
And what do I see? Based on all that has gone before, it may
come as no surprise that what I see is an opportunity-an opportunity
for us to rethink the limits of the parol evidence rule, and the role
that reliance plays in human affairs. Each party has a reliance story
to tell, and each story-if true-is compelling. If Sherrodd is telling
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Professor Burnham informs me that Chief Justice Turnage before his elevation to
the Montana Supreme Court was Republican majority leader in the state senate, and that
Justice Trieweiler was at one point president of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, a
group frequently supportive of Democratic issues and candidates. This seems to both of
us to underscore the possible political implications of the world view that judges inevitably
bring to cases like these.
498. Burnham, supra note 457, at 139-43.
499. Mooney, supra note 58, at 1157.
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the truth, he5" has at least been misled, possibly been consciously lied
to, and in any event been bullied and ultimately betrayed by the de-
fendant's agents. In reliance on their assurances, he has completed
his performance while at the same time binding himself to the very
written document that may prevent him from recovering the full
payment that he was promised, which he has honestly earned. To
deny him his claim in these circumstances is clearly an injustice.
But what if Sherrodd's story is a lie? Then COP is being asked to
pay more than Sherrodd had agreed to accept for his services, even
though COP has bound itself in turn to Morrison-Knudsen, relying on
Sherrodd's willingness to render his performance at the originally
agreed upon figure. And all this in the teeth of Sherrodd's signing of
a written contract that expressly binds him to the agreement he now
repudiates. If these are indeed the true facts, then surely to allow
Sherrodd his claim would also be an injustice. How should this di-
lemma be resolved?
In some versions of the parol evidence rule, the court will at least
receive and evaluate evidence bearing on the parties' intention to
truly embody their agreement in the written document. Suppose that
procedure had been followed in the Sherrodd case, and the judge had
received Sherrodd's evidence on the issue of integration, evidence
which presumably would include his own testimony (and perhaps that
of others) that in this case it was not the parties' intent to memorialize
their entire agreement, that both parties understood the real agree-
ment was different, and that signing the writing was just something
that apparently had to be done right away for some bureaucratic rea-
son. But suppose further that the judge had then determined that the
writing was indeed intended by both parties as their full and complete
agreement (and thus, inferentially, that there was no extrinsic agree-
ment as the plaintiff contended). If the trial judge, acting as a duly-
empowered trier of fact on this issue of intent, receives evidence from
both sides and then honestly decides against Sherrodd because his
story is not credible, then Sherrodd will lose, and he should. This is
so even if he was telling the truth. Without the benefit of omniscience,
a trier of fact (whether jury or judge) can only do its best. Even if the
outcome is factually wrong, it may nevertheless be proper, if the sys-
tem has functioned in the way it's supposed to, as best it can.
Depending on our opinions about the relative merits of trial by
judge or by jury, we might be more or less content with that mode of
500. At this point I am adopting the practice of the dissenting opinion in treating Sher-
rodd, Inc., as being, essentially, its officer and owner William Sherrodd. For all we know,
COP is a small, family-owned enterprise, too, but that doesn't come through in the opin-
ions.
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resolving the Sherrodd case, but at least the plaintiff would have had
a chance to persuade the court of the truth of his story. So adminis-
tered, the parol evidence rule imposes a cumbersome requirement
that any challenge to a written contract must clear a double hurdle,
first the judge and then the jury-but at least the track is laid out, and
the hurdles can be jumped.
But that describes a relatively liberal, Corbinian view of the pa-
rol evidence rule. The harsher version of the rule, which Sherrodd
may in fact exemplify,"1 takes a different tack, elevating the parol
evidence rule from a set of hurdles to an insurmountable obstacle.
This stronger rule seems to reflect two complementary but distinct
judicial attitudes. One is that the proponent of the oral agreement
cannot possibly be allowed to prevail, because no reasonable person
would behave like that-making an oral agreement and then signing a
document negating it. Such a story is just not plausible. The other at-
titude is that the plaintiff cannot possibly be allowed to prevail, be-
cause no reasonable person would behave like that. Maybe the plain-
tiff did in fact sign the agreement believing that he had an oral
agreement otherwise, but if he did, that was not a reasonable act-or
at least he couldn't reasonably expect the other party to keep its
word, once he had.
The first of these two attitudes is simply a narrow and remarka-
bly naive view of human behavior. Surely all of us have signed some-
thing we knew full well to be intended as a "contract," without read-
ing it, because we trusted the person presenting it for our signature.
We may even have been aware that the document contained language
which seemed to negate promises we had received, but signed it any-
way, based on the other party's assurance that nevertheless, those
promises would be kept. "Oh, you don't have to worry about that,"
we may have been told, "You and I have our own understanding on
that point;" "You can rely on our word on that;" "We've never used
that clause against anyone who's doing a good job for us." And fi-
nally, and ironically, what is probably presented as the clincher:
"That's just something the lawyers make us put in."
For a judge to say he literally cannot believe that people behave
this way is like Captain Renault's profession of shock, shock at the
discovery of gambling in Rick's casino; it's just, well, not credible.
What the judge is really saying, we cannot help but suspect, is that al-
though people in fact do behave that way, the judge does not believe
that they reasonably should-that such behavior must be, per se, un-
501. There is no suggestion in the majority opinion in Sherrodd that the trial judge
held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of integration before granting summary judgment
to the defendant.
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reasonable, and therefore out of reach of the legal system's protec-
tion. Under this view, whether the oral agreement was really made is
not decisive, or even particularly important. What matters is that
trusting in someone's oral promise is simply not reasonable behavior
if you know (or, maybe, should know) that the writing you signed
does not reflect that oral promise.
Here, ultimately, is where the roads of reliance diverge, and, like
Robert Frost's traveler, we have to choose. In his opinion in Sher-
rodd, Chief Justice Turnage talks of reliance on "written contracts."
In section 90, the Restatements also talk of reliance, in this case reli-
ance on a "promise." To some extent, there is overlap here-a writ-
ten contract is, after all, essentially just a collection of promises, and
relied-on promises are frequently made in writing. But the difference
between the tough, Turnage-type parol evidence rule and the Re-
statement's vision of promissory estoppel is not mere lack of congru-
ence; as Professor Burnham has suggested, there's a fundamental dif-
ference in world-views." This difference can be framed in many
ways. Proponents of a strong parol evidence rule may see it simply as
the difference between tidiness and sloppiness, or as the difference
between prudence and heedlessness, and those factors surely play a
part. But at the most basic level, it's the difference between a world
that runs on paper, and a world that runs on face-to-face communica-
tion-between a world that says "I don't believe it unless I see it in
writing, and I won't do it unless a writing tells me to," and a world
that says, "If you assure me this is so, I will take you at your word,
and rely on that, as you well know."
Each one of us lives, simultaneously, in both of those worlds. We
have no choice in the matter. If the parol evidence rule forces a court
to envision our world as being one where only paper matters, or-the
slightly weaker version-a world where paper always prevails over
face-to-face communication, then that rule forces the court (along
with the rest of us) to deny something we know to be true. And that
something is simply this: There are situations where it is, truly, more
reasonable to rely on a spoken word of commitment than on a piece
of paper, signed or not. And there should be.
Even assuming you are with me so far, your next logical question
must be: So what? More specifically, what could promissory estoppel
do for this area of contract law that other existing exceptions to the
parol evidence rule don't already do, and probably just as well?
With the possible exception of fraud (to which I will return
shortly below), no existing strand of parol evidence doctrine requires
the court to focus explicitly on the extent to which the proponent of a
502- See supra text accompanying note 475.
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writing actually and reasonably relied on the existence and terms of
that writing, as compared with the extent to which the proponent of
an oral agreement (potentially inconsistent with the writing) actually
and reasonably relied on the existence and terms of that oral agree-
ment. If the parol evidence rule were forced to submit to the disci-
pline of promissory estoppel, as other contract doctrines have com-
monly been made to do, then in a case like Sherrodd it would not be
enough for the majority opinion to refer in some general way to reli-
ance on written contracts. The court would have to address the ques-
tion of whether this defendant truly did reasonably and detrimentally
rely on this written agreement as expressive of the real and only
agreement of its agreement with the plaintiff, or whether conversely
this plaintiff did in fact reasonably and detrimentally rely on the de-
fendant's assurance that this oral agreement was real and reliable, the
writing notwithstanding.
In the course of that examination, the court might also consider
the question-seemingly implicit in Chief Judge Turnage's opinion,
but not stressed-of whether parties other than the defendant had
also relied in substantial ways on this written agreement, and whether
if taking that form of reliance into account as well, more injustice
would result from upholding the oral agreement than would flow
from rejecting it. But again, that's only one side of the coin; in line
with the reference to third parties in Restatement (Second) section
90, the court could also consider whether persons other than the
plaintiff could and did reasonably rely on the asserted oral agree-
ment, so that some injustice to them might result from refusing to en-
force it.
Could the answers to these questions about reliance ever be that
in fact both parties did reasonably, foreseeably and detrimentally
rely-one on the writing, the other on the oral agreement? Yes, they
could. One example: Two parties have a written agreement; they
also have a supplementary oral agreement, but there is a genuine
misunderstanding between them as to its meaning. One party's un-
derstanding of that oral agreement is consistent with their written
agreement; the other party's is not. In such a case, shouldthe writing-
compatible version automatically prevail? My personal answer would
be no, it shouldn't. Here, the court should try to assign responsibility
for the misunderstanding to one party or the other, as it does in other
areas of contract law. 03 But, one could instead adopt a tie-breaking
rule that says that in such cases of genuine misunderstanding, the
writing always wins. Such a rule seems to me problematic; neverthe-




less, it would be an distinct improvement on the Sherrodd ties-aren't-
even-possible approach.
Another kind of double-reliance problem may arise when an
agent with apparent authority to act generally with respect to a trans-
action makes promises or representations that conflict with the writ-
ing. This situation is complicated by the agency factor, but is essen-
tially the same problem as before. One side is relying on the writing
to negate the appearance of authority and thereby avoid such prob-
lems, while the other is relying on the agent's appearance of authority
to make the promises or representations relied on. Whether in this
case both parties can have acted reasonably is an interesting question;
probably they could. What does seem clear (to me) is that given the
tension between writing and speech, it would be wrong to assert that
in such a case the principal is always reasonable, and the other party
can never be.
I suggested earlier that, with the possible exception of fraud,
none of the established limitations on or exceptions to the parol evi-
dence rule addresses directly the question of reliance. The threshold
issue of integration has no stated reliance ingredient; however deter-
mined, it turns on the parties' intention at the time their agreement
was made. Some of the traditional exceptions are essentially attempts
to circumvent the parol evidence rule by undermining the contract it
purportedly embodies. Thus, if there was an "oral condition prece-
dent" to the agreement becoming effective, that may be shown by pa-
rol, not because it doesn't conflict with the writing (it probably does
504. The writing might negate that particular promise or representation, by a contra-
dictory express term; it might also negate generally the agent's authority to make agree-
ments or representations not expressed in the writing, in an effort to stave off just this sort
of challenge to the autonomy of the writing. Nevertheless, as in other cases where speech
and writing conflict, it may in the circumstances have been reasonable for the other party
to rely on what the agent said and did, rather than on the words of the writing. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 166 cmt. e (1958):
e. Although a principal notifies those dealing with the agent that the agent is not
authorized to make particular statements, if the principal believes or has reason
to believe that the agent will make such statements and that these will be relied
upon by persons with whom the agent deals, he is subject to liability if such
statements are made by the agent and relied upon by the third person.... If it is
provided in the contract that the agent is not authorized to make representations
not contained therein, the parol evidence rule may prevent the introduction of
such evidence as part of the contract; but if such statements are made and induce
the contract, the transaction can be rescinded at the election of the third person.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260 and cmts. c and d (1958) (innocent
principal may by contract language insulate itself from liability for agent's misrepresenta-
tion but not from "relatively mild remedy of rescission" for other party, at least until prin-
cipal has changed position in reliance on existence of contract; rule does not offend parol
evidence rule because contract is avoided, not enforced).
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conflict, at least implicitly), but because until the conditioning event
occurs, there is in theory no "contract," and thus nothing for the parol
evidence rule to protect."
The "fraud" exception is a similar stratagem. If the agreement
has been procured by fraud, so runs the traditional argument, then
under established principles it is voidable. If it is voidable, then it's
not truly a "contract" at all, and the parol evidence rule will not pro-
tect it. Voila! One arm of the fraud rule is aimed at "fraud in the fac-
tum," where the signer is deceived about the nature of what she is
signing- is led to believe that it's just a receipt, perhaps, or has a
document switched on her before she signs." But such fraud seems
relatively rare. Much more likely is "fraud in the inducement," oral
misrepresentations of fact or fraudulent promises made by one party
to induce the other party to sign on to the contract. Should evidence
of such fraud be admissible, despite the parol evidence rule? Many
courts will say yes, because "fraud vitiates every contract."' "°7 Others,
like the Montana court in Sherrodd, will say no, not if this is merely a
way to show a representation or promise that otherwise could not be
shown because we're dealing with an integrated writing. To be ad-
missible, that court declares, the fraud must not "relate directly to the
subject of the contract.""
Under the Sherrodd approach, then, assertions of fraud are likely
to run up against the same brick wall that awaits ordinary evidence of
an extrinsic oral agreement. But in more lenient jurisdictions, the
plaintiff may succeed in circumventing the parol evidence rule by
showing either fraudulent misrepresentations or fraudulent prom-
505. That, at least, was the rationale of the leading case for this exception. See Pym v.
Campbell, 119 Eng. Rep. 903 (Q.B. 1856). This exception is commonly stretched beyond
its original theoretical base to permit more general conditions to be shown, conditions
which do not necessarily go to the existence of the contract, but only to a duty of perform-
ance under it. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 3.7(a), (b) (3d ed. 1987); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 16, § 7.4
at 480-81 & nn.6-9. The Restatement (Second) explains this exception not on the basis
stated in the text, but as an application of the "collateral agreement" principle or as an in-
stance of incomplete integration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 217 cmt. b and re-
porter's note to cmt. b.
506. E.g., Park 100 Investors, Inc. v. Kartes, 650 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(personal guaranty agreement signed by individual stockholders would not be enforced
where lessor's agent had represented papers presented for signature as being already-
agreed-to lease binding only on lessee corporation). This type of fraud is the "fraud in the
factum" that will survive negotiation of an instrument to a holder in due course. See
U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1)(iii) cmt. 1, para. 5 (1995).
507. See, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 608 (N.Y. 1959) (Fuld,
J., dissenting (quoting Bridger v. Goldsmith, 38 N.E. 458, 459 (N.Y. 1894)); Coson v.
Roehl, 387 P.2d 541 (Wash. 1963).
508. Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 815 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Mont. 1991).
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ises-i.e., promises made without an intention to perform (this being
another traditional species of "fraud"). In either case, the proponent
of the evidence must show that she reasonably relied on the fraudu-
lent representation or promise. So in this respect, the fraud exception
is truly a reliance-based exception, and an important and useful one.
But it seems to me to be inferior to a frank application of promissory
estoppel, in two respects.
One of these is the conceptual basis of the justification being in-
yoked for admission of the evidence. As indicated, the reason why
evidence of fraud has traditionally been admissible is a technical, in-
deed a "classical" one: Where there is fraud, there is no contract;
where there is no contract, there can be no application of the parol
evidence rule. Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, is not this sort
of doctrinal manipulation, but a simple application of equity princi-
ples: Reasonable reliance on a trust invited should be protected.
Whether or not one accepts the outcome, it is difficult to quarrel with
the Sherrodd court's assertion that the traditional fraud exception is
just an attempt to get into evidence matter that the parol evidence
rule would prohibit. Of course it is; that's just the point. A frank ap-
plication of promissory estoppel would not evade that admission, but
would assert that in a proper case the parol evidence rule should bend
to a stronger and more universal principle: The principle of reliance
protection.
The second advantage that promissory estoppel may hold over
the fraud approach is its more expansive reach. Even in a jurisdiction
more receptive than Montana to the admission of fraud evidence, it
will probably be necessary to show either a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of fact, or a promise made with the intention of breaking it (or at
least with no real intention of performing). The mere making and
breaking of a promise doesn't establish that kind of fraudulent intent;
something more is needed, and that something more may be impossi-
ble to prove. Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, doesn't require
that degree of culpability on the part of the promising party. What it
does require is an apparently serious and reliable promise, on which
the other party actually and foreseeably relies, to her detriment.
Why has fraud remained a well-marked (if narrow) road around
the parol evidence rule, while promissory estoppel has yet to clear a
visible trail? For two reasons, probably. One is simply that classical-
minded courts are happier with the more conceptual justification ad-
vanced for the fraud exception; it fits with their formalistic overall
approach. More broadly, the fraud exception has visceral appeal be-
cause the possibility of active lying on the defendant's part makes the
plaintiff's case more sympathetic. But recall again the facts of Sher-
rodd: Even if we assume generally the truth of the plaintiff's asser-
July/August 1998]
tions, it still may be that the defendant's agents were neither lying nor
consciously making promises they intended to break when they in-
duced Sherrodd to sign onto the written contract. Should that factor
be crucial? Either way, the plaintiff's reliance was just as real, just as
reasonable-and just as catastrophic in its result. If anything, it may
be even more reasonable to rely on the sincerity of someone who in
fact is not consciously lying, than to be hoodwinked by one who is.
More might be said about the parol evidence rule or other par-
ticular contract doctrines as potentially affected by promissory estop-
pel. At this point, however, we should round off our discussion by re-
turning to the broader theme with which we began: The relation
between contract law in general and the principle of reliance protec-
tion.
Conclusion
At the end of every class session, there comes a point when the
pens and notebooks start to click shut-or, in the modern world,
when the laptop lids begin to lower. If the message hasn't already
been delivered, it may be too late, but in any case it's now or never.
Without attempting here to recapitulate all that has gone before-
your lids may be lowering, too-let me leave you with three simple
propositions regarding the place of reliance protection in contract
law.
The first of these is that there is more to reliance protection than
just "promissory estoppel." It has been my experience that when one
first focuses on something previously unknown or unnoticed, one is
often surprised by its omnipresence. Buy a new automobile of a
given make and model, and you are apt to discover that the highways
are suddenly swarming with cars just like yours. Realize that your old
washing machine is probably on its last legs, and you will find that the
newspaper ad inserts are bursting with messages from appliance deal-
ers who would like to sell you a new one. Find yourself facing some
surgical procedure, and your world will be peopled with survivors of
similar surgery, with stories to tell. Like radio waves in the ether,
these things have been there all along; you just haven't been tuned in.
So it is, I suggest, with reliance protection. If you examine the
Restatement (Second) to discover situations where the presence or
absence of reliance may have legal consequences, you will easily iden-
tify not only the seminal section 90," but its second-generation spin-
509. The principle of which is now expressly referred to in comment a to section 90
(but not in the rule itself) as "promissory estoppel." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979).
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offs, such as sections 87(2) (reliance on unaccepted offer), 89(c) (reli-
ance on modification), 139 (reliance overcoming statute of frauds),
and 150 (reliance on oral modification of an agreement subject to a
statute of frauds). But closer inspection reveals those to be only the
tip of an iceberg; in addition to these manifestations of "promissory
estoppel," there are literally dozens of references in the Restatement
(Second) to the possibility that one of the parties will have changed
its position in reliance on some commitment by the other. 1 This fac-
tor of reliance is seen as potentially important or even decisive on a
host of issues, e.g.: imposition of initial obligation on a promise;"' ap-
plication of the rules of offer and acceptance;"2 availability of power
of avoidance;513 availability of relief for fraud or misrepresentation;...
determining existence and materiality of breach;-5 assessment of
remedies. 
516
In short, our common law of contract-at least as reflected in the
Restatement (Second)-repeatedly recognizes and protects the sub-
stantial and detrimental changes of position that can result when one
person reasonably relies on another's manifestations of commitment.
The point, here, is not that each of these various examples of reliance
protection is of particular importance, taken singly; many of them
clearly are not. Taken together, however, they reveal that the hand-
ful of rules we have come to call "promissory estoppel" is not some
aberrational displacement of an otherwise orderly pattern of law, but
an integral part of that pattern-not a hole where the carpet has worn
through, but a recurrent motif, woven into the fabric itself.
And this, I respectfully suggest, is where the "promise theorists"
are doing both promissory estoppel in particular and contract law in
510. A list of Restatement (Second) provisions (more than just illustrative, but proba-
bly short of exhaustive) could include the following sections, all of which have somewhere
either in the statement of the rule or in its commentary an express reference to the fact
that reliance by one party could have a decisive or at least material effect on some issue:
§§ 15, 27, 34, 38, 40, 45, 63, 69, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 129, 130, 139, 150, 153, 158, 164,
167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175, 177, 178, 197, 218, 227, 228, 229, 230, 241, 256, 271, 272,
273,284,311,323,332,344, 349, 351,373, 370,376,378, 381, 382 (1979).
511. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACrS §§ 34(3), 86 cmt. b, 88(c),
89(c), 90 (1979).
512. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS §§ 38 cmt. a, 40 cmt. b, 63
cmt. c, 69 cmt. c, 87(2) (1979).
513. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs §§ 15(2), 153 cmt. d, 164(2),
175(2), 177(3), 178(2)(b), 381(3)(b) (1979).
514. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS §§ 167-172 (1979).
515. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 84(2)(b), 229, 230(3),
241(c), 256,271 (1979).
516. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158(2), 197 cmt. b, 272(2),
344(b), 349,351(3) (1979).
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general a disservice. By insisting that the essential core of contract
was, is now, and ever shall be promise, they either exclude or margi-
nalize the factor of reliance, thereby obscuring the degree to which
the structure of contract law once did, now does and probably always
will reflect and respond to the sight of reliance uncompensated, in-
duced by a trust invited and then violated. Undoubtedly there are
many instances where a contractual obligation exists in the complete
absence of any reliance at all, purely on the strength of a bargain
struck.517 Indeed, if Farber, Matheson and Barnett are right, there
may be more such cases than we thought. But Fuller & Perdue were
also right, sixty years ago, and they still are-a promise relied on and
then broken does present a stronger case for protection than just a
promise broken. Even if the doctrinal bars are generally lowered,
there will surely continue to be a variety of cases where an injury to
the reliance interest will be protected although a pure loss of expecta-
tion would not.51
My penultimate proposition is that while promise-enforcement
may often seem oblivious to the factor of reliance, the converse does
not follow: Reliance-protection can never be oblivious to the factor
of promise-of commitment. Reliance in the air, so to speak, is like
negligence in the air-"[it] will not do."5"9 If one is relying at all-and
certainly if one is reasonably relying-it must be on some commit-
ment, expressed by another. To be sure, the express promise (written
or spoken) may shade imperceptibly into the commitment which is
implicitly made as a result of words and conduct, viewed in the light
of surrounding circumstances, and courts may construct ancillary
promises from the raw material of other promises more explicitly
made. But the heart of promissory estoppel is a promissory commit-
ment reasonably understood to have been expressed by one party,
upon which the other party can and does, reasonably and foreseeably,
rely.
Here is where Gilmore, Macneil and others appear to me in-
517. It should be remembered that even though an obligation exists in theory, in many
cases no remedy will in fact be available unless and until some detrimental change of posi-
tion has occurred, at least in the form of an unfavorable (to the plaintiff) shift in the mar-
ket. Since a promise made as part of a bargained-for exchange generates only a net expec-
tation, its breach may either inflict no injury at all, or else an injury which is reasonably
mitigatable and will thus generate no recovery (whether or not the mitigation actually
takes place).
518. I am referring here to the threshold issue of legal protection or no, not to the re-
lated but clearly distinct question of whether such protection should take the form of a
remedy confined to the compensation of reliance.
519. The allusion is to Judge Cardozo's language in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (quoting POLLACK, TORTS 455 (11th ed.)).
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clined to go too far in the other direction, blurring the line between
commitments which have been voluntarily assumed and those that
are socially imposed. One may concede that the line between the two
is wavering, illogical and marked by needlessly confusing overlaps,
and yet feel that there is a fundamental difference between the two
types of obligations, a difference worth preserving in the structure of
the law.5" While tort law deals with conduct that flouts general no-
tions of proper behavior in society, contract law addresses injuries oc-
casioned by the breaking of commitments voluntarily expressed. So
too does promissory estoppel. Because it does, it rightfully belongs in
the domain of promise-enforcement, which conventionally we call
contract law; it should neither be exiled nor shanghaied across the
border.
My final proposition, like the two before it, concerns the proper
role for reliance protection. But here I am concerned not so much
with the structure of the law as with its effect, seen from the layper-
son's perspective. To the consumers of our legal system, does it really
matter where we pigeon-hole promissory estoppel and the other
forms of reliance protection, so long as we know where they are, and
can find them when we need them?
My answer is that it does matter, and that it may indeed matter a
great deal. Over a century, American contract law appears to have
changed its course. Maybe it truly was hijacked by Gilmore's bucca-
neering band of Holmes, Langdell and Williston. Maybe it just took a
different tack because of a vastly more complicated interplay of per-
sons, events, and social and economic forces. That may not matter
much now, if it ever did. In any event, American contract law has for
much of this century been embarked on a voyage of rediscovery, re-
trieving and reviving doctrines and approaches that were jettisoned to
make room for the first-class passengers of the Gilded Age. Thanks
to the prodigious intellectual and moral efforts of commentators like
Corbin and Llewellyn, and a host of judges both famous and obscure,
the equity side of contract law has been thawed out, nourished, and
gradually nursed back to health. This revival can be seen in many ar-
eas: expansion of the notions of fraud, duress, and undue influence;
emphasis on concepts like unconscionability, good faith and fair
dealing; attention to course of performance and course of dealing as
keys to reasonable expectation; efforts to solve the riddle of stan-
dardized forms. All these represent the equitable half of contract
520. For one classic exposition of this view, refer to Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on
the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975), (re-
viewing Gilmore's Death of Contract and reaffirming the continued strength of contract in
the modem legal system).
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law, reasserting itself. But reasserting itself, it should be understood,
with the aim not of replacing existing contract law, but of comple-
menting it.
And this, finally, is what it all comes down to. For our contract
law system to work properly, it cannot consist only of law, any more
than it could consist only of equity. Equity without law would be tyr-
anny indeed-shapeless, unpredictable, reflecting nothing more than
the judge's personal predilections. But in the contract area, as we
have seen, law without equity can be tyranny, too: Cold and unfor-
giving; rewarding wealth and power with still greater wealth and
power; repaying trust with betrayal; and finally-tritely but truly-
adding insult to injury.521 With the aid of equitable doctrines like prom-
issory estoppel to counter-balance the weight of legal rules, the courts
in this area can continue the never-ending process of tightrope-
walking that is contract decision-making. Without them, we are back
where we were a century ago.
The foregoing may sound like a political argument. It is, and is
meant to be. All law, it has been suggested, is politics, and in our sys-
tem, that is largely true: The act of law making is an inherently politi-
cal process, whether it takes place at the ballot box, in the halls of ex-
ecutive power, or in the legislative arena. Do the foregoing
observations apply also to the courts? Of course they do. Since the
521. See, e.g., Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 815 P.2d 1135 (Mont. 1991);
supra text accompanying notes 490-501. Another excellent example is Wior v. Anchor In-
dustries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 1996). In this case, the Indiana Supreme Court re-
versed a three-two decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals, which had held (reversing a
trial court grant of summary judgment for defendant) that plaintiff Wior should be permit-
ted to go to trial on his action for wrongful discharge, despite the absence of a written em-
ployment contract. See Wior v. Anchor Industries, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (1994). The
plaintiff asserted that in accepting what would otherwise have been an employment at will
as a plant supervisor of one of defendant's manufacturing plants, he had asked for and re-
ceived from defendant an assurance that his employment would be for "a position of per-
manence" (until retirement in "20 plus years"), without which assurance he would not
have been willing to discontinue his consulting business and move his family from Indian-
apolis to Evansville. Although the Court of Appeals treated the plaintiff's alleged em-
ployment agreement as essentially one for lifetime employment, so that the statute of
frauds one-year clause would not apply (applying a traditional narrow view of the statute
on this point), the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff's alleged employment
agreement was in reality for a twenty-year term, and thus within the statute of frauds.
Moreover, it held that plaintiff had not furnished sufficient "independent consideration"
for the asserted promise of permanent employment. Perhaps plaintiff did have "unique
skills," the Supreme Court conceded, but plaintiff's business "had not yet reached its po-
tential," and "was earning relatively little money." 669 N.E.2d at 177-178. In other words,
if plaintiff didn't really need the job with defendant, he could protect himself by a contract
for permanent employment; if he did, however, he couldn't. Catch-22. To quote again
Professor Ralph James Mooney, the "class-justice implications" of such a decision are all
too apparent. See supra note 499, and accompanying text.
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heyday of Karl Llewellyn and his cohorts, we have understood that
courts do not merely administer the law, but create it as well. In some
subject-matter areas, the law-making function has been largely as-
sumed by the legislature, with courts playing only the subsidiary role
of interpreting statutes and regulations. Not so with contract law,
however. In the present-day Nineties just as in the last ones, contract
law remains not only judge-administered, but judge-made. For this
reason, contract, of all areas of law, is the one where judges should be
least open to accusations of improper "activism." Contract law is not
only administered by judges, it was formed by judges, and when ap-
propriate can and should be reformed by judges.
And this is why arguments about contract law are ultimately, and
inescapably, political. Unless and until the legislature exercises its
prerogative of codifying the rules of contract law, those rules must
continue to be molded and shaped by the courts, in the crucible of
case and controversy. As trustees of our law-making power in this
area, courts have the responsibility of balancing the interests of dif-
ferent types of enterprises, of different kinds of individuals, and of all
classes of society. Besides treating the litigants before them in a
fashion that comports both with law and with equity, courts must con-
sider the effect of their decisions on all the rest of us: Buyers as well
as sellers, debtors as well as creditors, and insureds as well as insurers;
small enterprises as well as large; individuals as well as corporations;
the poor as well as the rich. And, despite all the intangible personal
and professional ties that may pull the other way, they must in fash-
ioning their decisions take into account the interests not only of those
who do have effective legal counsel when entering into agreements,
but also of those who do not.
As the Twentieth Century ticks off its last hours, we are told that
our global computer system-upon which virtually all of modem civi-
lization seems to depend-may be thrown into confusion by the arri-
val of the year 2000. Originally (and myopically) instructed to treat
all years as two-digit affairs, our computers may read the year "00" as
"1900," dragging us all willy-nilly back into the past-back, indeed, to
the year 1900, when Langdell, Holmes, and Williston held sway over
the world of contract law. It appears that, given the chance, some
courts and commentators would also make that return trip to the
golden age of classical contract, leaving much of modem contract law
behind, lost in some sort of inaccessible time warp.
Can promissory estoppel be preserved? Can reliance be res-
cued? Can the equitable heart of contract law be protected from the
Paper-Chasing neoconceptualists? The battle is never finally won, of
course, but neither is it ever finally lost. Stay tuned.
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